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Abstract 
This thesis conducts cross-country analyses using data from all inhabited 
continents to examine the support of common expectations based on either Neo-
classical Economics or popular beliefs. The first two chapters use SACMEQ data 
from sub-Saharan Africa.  
The first chapter argues that changes in class size trigger a number of mechanisms 
affecting how the pupils’ household, school leaders, teachers and peers behave. 
These behaviours are highly context-specific and may counterbalance or exacerbate 
one another. It finds that the main threat to a pupil’s achievement is sharing the 
teacher with more peers, but that household behaviours can mitigate or even 
outweigh this threat.  
The second chapter examines the conditional correlation of observable teacher 
characteristics and pupil achievement. It argues and demonstrates that previous 
research using the same data does not sufficiently address the teacher-pupil 
matching problem and that lacking to do so leads to very different conclusions. The 
chapter categorises the available observable teacher characteristics as proxies for 
either subject-matter or pedagogic competency and examines their 
complementarity by adding interactions between the individual proxies of these 
two competencies. The evidence suggests these two competencies are substitutes in 
six of ten countries. 
The third chapter uses OECD TALIS 2013 data to explore the connection between 
teachers’ workload and their job satisfaction. It applies a production function 
approach that combines both Top-down and Bottom-up approaches. It finds that 
the effect of teachers’ workload measured in hours is negligible. But evidence of the 
effect of teachers’ perceptions of their workplace from the English sub-sample 
provides clear evidence that the workplace matters. 
  5 
Table of Contents 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................................................................... 7 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................................................... 8 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................................... 9 
EXPLORING MECHANISMS OF CLASS SIZE EFFECTS ON ACHIEVEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA: THE ROLE OF TEACHERS, PHYSICAL RESOURCES AND HOUSEHOLDS ........................... 17 
1.1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 18 
1.2. THEORY AND LITERATURE ............................................................................................................................... 19 
1.2.1 The household ............................................................................................................................................. 20 
1.2.2 The role of the school leader and teacher ........................................................................... 21 
1.2.3 The peer group............................................................................................................................................ 24 
1.2.4 Geographical variation of household, school leader and teacher 
behaviour ..................................................................................................................................................................... 24 
1.3. THE SACMEQ DATA ........................................................................................................................................... 25 
1.3.1 Context .................................................................................................................................................................... 25 
1.3.2 The data ................................................................................................................................................................. 27 
1.3.3 Descriptive statistics ......................................................................................................................................... 33 
1.4. METHOD ........................................................................................................................................................................... 37 
1.5. FINDINGS .................................................................................................................................................................... 40 
1.5.1 Estimates for each country .............................................................................................................. 40 
1.5.2 Pooled model ................................................................................................................................................ 46 
1.5.3 Summary ......................................................................................................................................................... 48 
1.6. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................... 49 
WHY DO TEACHERS DIFFER IN THEIR QUALITY? PUPIL-FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATES FROM 
TWELVE SUB-SAHARAN COUNTRIES ............................................................................................................ 51 
2.1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 52 
2.2. LITERATURE ........................................................................................................................................... 55 
2.2.1 WHAT DOES PREVIOUS RESEARCH FIND? ............................................................................................ 55 
2.2.2 WHICH METHODS ARE USED? ...................................................................................................................... 57 
2.3. METHOD ..................................................................................................................................................... 60 
2.4. DATA .............................................................................................................................................................. 64 
2.4.1 CONTEXT AND QUALITY OF THE DATA .................................................................................................... 64 
2.4.2 WHICH TEACHERS ARE THE PUPILS FACING? ................................................................................... 68 
2.5. FINDINGS .................................................................................................................................................. 77 
2.5.1 THE ASSOCIATION OF TEACHER OBSERVABLE CHARACTERISTICS: SUBJECT-MATTER 
COMPETENCY ..................................................................................................................................................................... 78 
2.5.2 THE ASSOCIATION OF TEACHER OBSERVABLE CHARACTERISTICS: PEDAGOGIC 
COMPETENCY ..................................................................................................................................................................... 82 
2.5.3 ILLUSTRATING THE SELECTION BIAS ..................................................................................................... 83 
2.5.4 INTERACTIONS OF TEACHERS’ SUBJECT-MATTER AND PEDAGOGIC COMPETENCIES
 .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 86 
2.5.5 SUMMARY................................................................................................................................................................. 89 
2.6. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................... 89 
WHAT IS THE CONNECTION BETWEEN TEACHERS’ WORKLOAD AND THEIR JOB 
SATISFACTION? EVIDENCE FROM 32 SECONDARY EDUCATION SYSTEMS ..................................... 93 
3.1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 94 
3.2. IDENTIFYING SOURCES OF ENDOGENEITY ................................................................... 97 
3.2.1. A PRODUCTION FUNCTION FOR TEACHERS’ JOB SATISFACTION .......................................... 97 
  6 
3.2.2. POTENTIAL SOURCES OF ENDOGENEITY ............................................................................................. 99 
3.3. THE TALIS 2013 DATA ..................................................................................................................... 101 
3.3.1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................ 101 
3.3.2. MEASUREMENT OF HOURS WORKED AND JOB SATISFACTION ............................................ 103 
3.3.3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ......................................................................................................................... 106 
3.3.4. SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................................ 110 
3.4. METHOD ................................................................................................................................................... 110 
3.5. FINDINGS ................................................................................................................................................ 114 
3.5.1. DOES WORKING LONGER REDUCE TEACHERS’ JOB SATISFACTION? ............................... 115 
3.5.2. IS THERE HETEROGENEITY ACROSS DIFFERENT ACTIVITIES? ........................................... 122 
3.5.3. SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................................ 137 
3.6. TALIS ENGLAND 2013 ..................................................................................................................... 139 
3.6.1. THE DATA ............................................................................................................................................................ 139 
3.6.2. CONTROLLING FOR TEACHERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF SCHOOL-LEVEL CONFOUNDERS
 ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 143 
3.6.3. THE ASSOCIATION OF TEACHERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR JOB AND THEIR JOB 
SATISFACTION ................................................................................................................................................................ 145 
3.6.4. SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................................ 147 
3.7. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................................ 148 
CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................................................. 152 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................................ 156 
 
  
  7 
List of Figures 
 
FIGURE I-1: SCHEMA OF THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................................................................... 10 
FIGURE 2.1: PERCENTAGE OF PUPILS TAUGHT BY DIFFERENT TEACHERS IN MATHS AND READING BY YEAR ......... 69 
FIGURE 2.2: PERCENTAGE OF PUPILS WHOSE TEACHER HAS MORE THAN 1 YEAR OF TEACHER TRAINING BY 
SUBJECT ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 70 
FIGURE 2.3: PERCENTAGE OF PUPILS WHOSE TEACHER HAS NO IN-SERVICE TRAINING BY SUBJECT ........................ 71 
FIGURE 2.4: PERCENTAGE OF PUPILS WHOSE TEACHER HOLDS UNIVERSITY ENTRY QUALIFICATIONS OR HIGHER BY 
SUBJECT ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 72 
FIGURE 2.5: MEAN YEARS OF TEACHING EXPERIENCE OF PUPILS’ MATHS AND READING TEACHERS ........................ 73 
FIGURE 2.6: MEAN SUBJECT-MATTER TEST SCORE OF PUPILS’ MATHS AND READING TEACHERS ............................. 74 
FIGURE 2.7: MEAN PUPIL ACHIEVEMENT TEST SCORE IN MATHS AND READING .......................................................... 75 
TABLE 2.2: MEAN DIFFERENCE IN MATHS AND READING ACHIEVEMENT FOR PUPILS WITH THE SAME OR 
DIFFERENT TEACHERS ............................................................................................................................................................. 76 
FIGURE 3.1: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF A ONE HOUR CHANGE - TOTAL WEEKLY WORKLOAD ...................................... 116 
FIGURE 3.2: CORRELATION OF MODEL 1 (BASELINE) AND MODEL 4 (PREFERRED) ESTIMATES – TOTAL WEEKLY 
WORKLOAD ............................................................................................................................................................................ 119 
FIGURE 3.3: CORRELATION OF AVERAGE WORKLOAD AND ESTIMATES FOR THE WORKLOAD JOB-SATISFACTION 
RELATIONSHIP ....................................................................................................................................................................... 120 
TABLE 3.4: STANDARD DEVIATION OF TEACHERS’ WORKLOADS BY COUNTRY .......................................................... 121 
FIGURE 3.4: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF A ONE HOUR CHANGE - FACE-TO-FACE TEACHING WORKLOAD .................... 124 
FIGURE 3.5: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF A ONE HOUR CHANGE - LESSON PLANNING ...................................................... 127 
FIGURE 3.6: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF A ONE HOUR CHANGE - LEADERSHIP ACTIVITIES ............................................ 128 
FIGURE 3.7: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF A ONE HOUR CHANGE - MARKING ...................................................................... 129 
FIGURE 3.8: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF A ONE HOUR CHANGE - ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIVITIES .................................... 130 
FIGURE 3.9: CORRELATION OF BASELINE (M1) AND PREFERRED (M4) ESTIMATES – FACE-TO-FACE TEACHING
 ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 131 
FIGURE 3.10: CORRELATION OF BASELINE (M1) AND PREFERRED (M4) ESTIMATES - MARKING ........................ 132 
FIGURE 3.11: CORRELATION OF BASELINE M1) AND PREFERRED (M4) ESTIMATES – SCHOOL LEADERSHIP 
ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................................................................................................. 132 
FIGURE 3.12: CORRELATION OF BASELINE (M1) AND PREFERRED (M4) ESTIMATES – ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................................................................................................. 133 
FIGURE 3.13: PROPORTIONS OF TEACHERS IN ENGLAND AGREEING WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ......... 142 
FIGURE 3.14: COMPARING MODELS FOR THE WORKLOAD-JOB SATISFACTION RELATIONSHIP IN ENGLAND ....... 145 
FIGURE 3.15: THE ASSOCIATION OF TEACHER PERCEPTIONS AND THEIR JOB SATISFACTION IN ENGLAND.......... 146 
 
  8 
List of Tables 
TABLE 1.3.1: ADJUSTED NET ENROLMENT RATE FOR PRIMARY SCHOOL.................................................................... 26 
TABLE 1.3.2: COMPOSITION OF SAMPLE USED ................................................................................................................... 28 
TABLE 1.3.3: CHANGE OVER TIME (2000 TO 2007) IN KEY VARIABLES ..................................................................... 34 
TABLE 1.5.1A: FINAL MODEL FOR READING ACHIEVEMENT (GROUP 1 COUNTRIES)................................................... 41 
TABLE 1.5.1B: FINAL MODEL FOR READING ACHIEVEMENT (GROUP 2 COUNTRIES) ................................................... 42 
TABLE 1.5.2A: FINAL MODEL FOR MATHS ACHIEVEMENT (GROUP 1 COUNTRIES) ...................................................... 43 
TABLE 1.5.2B: FINAL MODEL FOR MATHS ACHIEVEMENT (GROUP 2 COUNTRIES) ...................................................... 44 
TABLE 1.5.3: POOLED MODEL .............................................................................................................................................. 47 
TABLE 2.1: SAMPLE SIZE OF TEACHERS AND PUPILS ......................................................................................................... 66 
TABLE 2.3: OLS ESTIMATES OF TEACHER OBSERVABLE CHARACTERISTICS AND TEACHER QUALITY (EQUATION (6) 
FOR PUPILS WITH DIFFERENT TEACHERS) ........................................................................................................................... 79 
TABLE 2.4: OLS ESTIMATES OF TEACHER TEST SCORES AND THEIR DIFFERENTIAL TEACHING ABILITY (EQUATION 
(6) FOR PUPILS WITH THE SAME TEACHER)........................................................................................................................ 81 
TABLE 2.5A: WITHIN-SCHOOL ESTIMATES OF TEACHER QUALITY FOR MATHS ............................................................ 83 
TABLE 2.5B: WITHIN-SCHOOL ESTIMATES OF TEACHER QUALITY FOR READING......................................................... 84 
TABLE 2.6: INTERACTION EFFECTS OF TEACHER TEST SCORE WITH PROXIES OF TEACHERS’ PEDAGOGIC 
COMPETENCY (FOR PUPILS WITH DIFFERENT TEACHERS) ................................................................................................ 88 
TABLE 3.2: JOB SATISFACTION OF TEACHERS IN TALIS COUNTRIES .......................................................................... 107 
TABLE 3.3: PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL HOURS WORKED ON SPECIFIC TASKS ................................................................. 109 
TABLE 3.5: SUMMARY TABLE OF SIGNIFICANT ESTIMATES AT 95% CONFIDENCE (M4)........................................ 135 
TABLE 3.6: THE ASSOCIATION OF WORKLOADS AND JOB SATISFACTION (POOLED MODEL).................................... 136 
 
 
  9 
Introduction 
As the title of this thesis suggests, this thesis focuses on teachers. Millions of 
teachers around the world are preparing their country’s next generations for adult 
life and to compete in an increasingly global labour market. At least since 
Hanushek’s seminal “Failure of input-based schooling policies” (2003) in which he 
argues that school policies should favour investment in teachers, it is generally 
accepted among education economists and policy makers that teachers are the 
most important among the school resources. More recent research from the US and 
the UK further substantiates his claim and shows that the total effect of a teacher 
on a pupil’s achievement test score, i.e. a teacher’s total effectiveness, ranges 
between 8 and approximately 20 percent of a standard deviation (cf. Nye et al, 
2004; Rockoff, 2004; Hanushek et al, 2005; Rivkin et al, 2005; Kane et al, 2006; 
Aaronson et al, 2007; Clotfelter et al, 2007; Slater et al, 2011). 
In this thesis I apply a theoretical framework in which a teacher’s effect on a 
pupil’s achievement depends on the teacher’s inputs, for example the teacher’s 
skills, job satisfaction, intrinsic motivation, as well as incentives to extrinsically 
motivate the teacher. Thus, this definition extends typical definitions of teacher 
inputs that tend to be restricted to teachers’ observable characteristics. I assume 
that these inputs cause the heterogeneity of behaviour patterns that pupils face, 
which ultimately affects their achievement (see Figure 1).  
This theoretical framework is inspired by previous research into teacher 
effectiveness by economists as well as psychologists. Economists tend to explore 
teacher effectiveness focusing on teachers’ observable characteristics, such as their 
teaching experience, kind and duration of teacher training, academic qualifications 
or gender and their conditional correlation with pupil achievement test scores. The 
field of educational psychology has a longstanding tradition in researching 
individuals’ motivation. Various definitions of motivation exist, but one of the most 
well-known is by Deci and Ryan (1985), according to which motivation can be 
intrinsic or extrinsic. Applied to teaching, teachers may be intrinsically motivated 
if they teach simply for the joy of teaching. In contrast, examples for extrinsic 
motivation to teach are a teacher’s salary and public recognition. This definition of 
extrinsic motivation is very closely related to the economic notion of an incentive, 
which entails extrinsic motivators that can be manipulated by policy makers. 
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Figure I-1: Schema of theoretical framework 
 
From the field of occupational psychology, this framework lends the notion of job 
satisfaction as an important teacher input. According to Kahneman and Krueger 
(2006) job satisfaction measures the quality of an individual’s perceived experience 
at work. Evidence from across the social sciences demonstrates that job satisfaction 
is important for the efficiency of organisations. For example, job satisfaction is 
negatively associated with burnout (cf. Prosser et al, 1997; Kalliath and Morris, 
2002; Piko, 2006). To psychologists burnout is a symptom characterised by 
individuals feeling overwhelmingly exhausted, detached from their job, cynical and 
ineffective (Maslach et al, 2001). Burnt out individuals are therefore likely to be 
less productive in their jobs, for example due to extended periods of absence, and 
run the risk of incurring social costs in the form of health care expenses (Faragher 
et al, 2005). Fischer and Sousa-Poza (2009) find that job satisfaction predicts both 
subjective and objective measures of health and others find that job satisfaction 
predicts both workers’ intentions to leave their employer and actual turnover rates 
(for example see Hellman, 1997; Lambert et al, 2001; Kalliath and Morris, 2002; 
Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, 2007). Thus it is important to examine how changes in 
a teacher’s working environment affect variation in his or her job satisfaction in 
order to maximise teacher’s productivity and thereby the efficiency of the education 
system. 
Pupil 
Achieve-
ment
Teacher 
behaviour in 
classroom
(e.g. resource usage)
Teacher inputs
(e.g. skills, motivation, 
incentives, job 
satisfaction)
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The third chapter of this thesis therefore investigates the production of teachers’ 
job satisfaction and focuses on the conditional correlation of teachers’ weekly 
workload and their job satisfaction. The first two chapters use this theoretical 
framework to examine (i) the effect of teacher behaviour in the classroom on pupil 
achievement, specifically teachers’ usage of classroom resources as well as of 
themselves as a teaching resource (ii) the effect of teachers’ subject-matter and 
pedagogic skills on pupil achievement.  
In this thesis I use data from a total of 46 education systems covering all inhabited 
continents. The first two chapters use data from the Southern and Eastern African 
Consortium for the Monitoring of Educational Quality (SACMEQ) collected in the 
year 2000 (SACMEQ II) and 2007 (SACMEQ III). As the name suggest, SACMEQ 
data focuses on a large region within Africa and contains more countries from the 
African continent than other, more prominent cross-country datasets such as the 
PISA and TIMSS datasets. SACMEQ data is also much less frequently used than 
the latter. In total, SACMEQ II and III consists of 15 education systems, 
Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zanzibar and Zimbabwe1.  
In between these two time periods the education systems of Kenya, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zanzibar especially underwent large expansions, as substantial 
proportions of these countries’ school-aged population were not attending school. In 
other words, these countries lagged far behind reaching their Millennium 
Development Goal of universal primary education in the year 2000 (cf. UNESCO 
Global Monitoring Report, 2011). Other countries, such as Botswana, Mozambique 
and Swaziland, also needed to expand their education systems, but rather than 
suddenly abolishing all direct school fees and thereby encouraging a demand-shock 
of pupils wanting to attend schools, these latter countries gradually expanded 
access to their education systems. Some SACMEQ countries, such as Namibia, the 
Seychelles and South Africa had already reached, or were very close to universal 
primary education by 2000. 
In each wave SACMEQ samples multiple grade 6 pupils per school, whereby the 
schools are registered government or non-government schools. SACMEQ surveys 
consist of different parts: Head teachers are surveyed on their demographics and 
                                                        
1In this thesis I use data from all except Zimbabwe as this data has the reputation of being unreliable 
due to the political system.  
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those of the school, as well as their own teaching. Similarly teachers are surveyed 
about their demographics and teaching. Finally the pupils are asked to fill in a 
questionnaire about themselves and their family. Pupils are tested in maths and 
reading in wave two, and in a third subject ‘health/science’ in wave three. Teachers 
are also tested in the subject they teach. For example if a teacher teaches maths, 
reading and ‘health/science’ in wave three, he or she will be tested in these three 
subjects. 
The third chapter uses data from the OECD Teaching and Learning International 
Survey (TALIS) collected in 2013, which is the second round after the first in 2008. 
In contrast to SACMEQ, TALIS data samples multiple teachers per school in 332 
high and middle-income countries. TALIS 2013 surveys both head teachers and 
teachers about the teaching and learning process. In doing so it collects data on 
characteristics of the school, as well as demographics, attitudes, beliefs and 
behaviours of the teachers and the heads. I use TALIS data as it is the first cross-
country dataset of teachers to collect data on teachers’ job satisfaction and it is 
therefore ideal for my research interest. 
The three chapters also share the same methodological approach. As both 
SACMEQ and TALIS data are observational, and although each data has a nested 
structure of either pupils or teachers in schools, I cannot obtain causal estimates to 
answer my research questions. I therefore employ a cross-country comparative 
approach. This should not be mistaken with a multiple case study approach. 
According to Yin (2009) a case study is “[a]n empirical inquiry about a 
contemporary phenomenon (e.g. a “case”), set within its real-world context […]” 
(Yin, 2009, p.18), which focus on the understanding of the cases by examining the 
context and other complex conditions related to them (Yin, 2009). Thus a multiple 
case study approach here would require an in-depth understanding of each of the 
educations systems sampled in this thesis, which would go not only beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but also beyond the scope of most case study research. 
As the data used here is correlational the main advantage of cross-country 
comparisons is to improve validity of the study. Instead of applying a model to a 
sample from one country only, the focus here lies on the cross-country patterns. For 
example, a consistent correlation of teachers’ weekly workload and their job 
satisfaction across all TALIS countries if observed would add more weight to the 
                                                        
2 I do not use data from the US, as this sample does not meet the OECD threshold response rate for 
schools and teachers. 
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claim that teachers’ job satisfaction is in fact affected by their weekly workload. 
This study does not focus on pooled models, but does include some to contrast 
findings, because such models average over the entire sample of countries and 
could mask heterogeneity across countries. In addition, although pooled models 
often account for unobserved differences between levels, which in this thesis is the 
country level, this thesis acknowledges the fact that each country has its own 
social, cultural and economic context that will affect country-level estimates. And 
reporting these individual estimates for each country is more likely to be of use to 
policy makers than pooled estimates averaging across a range of countries. 
Another common feature of the three chapters is their challenging common 
expectations. In each paper I set out to find empirical support for a traditional 
economic theory or a common belief. The first chapter for example addresses the 
debate on class size. In a nutshell, reducing class size implies high costs, as 
increasing numbers of teachers are needed. On the other hand, smaller class sizes 
are supposed to allow pupils to learn better. The existing evidence though does not 
fully support this notion, which suggests that the mechanisms of class size are not 
fully understood. The first chapter argues that a change in class size will have a 
compositional effect, changing classroom and school composition as well as peer 
dynamics, and an effect on how school resources and teachers are used. Moreover 
these underlying mechanisms relate to human behaviour. Thus the effect these 
mechanisms have on pupil achievement will depend on the sample’s specific 
(country) context i.e. the preferences of households, teachers and school leaders as 
well as the incentives they are faced with. 
I explore this using data from nine countries from the sub-Saharan Eastern and 
Southern Africa region that are part of the SACMEQ datasets sampled in the year 
2000 and 2007. I find that the effect of an increased amount of pupils sharing 
school, classroom resources or teachers varies in magnitude and direction both 
within and across the nine countries. This underlines that the aggregate effect of a 
change in class size depends heavily on the individual country context. Evidence 
obtained from pooled estimates shows that when these country contexts are 
accounted for, sharing the teacher with an increased number of pupils is the main 
threat to a pupil’s achievement. Yet household support behaviours such as 
providing the child with extra tuition in particular can counterbalance or even 
outweigh having to share the teacher with more peers.  
  14 
The second chapter explores why teachers differ in their quality and challenges the 
assumption that the laws of human interaction are universal, as Neo-Classical 
Economics might lead one to believe. If this were the case then teachers in 
developing countries, for example in sub-Saharan Africa should differ in their 
quality due to the same variables, so that evidence from the US should be 
applicable for policy guidance in these countries. But teacher labour markets in 
sub-Saharan southern and eastern Africa are likely to operate differently, due to 
the various financial and human capital restraints these countries face, leading to 
a very heterogeneously skilled teacher labour force. Similarly, because of the 
different incentive structure in these countries, a different kind of teacher may be 
attracted into the profession, who may behave differently. For example, better 
trained teachers may be worse teachers in the classroom, because they are trying 
to progress up the career ladder or aspire to a career in the government, and 
therefore do not use their skills to the pupils’ advantage.  
At the same time I argue that previous research in sub-Saharan Africa exploring 
this issue do not address adequately the non-random matching of pupils to 
teachers. I therefore follow Clotfelter et al (2006), who argue that allowing for 
pupil-fixed effects addresses this issue sufficiently. I demonstrate that previous 
research using the same data does not sufficiently address the teacher-pupil 
matching problem and that failing to do so leads to very different conclusions. The 
evidence also shows that even within schools, pupils and teachers are not matched 
randomly. Finally, the pattern of the findings of my pupil-fixed effects models 
resembles the pattern emerging from the US, in that there are no consistent 
predictors across countries. Yet each country has its own combination of 
statistically significant predictors, so that US evidence is not a suitable guide for 
policy in these countries. 
Especially in England it is commonly perceived, as a quick Google search of the 
keywords “teacher workload” will show, that teachers work too many hours3, that 
most of the administrative tasks are unnecessary4, and that the high workloads are 
                                                        
3 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/educationopinion/11243368/Teacher-workload-at-
unacceptable-levels.html ,[Last accessed: 24/05/15] 
 
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-pledges-to-reduce-teacher-workload ,[Last 
accessed: 24/05/15] 
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a key factor for newly qualified teachers to quit the teaching profession5,6. One 
would therefore expect that a teacher’s workload would be strongly correlated with 
his or her job satisfaction. In the third chapter I explore this specific aspect using 
the OECD TALIS data from 32 countries. I embed this analysis in a production 
function that unifies the two prevailing streams of literature, namely Top-Down 
and Bottom-Up approaches (cf. Diener, 1984). Thus it combines the notion that a 
teacher’s job satisfaction might be determined by the environment he or she is in 
(Bottom-Up) with the notion that individuals process their environment differently 
(Top-Down). Based on this production function I identify potential groups of 
stakeholders that could both directly affect teachers’ job satisfaction as well as 
their workload and thereby bias endogenously bivariate OLS estimates of the 
workload – job satisfaction relationship. These groups of stakeholders are the 
teachers themselves, the pupils, the parents, the other teachers in the school, the 
head teacher and the physical resources available in the school. In addition, I 
consider the association of not only total weekly workload, but also explore 
heterogeneity of effects for five different activities teachers do while working; face-
to-face teaching hours, time spent planning, marking, doing administrative tasks 
as well as the time they are engaged in school leadership activities.  
I find that for the majority of the 32 education systems estimates are not 
statistically significant and those that are, are of negligible magnitude. In other 
words there is no convincing evidence that teachers’ job satisfaction varies as a 
result of the amount of hours they work. Yet, I do find that certain aspects of the 
teachers’ working environment explain substantial variation in their job 
satisfaction. Using data on teachers’ perceptions of their workplace available in the 
English sub-sample, I find that teachers value well behaved pupils, sufficient 
autonomy to do their job and scope to progress as a teacher. An effective school 
leadership team is similarly important to them, but supportive parents, school 
leaders providing clear vision and direction, scope to progress to higher pay and the 
perception of receiving fair pay given their performance are also statistically 
significant, but increasingly less important. The obtained estimates range from 
0.09 to 0.39 SD. 
                                                        
5 https://www.the-newshub.com/uk-politics/i-quit-the-ever-increasing-workload-of-the-british-teacher 
,[Last accessed: 24/05/15] 
 
6 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3020580/More-40-new-teachers-leave-profession-12-months-
Excessive-workload-blamed-number-quit-triples-six-years.html ,[Last accessed: 24/05/15] 
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Before moving on to the first chapter, I would like to make a remark regarding the 
structure of this thesis. Each of the three chapters themselves was conducted as a 
small research project with the intention to be published. Thus, in the chapters I 
refer to them as “papers”. The second chapter of this thesis has already been 
released as a working paper in the IoE Department of Quantitative Social Science 
working paper series in a previous form, but has since undergone substantial 
changes before entering this thesis and does not include the contribution of my 
previous supervisor Rebecca Allen and is solely my own work. Also, as the chapters 
are to be published, and as they do not all share the same underlying dataset, I do 
not introduce the reader to the data in a separate chapter. Instead I introduce the 
reader to the relevant aspects of the data within each chapter. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Exploring mechanisms of class size effects on 
achievement in Sub-Saharan Africa: the role of 
teachers, physical resources and households  
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1.1. Introduction 
Reducing class size is a common item on the agenda for policy makers to debate in 
developed countries. In a nutshell, reducing class size implies high costs, as 
increasing numbers of teachers are needed. On the other hand, smaller class sizes 
are supposed to allow pupils to learn better. Evidence on the effect of class size on 
achievement is predominantly from developed economies. The most robust findings 
are either from the Tennessee STAR randomised experiment in the 1980s in the 
US or from adaptations of Angrist and Lavy’s (1999) paper applying Maimonides’ 
rule in Israel. Angrist and Lavy (1999) find significant effects in favour of smaller 
classes, but not for every examined cohort. Adaptations of this approach in Poland 
and France also find such effects, but of much smaller, nearly negligible magnitude 
(cf. Jakubowski and Sakowski, 2006; Gary-Bobo and Mahjoub, 2006). In contrast 
Asadullah (2005) finds a positive effect in favour of larger class size in Bangladesh. 
Evidence from Tennessee STAR again suggests results in favour of smaller class 
sizes and long-term effects seem to exist until entry into higher education (eg. Nye 
et al., 1999, 2000 and 2001). Hanushek (2003) though notes that the advantage of 
continuously being in a smaller class does not increase over time. Thus, even in the 
light of this evidence, the underlying mechanisms of the effects of class size are not 
fully understood.  
This paper argues that a change in class size will have a compositional effect and 
an effect on how school resources and teachers are used. The compositional effect 
can be divided into two parts: First it is likely to change existing peer dynamics as 
literally individuals will either be removed or added to a class depending on the 
direction of change in class size. Second, if households care about the quality of 
their children’s education, they will react to changes in class size and reconsider 
the kind of school they send their children to, how much academic support such as 
extra tuition and help with homework to provide their children with, and the 
amount of education to invest in their children.  
A change in class size also implies that a teacher or any other resource in a school 
needs to be shared by a different number of pupils. How these resources are shared 
depends on head teacher and teacher behaviour. For example in the classroom, the 
teaching methods a teacher applies decide how the available resources in the 
classroom are shared among the pupils.  
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Thus a change in class size triggers various mechanisms, which on aggregate may 
exacerbate or counteract each other. Heterogeneity of findings across countries is 
to be expected here as the individual country contexts will affect household 
preferences, i.e. the extent to which households support their children, as well as 
the kind of teachers and school leaders who select into the teaching profession and 
the kind and quality of resources and teachers available in individual schools. This 
paper therefore reports findings both for individual countries and contrasts a 
pooled model that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity across countries. 
This paper uses a rich secondary dataset of pupils matched to teachers and schools, 
in nine of the fifteen member countries of the Southern and Eastern African 
Consortium for the Monitoring of Educational Quality (SACMEQ), which was 
collected in the years 2000 and 2007. The paper estimates the association of usage 
of school, classroom resources and teachers as well as of receiving extra tuition and 
help with homework, using multivariate linear regressions. Estimates are reported 
separately for each country and are contrasted with a pooled model that accounts 
for unobserved between-country differences. The findings indicate that the effect of 
an increased amount of pupils sharing school, classroom resources or teachers 
varies in magnitude and direction both within and across the nine countries and 
underlines that a class size aggregate effect of a change in class size depends 
heavily on the individual country context, i.e. the preferences of households, 
teachers and school leaders as well as the incentives they are faced with. The 
pooled estimates show that when these country contexts are accounted for, sharing 
the teacher with an increased number of pupils is the main threat to a pupil’s 
achievement. Yet household behaviours such as providing the child with extra 
tuition in particular can counterbalance or even outweigh having to share the 
teacher with more peers.  
The paper is structured as follows: The next section provides the reader with the 
relevant theory and literature before Section 1.3 introduces the reader to the 
SACMEQ data and the context of the sampled countries. Section 1.4 discusses the 
multivariate regressions applied to the data, before reporting the obtained 
estimates in section 1.5, Section 1.6 concludes.  
1.2. Theory and literature 
Traditionally human capital accumulation is formalised in an education production 
function (cf. Hanushek, 1979), whereby educational achievement A of individual i 
in class j and school k is a function of the individual P, often referred to as innate 
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ability, his or her family background H, schooling S, which in turn is a function of 
physical school resources R, teachers T, school leadership L and the respective peer 
group G. 
Aijk = f(Pi, Hi, Sk(Rjk, Tjk, Lk, Gjk))      (1) 
The following will show how a demand shock for education can affect each of the 
constituent inputs of the education production function, beginning with the 
household level. The discussion will include a number of factors that may affect the 
class-size mechanisms as well as pupil achievement, i.e. potential sources of 
endogeneity, which I will return to when discussing the modelling strategy in 
section 1.4. As this research uses data from sub-Saharan Africa, the following 
discussion will use examples from the African context for illustration. 
1.2.1 The household  
An influx of pupils into the school a pupil is attending will present the child’s 
household with a number of decisions: 
First, households may be prompted to differentiate schooling investments for their 
children, either through amount of schooling or through attendance at schools of 
differing quality. As Gandhi Kingdon (2002) notes, parents may have differing 
preferences for sons compared to daughters. In the Indian context for example it is 
usual that a daughter’s parents-in-law reap the majority of the profit of her 
productivity, thereby providing a disincentive for parents to invest in daughters’ 
education. Dickerson et al (2013) find that in the African countries focused on in 
this paper, girls tend to be enrolled in schools where pupils perform better in 
maths. Further they find that the gap in achievement between girls and boys is 
much larger in regions “where the role of the women is confined to the home”, i.e. 
in areas with high fertility, low levels of education among women and Islam is 
more prevalent (cf. Davis-Kean, 2005 for socio-economic status and race in the US). 
Also a perceived deterioration of educational quality will increase opportunity costs 
of education and encourage pupil absenteeism and drop out in order to participate 
either in the labour market or in home production. Especially as a child’s age 
increases, the more suitable it becomes to work in the labour market, which will 
increase opportunity costs further and provide a disincentive to participate in 
education. These opportunity costs may also be exacerbated if the labour market 
depends on school-aged children prior to the shock. In this case the abolition of 
school fees may function as a negative supply shock to the labour market 
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increasing wages. Governments can, of course, make this choice obsolete by 
enforcing anti child-labour legislation. 
Parents may also decide to move their children into private school. Watkins (2004) 
reports that private schools founded without government intention are known to 
cater for the poor who are willing to pay, because these schools signal better 
transparency and accountability to these groups. Oketch et al (2010b) explore the 
popularity of such schools in Nairobi, Kenya and conclude that contrary to 
Watkins’ argument of household preferences, the driving factor is a lack of supply 
of regular public schools. In general school choice will also affect the peer dynamics 
in schools, as instead of the number of pupils, this behaviour changes the socio-
cultural composition of a school. 
Households may also be prompted to adapt the academic support they provide to 
their children, such as helping their children with their homework or paying for 
extra tuition. Evidence from Norway and the US suggests a connection between 
class size and household support. Bonesronning (2004) finds in Norway that 
households tend to decrease their effort when class size increases from low levels. 
Datar and Mason (2008) find in a sample of US kindergarten pupils that an 
increase in class size is associated with an increase in parent-financed activities 
and a reduction in parent-child interaction, but there is no significant association 
with parent-school interaction. Again, there is no corresponding evidence from sub-
Saharan Africa. 
1.2.2 The role of the school leader and teacher 
Within schools, technical effectiveness of available physical resources (such as 
textbooks, chairs, tables, blackboards, class libraries, and so on) and teachers 
arises from behaviour patterns of school leaders and teachers. School leaders make 
strategic decisions how to equip classrooms with resources and allocate teachers 
and classes to them. In other words, the effect of a resource on a pupil’s 
achievement is a function of how the resource is allocated to the pupil. 
In the sub-Saharan context multi-grade teaching and teaching in shifts are 
common practice in some countries (cf. Mulkeen, 2009). Multi-grade classrooms 
contain pupils of more than one school grade and thus increase class size compared 
to single grade classes. Little (2004) notes that multi-grade teaching often occurs 
out of necessity rather than as a pedagogic choice, for example when demand for 
education outstrips supply in order to grant pupils access to education. 
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Governments rarely acknowledge its existence, so that curricula are not adapted 
accordingly and teachers are expected to cover these and meet exam expectations 
as if the classroom only consisted of the one grade (cf. Little, 2004). Evidence is 
mostly from developed countries such as the US and suggests no cognitive 
disadvantages for pupils educated in multi-grade classrooms. Evidence from 
developing country contexts is sparse. Jarousse and Mingat (1991) find that multi-
grade classes outperform single grade classes in both Burkina-Faso and Togo, but 
the indicative quality for the southern and eastern African context more than a 
decade later must be questioned. 
In contrast, teaching in shifts provides a means to reduce class size. Here schools 
allocate specific time slots to proportions of the school’s total enrolment. Although 
this approach is popular among policy makers for reducing unit costs of resources, 
it is criticised for implying a reduction in the amount of time a pupil is taught. 
Mulkeen (2010) notes that in Zambia teaching in shifts means a school day may 
only be 2.5 hours long. Also pupils and teachers allocated to afternoon shifts may 
be less productive because they are tired and are attending school in the heat. 
Corresponding evidence though does not show a clear negative association of 
teaching in shifts and achievement. Again, robust evidence is sparse, but while Lee 
and Zuze (2011) find a negative association in sub-Saharan southern and eastern 
African countries and Michaelowa (2001) in francophone Africa, Bray (2008) 
reports no significant differences. Bray suggests that although pupil-teacher 
contact time may be reduced per day, it is possible to impose more days of school 
per week, such as school on Saturdays. Also, international comparisons show that 
regular contact time varies substantially across countries, suggesting that the 
crucial variable is how a given amount of time is used rather than the total amount 
of time per se (cf. Bray, 2008). 
In the classroom a teacher’s strategic use of resources arises from the teaching 
methods he or she applies while creating learning environments. For example, if 
there are not enough textbooks for all pupils due to an increase in class size, 
teachers may opt to ‘preach to the pupils from the front of the class’, also known as 
ex-cathedra teaching, or use group work methods (cf. Cuseo, 2007 for the case of 
higher education in the US). Similarly, the effect of a blackboard in the classroom 
on the pupils’ achievement depends on how the teacher uses the blackboard, i.e. 
what he or she writes on the board or whether he or she uses it at all. 
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A further key skill teachers require to design effective learning environments is 
being able to identify the learning needs of each individual pupil. Yet addressing 
these fully may require a variety of teaching methods, which may not be possible 
given school and class size or available resources.  
These two key skills, knowledge of and being able to implement teaching methods 
and identifying pupils’ learning needs can arguably be acquired through training. 
Sub-Saharan African countries have a history of an undersupply of trained 
teachers even before signing the MDGs, although there was stark variation 
between countries. For example only 29 percent of all teachers were trained in 
Namibia in 1999, whereas 98 of all teachers were trained in Kenya (UN Institute 
for Statistics, 2010 cited in UNESCO EFA Global Monitoring Report 2011 
Statistical Annex7). In the light of increased demand, countries may hire less well 
trained or untrained teachers on temporary contracts whose demography can vary 
from parents, over village elders to trainee teachers, whose pedagogic skills, 
particularly those concerning effective teaching methods, will vary (cf. Fyfe, 2007). 
Vegas and de Laat (2003) find that in Togo pupils of regular teachers outperform 
those of contractual teachers, despite contractual teachers having the same 
amount of years of education. In contrast in Niger, Bourdon et al (2005) find no 
significant difference of teachers’ contractual status on pupil achievement. Hein 
and Allen (2013) also find no clear link between teachers’ observable 
characteristics and teacher quality in twelve SACMEQ countries using data from 
the year 2000.  
In addition, teachers’ motivation and attitudes towards their pupils are important 
(cf. Michaelowa, 2002; Bennell, 2004). If, for example, there is a societal 
expectation that women perform particular social roles such as housekeeping, 
childbearing and child rearing, this may influence the teacher’s behaviours 
towards female pupils (cf. Kazeem et al, 2010). Evidence by Dickerson et al (2013) 
based on data from 19 countries in Western, Eastern and Southern Africa in cross-
sectional data from 2000 and 2002 is consistent with no discrimination of female 
pupils. But with a sudden increase in school-goers, teachers’ motivation and 
attitudes towards their pupils may change. 
                                                        
7 Link has expired: file name “Statistical tables-2011-Longer version-Final-Website.xls”, downloaded on the 15th 
of November 2012, is available on request from the author. 
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1.2.3 The peer group 
Changes in class size are also likely to change the composition of a pupil’s 
respective peer group and thus affect the existing peer dynamics as literally pupils 
are either added or removed from the class depending on the direction of the 
change in class size. Evidence on peer effects is again mainly from developed 
countries and some evidence suggests that strategically grouping pupils according 
to gender (e.g. Hanushek et al., 2003; Lavy and Schlosser, 2011) or ability (Lavy et 
al., 2011; Duflo et al., 2011) may be beneficial for pupil achievement. There is no 
evidence on the size and direction of corresponding peer effects from the countries 
chosen here, nor on the prevalence of schools strategically assigning pupils to 
classes.  
Also, from a teacher’s perspective a change in peer dynamics may complicate being 
able to identify pupils’ needs. Also teachers need to successfully channel a change 
in peer dynamics through their classroom management skills to maximise the 
pupils’ learning. 
1.2.4 Geographical variation of household, school leader and 
teacher behaviour 
In sub-Saharan Africa research has shown that the more remotely a school is 
located, the more likely it will struggle to attract well trained staff and will be less 
well equipped in respect to physical school resources such as schoolbooks, 
classrooms, etc (cf. Mulkeen, 2010). Teachers in sub-Saharan Africa are also known 
to lack adequate incentives to teach in increasingly remote areas (cf. Mulkeen, 
2010). Apart from lower motivation, teacher absenteeism rates, especially in rural 
areas, are also attributed to teacher’s health conditions for example due to HIV, 
local weather conditions such as floods, and administrative factors such as needing 
to travel some distance to collect their salary (cf. Das et al, 2005; Bennell, 2005; 
Chaudhury, 2006). Standards of living also vary substantially by geographical 
location (Sahn and Stifel, 2003). In rural areas, farming may require as many 
hands as possible to manage the workload, thus functioning as a disincentive to 
attend or do well at school. Also, indirect school costs may be higher in rural areas 
in respect to commuting expenses, either monetary or non-monetary in the form of 
time spent. 
Another dimension of unequal distribution of resources is between public and 
private schools. Especially high fee-paying private schools may have access to more 
and better quality resources and teachers than public schools. Further there is 
cooperation of schools and aid organisations that may reduce transaction costs for 
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access to number and quality of resources, teachers and leadership (cf. Rose, 2009; 
Ulleberg, 2009).  
1.3. The SACMEQ data 
1.3.1 Context 
The data used are from the second and third wave of SACMEQ, the Southern and 
Eastern Africa Consortium for the Monitoring of Educational Quality. The second 
wave was collected in the year 2000, the third in 2007. There are fifteen member 
countries taking part in total, of which nine are used here. Among these countries, 
some, such as the Seychelles, Mauritius, Malawi, South Africa and Namibia had 
already reached, or were close to, enrolling all primary school aged children. In 
other words, these countries were close to meeting the second of the UN 
Millennium Development Goals. Others were far off meeting this goal as they had 
school fee policies in place preventing large proportions of the school-aged 
population from attending school. But whereas Botswana and Mozambique decided 
to gradually abolish these fees to enable increasing amounts of pupils to attend 
school, other SACMEQ countries such as Kenya in 2003, mainland Tanzania and 
Tanzania-Zanzibar (from now on Zanzibar) in 2001 and Zambia in 2002 opted to 
abruptly abolish all direct school costs. This sudden abolition of fees led to a 
substantial increase in primary school enrolment, threatening to increase school 
and class size against a backdrop in supply of schools, physical resources and 
teachers, with potentially disastrous effects on pupil achievement. For the 
remainder of this paper, Kenya, Tanzania, Tanzania-Zanzibar and Zambia will be 
referred to as group 1. 
The rise in enrolment is shown in Table 1.3.1, where between 1999 and 2008, 
adjusted net enrolment for primary school8 increases by 19 percentage points in 
Kenya. In Zambia the corresponding increase is 26 percentage points and the 
overall average increase for mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar is reported to be 39 
percentage points (UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2014). It must be added at this 
point that in contrast to Kenya and Zambia, the Tanzanian government decided to 
stagger the increased demand between 2002 and 2006 so that 100 percent primary 
school net enrolment was to occur in 2006. The Tanzanian government decided to 
do so by granting access to primary schools to certain additionally eligible birth 
cohorts (Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2001).  
                                                        
8 The proportion of children of the official primary school age enrolled in primary or secondary education. 
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Table 1.3.1: Adjusted Net Enrolment Rate for Primary School 
  1999 2008 Difference 
P
o
li
c
y
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
Kenya 63 82 19 
Tanzania 49 98 39 
Zambia 71 97 26 
Unweighted 
Average 
61 92 28 
N
o
 p
o
li
c
y
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 Mauritius 93 97 4 
Malawi 99 97 -2 
Namibia 88 87 -1 
Seychelles 931 94 1 
South Africa 97 96 -1 
Unweighted 
Average 
94 94 0 
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics http://data.uis.unesco.org/ last accessed on the 
10th of April 2014; 1 data from year 2000 
The second half of Table 1.1.1 contains five countries that did not receive such a 
policy change and are Mauritius, Malawi, Namibia, the Seychelles and South 
Africa, which from now on will be referred to as group 2. These countries already 
had achieved very high levels of adjusted net enrolment for primary school, which 
changed only slightly during the same period (Table 1.3.1). Of these countries 
South Africa and the Seychelles have a long history of compulsory, free primary 
education (cf. Government of Seychelles Ministry of Education, 2001; Government 
of the Republic of South Africa, 2005). Namibia and Mauritius implemented free 
primary education policies in the early 1990s and Malawi did so in 1994 (cf. 
Government of the Republic of Mauritius, 2001; Government of the Republic of 
Namibia, 2002).  
Apart from differing by experiencing the demand shock to their primary school 
systems, World Bank data of these nine countries indicates (see appendix for 
details) that the group 2 countries are typically much wealthier, but in general 
grow slower economically and in terms of population, and have higher HIV 
prevalence rates than the group 1 countries. Group 2 is also more heterogeneous, 
and includes small holiday island nations as well as large territorial states with 
both small and large populations. Malawi appears to be an outlier. Although 
classified here as a group 2 country, its growth in population is similar to the group 
1 countries. Yet it has the smallest growth in GDP per capita and by far the lowest 
rate of persistence to grade 6 (see appendix). 
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1.3.2 The data 
SACMEQ data is heavily used by member governments as an additional data 
source to complement their administrative data and they welcome the data 
collection process as a means of local capacity building. 
In each wave SACMEQ samples grade 6 pupils attending registered government or 
non-government schools. Thus the sampled data may not be representative for all 
schools if, as is the case in Kenya, private schools exist that are not registered with 
the government. Oketch et al (2010a) highlight that of their sample of low cost 
private schools in Nairobi, one quarter are not registered. But it is unknown how 
large this potential bias is for the entire country. The participating governments 
also have some leeway in the definition of the target population. For example, the 
Tanzanian samples only contain individuals in government schools. In short, it is 
hard to ascertain the actual corresponding populations and the reader should keep 
this in mind. 
Pupils are sampled in two stages. In the first stage schools are stratified by region 
and number of grade 6 pupils, whereby the latter is truncated into two categories, 
small and large. Schools are then selected with probability proportional to the 
number of their respective grade 6 pupils. In the second wave, a maximum of 20 
pupils are sampled at random in each school in all countries except Namibia and 
Mauritius where a maximum of 40 pupils are sampled and the Seychelles, where 
all grade 6 pupils in the selected schools are sampled. In the third wave the 
maximum sample size for the second stage is increased in all countries apart from 
the Seychelles where again all pupils in grade 6 are sampled in the chosen schools. 
This time a maximum of 50 pupils are sampled in Namibia, Mauritius, Kenya and 
Zanzibar and a maximum of 25 pupils in all other countries. According to 
SACMEQ’s technical documents and country reports the response rates of pupils in 
the second wave are 89 percent in Kenya, 83 percent in Malawi, 93 percent in 
Mauritius, 92 percent in Namibia, 96 percent in the Seychelles, 85 percent in 
South Africa, 77 percent in Tanzania, 75 percent in Zambia and 83 percent in 
Zanzibar (Onsomu et al, 2005). In the third wave response rates are 91 percent in 
Kenya, 79 percent in Malawi, 89 percent in Mauritius, 91 percent in South Africa 
(Moloy and Chetty, 2010; Milner et al, 2011; Sauba and Lutchmiah, 2011; Wasanga 
et al, 2012). Response rates are not available for the other countries. Table 1.4.1 
reports the achieved sample size in each country. In order to ease comparability, 
individuals and schools in educational districts that are not sampled in both waves 
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are omitted here. This leads to a total sample size of 55,328 pupils nested in 2,630 
schools.  
 
Table 1.3.2: Composition of sample used 
 Schools  Pupils  
 SACMEQ 
II 
SACMEQ 
III 
Total 
 
SACMEQ II 
SACMEQ 
III 
Total 
 
Kenya 184 193 377 3,299 4,436 7,735 
Tanzania 127 140 267 1,937 2,996 4,933 
Zambia 155 84 239 2,410 2,614 5,024 
Zanzibar 145 143 288 2,514 2,791 5,305 
Malawi 140 139 279 2,333 2,781 5,114 
Mauritius 89 72 161 1,685 1,622 3,307 
Namibia 270 267 537 5,048 6,398 11,446 
Seychelles 24 24 48 1,484 1,480 2,924 
South 
Africa 
125 309 434 2,366 7,134 9,500 
Total 1259 1371 2630 23,076 32,252 55,328 
 
SACMEQ surveys consist of different parts: both pupils and teachers are tested on 
similar, but not identical tests in all tested subjects. These are maths and reading 
in wave two and an additional ‘health/science’ test in wave three. Head teachers 
are surveyed on their demographics and those of the school, as well as their own 
teaching. Similarly teachers are surveyed about their demographics and teaching. 
Finally the pupils are asked to fill in a questionnaire about themselves and their 
family. In their technical documents SACMEQ acknowledge that item non-
response exists ‘occasionally’. In these cases, if less than 15 percent of the 
respective item is missing, SACMEQ impute the missing values by replacing 
continuous variables with the mean and categorical variables with the mode of the 
respective lowest level of aggregation in the data. As will be seen in the following 
multivariate regression analysis, the loss of observations due to missing data is 
negligible. 
SACMEQ pupil and teacher tests scores are based on multiple-choice items and are 
estimated using Rasch models. To make SACMEQ test score measures comparable 
over time, the tests in each subject in each wave contain common items. Rasch 
models (cf. Rasch, 1960), also known as one-parameter item response models, are 
commonly used to estimate competency in a specific subject and are also applied in 
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the OECD PISA studies. Compared to the two and three parameter item response 
models, Rasch models neither account for guessing nor that items may differ in 
their quality to discriminate between higher and lower abilities (cf. van der Linden 
and Hambleton, 1997). Baird et al (2011) criticise the validity of PISA studies 
because of the way pilot studies are conducted. Pilot studies are intended to 
identify items in which certain samples differ substantially from expected levels, so 
that such items can be improved or removed for the main study. As PISA tests are 
not piloted in every participating country, it cannot be established whether all 
items used are valid. Kreiner and Christensen (2013) reanalyse PISA reading skills 
data from 2006 and provide evidence indicating that the Rasch models used by 
PISA are neither valid within nor across countries and that the produced rankings 
of countries are not robust. This may also be an issue in SACMEQ, as the extent of 
piloting is unknown to the author. Further the language of testing may be a 
problem. SACMEQ tests are conducted in English, but English typically will not be 
the mother tongue of every sampled pupil within countries. Similarly children from 
wealthier households or from urban centres may come into contact with English 
sooner than poorer children. Also the age at which English is introduced as 
medium of instruction can differ across countries. In the light of these potential 
flaws in the provided Rasch scores, this research therefore assumes that their 
validity holds. 
For the purpose of the analysis here I generate several variables. The first variable 
captures the number of physical school resources. This summative measure is 
based on whether or not the head teacher reports the presence of a school library, a 
hall, a staff room, a head teacher’s office, a store room, a first aid kit, a sports 
ground, water supply, electricity, a telephone, a fax machine, a school garden, a 
typewriter, a duplicator, radio and tape recorder.  
The second variable captures the number of classroom resources. This summative 
measure is based on 6 items that measure whether or not the classroom has a wall 
chart, cupboard, bookshelves, classroom library, a desk and chair for the teacher as 
well as a blackboard and chalk. Although this variable is a teacher-level variable, 
analysis of variance shows that in all countries except the Seychelles (35 percent), 
Mauritius (63 percent) and Zanzibar (77 percent), at least 90 percent of the 
variation lies between schools. 
The third variable captures the number of pupil materials. This summative 
measure is obtained from 8 items in the pupil questionnaire that indicate whether 
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the pupil has an exercise book, a notebook, a pencil, a sharpener, an eraser, a ruler, 
a ballpoint pen and a file. 
The fourth generated variable represents socioeconomic status and captures the 
sum of three aspects: First, the level of parental education. On a scale from 1, 
representing no education to 6, representing post-secondary education a pupil can 
achieve a maximum of 12 for both parents. The second aspect covers the quality of 
walls, floor and roof of the house the pupil lives in. The corresponding items are 
whether or not the pupil lives in a house with stone or cement walls, carpeted or 
tiled floors and a tiled roof. The third aspect covers a list of ten household items, 
which are a newspaper, magazine, cassette player, radio, car, motorcycle, bicycle, 
water, electricity and a table. Thus, the final SES variable is the sum of these three 
aspects and can range from 0 to 25. For example, a pupil whose parents have both 
attended post-secondary education, lives in a house with concrete walls, carpeted 
floor and tiled roof and owning all ten household items will score at the top of the 
SES measure. This measure implicitly assumes that owning a radio is equal to one 
additional level of parental education, but any other reweighting of these aspects is 
arbitrary in the absence of suitable theory. Further, this measure assumes that 
prices for the ten household items remain constant. Also cassette players may 
become out-dated and disposed of in the 2007 wave due to widespread availability 
and affordability of CD players. 
SACMEQ provides its own measure of socioeconomic status, which is estimated 
using Rasch models. Dolata (2005) describes the complex procedure. The main 
difference between the latter and the generated measure here are that SACMEQ’s 
measure is estimated pooling all member countries together across all three waves 
and standardised to the SACMEQ mean in the year 2000. Analogously to the test 
score measure, this latent SES measure assumes that each item has the same 
quality to discriminate between higher and lower socioeconomic status, and 
households with the same level of SES have the same probability of agreement 
with each item. Thus it ignores that prices for items in the house or building 
materials may differ across countries and over time, or that the severity of barriers 
for parents to reach higher levels of education may differ across countries. My 
manually generated socioeconomic status measure is therefore preferred for both 
its simplicity and similarity with SACMEQ’s analogue: The Pearson correlation 
coefficient is 0.95 when both waves and all countries are pooled together; the 
correlation coefficient is ≥ 0.93 within each sampled country. 
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As discussed in the theory section, school leaders may decide to apply multigrade 
teaching, teaching in shifts or both. Using official school enrolment as a proxy for 
school size will be misleading if the school in fact teaches in shifts, because it is of 
interest here how physical school resources and teachers are allocated to pupils 
when the sampled grade 6 pupils attend school. I therefore use the maximum 
number of pupils attending school during the same shifts as the sampled grade 6 
pupils as a proxy for school size.  
In SACMEQ both teachers and head teachers are asked corresponding questions 
on grade 6 class size, yet they refer to the official enrolment figures instead of a 
headcount of pupils in the actual rooms the grade 6 pupils are taught. Thus, 
SACMEQ data on class size represents grade 6 enrolment divided by the number of 
grade 6 classes, which does not differ by subject, thus suggesting that class 
composition remains unchanged for both subjects. Dividing school size per shift by 
the number of classrooms the schools claim to have, which may be located in 
temporary, permanent or open-air spaces, gives an idea of the actual class size 
grade 6 pupils may be in. This measure is preferred to grade 6 enrolment as a 
proxy of actual class size the pupils are likely to experience. 
As a change in class size implies that a teacher or any other resource in a school 
needs to be shared by a different number of pupils, the variables of interest are 
ratios of the corresponding number of pupils over the number of teachers or school 
and classroom resources. Similarly, pupil-level resources may also be shared 
among pupils in a classroom. Although having generated a variable capturing the 
number of pupil resources available to a sampled pupil, it is not possible to 
compute an analogue ratio of pupils per class over pupil-level resources in the 
classroom. In order to do so, data on all pupils in a class would be necessary. It is 
possible to compute a ratio of the number of sampled grade 6 pupils per school by 
the number of sampled pupils’ resources for each school. Micklewright et al (2012) 
though show that measures based on a sample rather than on the population will 
be subject to sampling bias in a regression attenuating the coefficient. 
Furthermore, Micklewright et al (2012) show that the bias increases as sample size 
per school decreases. If multigrade teaching is common, this variable is also subject 
to an additional bias, as it then must be assumed that the sampled grade 6 pupils 
are representative of all pupils in their classroom. I therefore do not compute a 
ratio corresponding to pupil-level resources. 
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All in all, SACMEQ data is quite suitable to investigate class size mechanisms and 
their effect on pupil achievement. SACMEQ provides repeated cross sectional data 
from before and after the abolition of direct school fees in Kenya, Tanzania, 
Zanzibar and Zambia as well as from five ‘untreated countries’ in the same 
geographical region. Many questions in both waves of data used are identical or 
contain the same items so that many variables can be studied over time. Recall the 
education production function in equation (1), where pupil achievement is a 
function of the pupil, the household he or she lives in and the school, which in 
return is a function of available resources, teachers, leadership and a peer effect. 
The available SACMEQ data covers household behaviour, pupil characteristics and 
school resources. Corresponding variables are the number of physical school 
resources, the number of physical classroom resources, the number of pupil 
materials, the number of teachers per school, household SES, pupils’ age, gender, 
days absent, grade repetition, whether or not they receive extra tuition or help 
with their homework. Based on these data it is possible to compute variables 
indicating resource usage in the form of the number of pupils per resource, such as 
pupils per teacher, pupils per school resource and pupils per classroom resource. 
The data also has a few shortcomings. First, the data does not provide headcounts 
of pupils per school per shift, or class size per shift and instead relies on school 
enrolment numbers. Thus proxy variables for school and class size must be 
computed based on school enrolment figures per shift and therefore cannot account 
for pupil absenteeism. Neither does the data cover all individuals in a school, but 
only grade 6. Thus, if multigrade classrooms are common it will not be possible to 
capture peer effects sufficiently. Following the literature on peer effects outlined in 
section 1.3, data on the average SES of the respective classrooms, or the proportion 
of female pupils in them would be useful, but is not available. Although it is 
possible to generate corresponding proxies for these variables from the sampled 
pupils, this would make the assumption that the composition of the grade 6 pupils 
in a school is also representative for other grades in the school. This though may 
not be the case especially in the second wave in the treated countries where lower 
grades may contain poorer pupils who were unable to attend school prior to the 
policy change. Also the argument of classical measurement error on such variables 
as described earlier applies too (cf. Micklewright et al, 2012). Thirdly, the data does 
not provide information on whether the parents moved the sampled pupils from 
one school to another or on the type of school the pupils attended previously. 
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1.3.3 Descriptive statistics 
This section documents changes over the 2000-2007 period in the key explanatory 
variables (see Table 1.3.3). The narrative here will focus on the group 1 countries 
and discuss the extent to which the variables of interest change in the expected 
directions. The reader is referred to the appendix for more detailed information. 
Physical school and classroom resources 
Given the theory outlined above one would expect to observe a relatively fixed 
supply of physical school resources and teachers to prevail among all group 1 
countries, and thus only small statistically significant or no significant changes. 
Indeed the data indicates that this expectation generally holds for both groups of 
countries. Table 1.3.3 also shows that the average number of teachers per school 
remains unchanged in all countries except Zanzibar. Contrary to expectation this 
education system appears to have invested in hiring teachers so that there are 
approximately 8.9 teachers more per school on average than in 2007. Furthermore 
the group 1 countries appear to experience a slight decrease in number of school 
resources, which are significant in Kenya (-0.6), Tanzania (-0.8) and Zambia (-1.8). 
These reductions may be due to wear and tear of items that due to prevailing policy 
prioritisation of ensuring access, have not been replaced. Similarly the average 
number of classroom resources remains unchanged in Kenya and Zambia, but 
increase slightly in Tanzania (by 1.1 items) and Zanzibar (by 0.3 items). In respect 
to the average number of pupil resources (see appendix) there are small significant 
increases in Tanzania by 0.8 materials, Zambia by 0.4 materials and Zanzibar by 
1.1 materials. 
In contrast to the group 1 countries, there is no theory to predict the direction of 
corresponding changes among the group 2 countries, thus heterogeneity of 
magnitude and direction of changes is likely. The data presented here supports this 
expectation. For example while there is an increase in the average number of 
school resources per school in Namibia by 1.1 items, there is a decrease by 0.9 
items in Malawi, but no significant change among the other untreated countries. 
Similarly there is a decrease in pupil resources in Mauritius by 0.4 items, whereas 
there are significant increases in all other untreated countries. Overall though the 
supply of school resources and teachers in this group of countries also remains 
fairly stable. 
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Table 1.3.3: Change over time (2000 to 2007) in key variables 
  Constituents of key explanatory variables Key explanatory variables Achievement 
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KEN 156*** 
(7) 
9.6*** 
(1.4) 
-0.6* 
(0.3) 
0.2 
(0.1) 
0.5 
(0.9) 
-1.3 
(1.9) 
-17.5*** 
(3.8) 
39.1*** 
(7.2) 
2.5 
(1.3) 
9.6*** 
(1.3) 
-6 
(6) 
-3 
(7) 
TAN 168*** 
(20) 
13.0** 
(4.7) 
-0.8** 
(0.3) 
1.3*** 
(0.2) 
-1.2 
(2.1) 
-27.9*** 
(3.2) 
-47.3*** 
(3.9) 
83.8*** 
(16.4) 
-10.4*** 
(3.2) 
16.0*** 
(4.1) 
24*** 
(6) 
33*** 
(7) 
ZAM -75*** 
(12) 
-31.1 
(32.0) 
-1.8*** 
(0.5) 
-0.1 
(0.2) 
-4.0 
(2.6) 
6.6** 
(2.2) 
-41.5*** 
(4.1) 
1.7 
(7.2) 
-2.5 
(7.3) 
2.3 
(4.8) 
0 
(4) 
-6 
(6) 
ZAN 127*** 
(21) 
0.9 
(4.6) 
-0.1 
(0.3) 
0.3* 
(0.1) 
8.9* 
(3.5) 
-0.5 
(2.2) 
-39.5*** 
(3.8) 
31.7 
(18.8) 
-4.7 
(4.5) 
-0.8 
(0.9) 
8 
(4) 
56*** 
(5) 
Raw 
average 
94 -1.9 -0.8 0.4 1.0 -5.8 -36.4 39.1 -3.8 6.8 6 20 
G
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MAL -33 
(27) 
5.0 
(5.0) 
-0.9*** 
(0.3) 
-0.0 
(0.2) 
-4.2 
(2.6) 
12.3*** 
(4.2) 
-65.4*** 
(3.9) 
145.6** 
(50.2) 
3.8 
(4.7) 
16.0*** 
(4.8) 
14*** 
(4) 
5 
(4) 
MAU -117*** 
(11) 
-15.6 
(11.6) 
-0.6 
(0.3) 
0.7*** 
(0.2) 
0.1 
(1.8) 
-3.5 
(2.8) 
-6.1* 
(2.6) 
-10.3 
(5.5) 
-4.6 
(3.3) 
-6.9** 
(2.8) 
23* 
(11) 
27** 
(10) 
NAM 15** 
(5) 
1.2 
(2.2) 
1.1** 
(0.4) 
-0.2 
(0.2) 
0.7 
(0.9) 
8.2*** 
(1.2) 
-23.8*** 
(3.3) 
-17.6*** 
(4.5) 
0.9 
(2.5) 
-1.5* 
(0.7) 
40*** 
(5) 
48*** 
(6) 
SEY -182*** 
(10) 
-2.9 
(2.1) 
0.2 
(0.4) 
0.7*** 
(0.2) 
-4.7 
(5.8) 
6.1*** 
(1.2) 
-18.6** 
(5.5) 
-15.6 
(8.3) 
-0.7 
(0.4) 
-2.4* 
(1.0) 
-4 
(8) 
-7 
(10) 
SOU -12 
(8) 
-7.5 
(8.6) 
0.3 
(0.5) 
-0.2 
(0.2) 
0.7 
(1.0) 
5.1* 
(2.2) 
-44.3*** 
(3.8) 
-4.0 
(7.5) 
2.6* 
(1.1 
-1.3 
(0.8) 
11 
(9) 
3 
(11) 
Raw 
average 
-66 -4.0 0.0 0.2 -1.5 5.6 -31.6 19.6 0.4 0.8 17 15 
Notes: Estimated means, Standard Errors clustered by school in parentheses; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001; 1 estimates for maths classrooms reported, as these 
are practically identical for reading classrooms. Raw average = unweighted average of estimates of each group
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School and class size 
Having established that the supply of physical resources in schools has remained 
fairly constant among both groups of countries and that the number of teachers per 
school has only changed significantly in Zanzibar, the Table shows that, as 
expected, the group 1 countries here experience a strong increase in primary school 
enrolment. Estimates reveal an increase in average enrolment per shift by 156 
pupils in Kenya, a corresponding increase of 168 pupils on average in Tanzania 
and an increase by 127 pupils in Zanzibar. In contrast average enrolment per shift 
decreases in Zambia in the same time period by 75 pupils. One of the reasons for 
the decrease in school enrolment per shift in Zambia may be that schools have 
changed the number of shifts taught. Estimates for the number of shifts are 
reported in the appendix and appear to be very stable only decrease slightly in 
Tanzania and Zanzibar. These suggest that the observed changes in school 
enrolment per shift in Zambia might be driven by either an increase in number of 
schools, or by a change in the number of pupils allocated to shifts. 
The observed changes in school size lead to the question how the average class size 
that grade 6 pupils experience changes. According to the data the average number 
of grade 6 classes per school remains unchanged in all countries except Tanzania 
where the number increased by 0.38 to 2.16 classes, and in Zambia where the 
number decreased by 0.67 to 2.2 classes (tables not shown). Assuming multigrade 
classrooms, this research uses the number of pupils per class per shift to 
approximate the class size the sampled grade 6 pupils experience. Interestingly, 
estimates change significantly only for Kenya (9.6 pupils) and Tanzania (13 pupils) 
and these are the only two countries where the average number of pupils per 
classroom and shift changes over time. Zambia is also interesting, because despite 
the decrease in the average number of classrooms per school noted above, the 
average number of pupils per classroom per shift has not changed significantly. 
Summarising, SACMEQ data shows that school size does not increase in each 
group 1 country and that schools compensate for these changes by varying the 
number of pupils per shift. 
Resource usage 
The resource usage variables combine the respective number of pupils and divide 
these by the respective number of school or classroom resources or the number of 
teachers in the school. One would expect to observe significant changes in the 
corresponding pupil-resource allocation ratios (see Table 1.3.3). Interestingly, the 
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changes in numerator and denominator for school resources appear to have 
counterbalanced each other in Zambia, Zanzibar, Mauritius and the Seychelles, as 
there are only significant increases in Kenya (+39.1 pupils per school resource), 
Tanzania (+83.8 pupils per school resource) and Malawi (+145.6 pupils per school 
resource), and a significant decrease in Namibia by 17.6 pupils per school resource. 
The table further indicates that pupil teacher ratios increase in Kenya by 9.6 
pupils per teacher and in Tanzania and Malawi by 16 pupils per teacher. In 
contrast, this ratio decreases significantly in Namibia by 17.6 pupils per teacher. 
Analogously, in respect to allocation of pupils to classroom resources one would 
expect to observe changes in Kenya and Tanzania, which are the only countries 
where on average the expected number of pupils per classroom increases 
significantly, and Zanzibar, Mauritius and South Africa where there are significant 
changes in the average number of resources in reading classrooms. Again there 
appears to be some counterbalancing effects of changes in the numerators and 
denominators so that the average number of pupils per classroom resource only 
increases in South Africa by 2.6 and decreases in Tanzania by 10.4.  
Household support 
In respect to receiving extra tuition the data shows a consistent negative pattern 
across all sampled countries ranging from -6.1 percent to -65.4 percent in Malawi. 
Yet there is no such consistent pattern regarding receiving help with homework. 
This household behaviour increases significantly in all group two countries except 
Mauritius as well as Zambia in group 1. In Tanzania this household behaviour 
reduces, but there is no significant change in any of the other countries. 
Pupil achievement 
The final piece in the puzzle now is to examine the change in pupil achievement. 
Following the common belief that net enrolment shocks, go hand-in-hand with a 
decrease in achievement one would expect to observe a reduction in achievement 
among the group 1 countries. The data though does not support this expectation, as 
in none of the sampled nine countries does average pupil achievement reduce 
significantly. Instead Tanzania experiences an increase in average achievement in 
reading by 33 points and in maths by 24 points and pupils in Zanzibar outperform 
their peers in the year 2000 by 56 points in reading. Among the group 2 countries, 
average achievement in maths increases by 27 points in reading and 23 points in 
maths in Mauritius, by 48 points in reading and 40 points in maths in Namibia, 
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and pupils appear to outperform their peers in the year 2000 in maths by 14 points 
in Malawi. 
The reader should be reminded at this stage that the bivariate analyses presented 
above so far are not linked to pupil achievement, so that it is unknown at this point 
whether and to which extent the documented changes translate into changes in 
pupil achievement. Multivariate analyses allow resource usage and school 
composition to covary and estimate their correlation with pupil achievement. The 
next section discusses the multivariate regression models used. 
 
1.4. Method 
Ideally this section should explore all possible mechanisms of class size effects on 
achievement described in Section 1.3. Yet, due to data limitations it is not possible 
to explore peer effects or a household’s school choice (see section 1.3). This section 
therefore focuses on two specific mechanisms, usage of resources and teachers in 
the school and household support.  
I pool both waves so that the obtained estimates exploit variation both within and 
across points in time for each country. I report standardized coefficients below in 
Tables 1.5.1a to 1.5.3, also known as beta coefficients to ease cross-country 
comparison, as the dependent variable is likely to have a different variance in each 
country. Standardized coefficients also allow direct comparison of each predictor as 
standardization removes the scale of each variable. I obtain the standardized 
coefficients by standardizing the dependent variable and each of the continuous 
variables in the model to the corresponding national mean and national standard 
deviation. I do not standardise the dummy variables on the right hand side, Thus 
the coefficients on the continuous variables indicate the change in pupil 
achievement in national standard deviations when the corresponding predictor 
changes by a national standard deviation; the coefficients on the dummy variables 
indicate the difference in achievement when the variable is “1” compared to when 
the variable is zero.  
I model the effect of these two mechanisms on achievement by estimating 
achievement A of individual i in class j, school k as a linear function of a vector of 
household support H, resource usage R and a vector of control variables C 
Aijkt = α + β1Hi + β2Rijk + β3Cijk + uijk      (2). 
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The variables in vector H are whether the pupil receives help with his or her 
homework and whether the pupil receives extra tuition. Vector R contains access 
ratios presented in section 1.5.3 as well as the number of pupil-level resources. As 
described earlier, SACMEQ does not provide adequate information to compute a 
variable corresponding to the allocation of pupils to pupil-level resources in a given 
classroom. Nevertheless, I include the number of pupil-level resources available to 
a sampled individual, as especially the effectiveness of how teachers use classroom 
resources is likely to depend on the extent to which a pupil has all necessary books 
and writing materials. Also, if pupil-level resources were shared among the pupils 
in a class, ceteris paribus an increase in class size would reduce the number of 
these resources available to each pupil.  
The control variables included in vector C are closely linked to the discussion in 
section 1.2 and play an important role in order to interpret both resource and 
teacher usage and household support in the intended way as proxies for school 
leader, teacher and household behaviour. First, I control for the school’s 
geographical location. Holding this dimension constant removes differences in 
teacher and head teacher behaviour due to geographical location, such as teachers 
being absent so they can travel to collect their monthly pay. Furthermore, holding 
constant geographical location implies that the supply of schools is distributed 
evenly across the country and counterbalances geographical asymmetries in the 
distribution of resources and teachers within them. I then control for school type as 
public and private schools differ in the contracts they can design. I also hold 
constant the number of years of pre-service and the number of in-service training 
days of teachers to ensure that changes in classroom resource usage are not driven 
by duration of teacher training. Analogously, I control for whether the head teacher 
has received leadership training.  
The support parents can offer their child is conditional on the household’s budget. 
SACMEQ does not have information on household income, so that this is proxied 
by socioeconomic status. Households also need to decide whether to trade-off 
education for child labour or the child contributing to home production. The first 
proxy included in the model for these decisions are the number of days the sampled 
child was absent in the month prior to data collection. This measure also 
incorporates days absent due to illness or other reasons, i.e. is measured with error 
and therefore is not included as a main variable of interest for household 
behaviour. A similar variable capturing opportunity costs in the long-term is the 
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pupil’s age, which is also included. As households may also differentiate their 
support for sons and daughters, I include a variable indicating gender. Finally, the 
vector of control variables also contains a time-dummy in order to remove any 
unobserved change over time. 
Although SACMEQ offers a large number of variables there are a few that are 
intentionally not included. For example teacher subject competency scores are not 
included in the model in order to assure comparability of findings across countries, 
as these data are not available for every country for every point in time. I also do 
not control for teacher and head teacher gender and academic education, as it is 
unlikely that these variables equip individuals with the necessary skills to teach or 
manage and lead a school. Another observable characteristic often noted in the 
literature is work experience. Literature from the US (cf. Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin et 
al, 2005; Hanushek, 2005) suggests that teachers improve only in the initial years 
of their career. Hein and Allen (2013) though do not find a clear improvement of 
teachers in SACMEQ countries even in the initial years. I therefore do not control 
for the number of years of teacher or head teacher experience.  
The estimates obtained from equation (2) are first reported separately for each 
country, which allows exploring how the specific country context frames school 
leader, teacher and household behaviour. Thus the findings from these models are 
likely to be very heterogeneous, as households, school leaders and teachers may 
differ in their preferences or will be exposed to different incentives. In some 
countries for example, pupils may receive extra tuition not because they are 
struggling at school, but rather to give them an additional advantage. Thus the 
correlation of this household behaviour may positive or negative depending on the 
existing household preferences in the respective country. Teachers’ behaviour may 
also vary not only due to the duration of their teacher training, both pre and in-
service, but also the quality of the training they received, which the equation (2) 
when applied to each country separately cannot account for. I therefore pool the 
individual country samples together and include country dummies, which accounts 
for all unobserved country differences.  
Nevertheless all findings presented here are correlational despite the large number 
of control variables, as confounders such as or other household support behaviours 
are unobserved. It is hard to eyeball the aggregate effect of the omitted variable 
bias here; teachers might interact differently with pupils of differing ability: pupils 
of differing ability might be grouped non-randomly into classes, so that teachers 
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and pupils are not matched randomly. Similarly households may invest less 
support in more able children. If this is the case, estimates of household support 
should be biased down. It is also possible that the variables of interest are 
measured with error, which will attenuate the estimates. The reader should also be 
aware that in the absence of experimental data, the direction of causality cannot be 
guaranteed to run from the right to the left in equation (2). 
 
1.5. Findings 
1.5.1 Estimates for each country 
Resource usage 
As expected, the findings in Tables 1.5.1a to 1.5.2b are indeed very heterogeneous 
and thus underline the importance of the individual country context. Among the 
group 1 countries, most estimates corresponding to the number of pupils sharing a 
teacher, school or classroom resources are not associated with achievement. For 
reading achievement the only significant correlations are for the allocation of 
pupils to teachers in Kenya and Zambia, where a one standard deviation increase 
in this predictor is associated with a 0.20 and 0.05 SD decrease in achievement 
respectively. For maths achievement, the estimate for the sharing of teachers in 
Kenya is very similar to that for reading. But the estimates show that for both 
Kenya and Zambia a standard deviation increase in pupils per classroom resources 
is associated with an increase in pupil achievement by 0.06 and 0.05 SD.  
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Table 1.5.1a: Final model for reading achievement (group 1 countries) 
 
 
Kenya Tanzania Zambia Zanzibar 
C
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o
l 
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Wave 2 
0.03 
(0.50) 
0.40*** 
(5.99) 
-0.26*** 
(-3.43) 
0.44*** 
(8.88) 
School location 
-0.02 
(-0.74) 
-0.09** 
(-3.18) 
-0.08* 
(-2.45) 
-0.10*** 
(-4.25) 
Pre-service 
teacher training 
0.08** 
(2.74) 
-0.04 
(-1.49) 
0.04 
(1.23) 
0.03 
(1.07) 
In-service 
teacher training 
-0.00 
(-1.25) 
-0.00 
(-0.58) 
-0.00 
(-0.23) 
-0.00*** 
(-3.58) 
No leadership 
training (head) 
0.09 
(0.80) 
-0.07 
(-0.11) 
0.06 
(0.91) 
0.03 
(0.57) 
Government 
school 
-0.39** 
(-3.06) 
N/A 
-0.47 
(-1.79) 
-0.62*** 
(-6.06) 
Pupil SES 
0.20*** 
(9.50) 
0.22*** 
(10.71) 
0.23*** 
(8.13) 
0.16*** 
(7.21) 
Female pupil 
-0.11*** 
(-4.42) 
-0.22*** 
(-6.31) 
-0.13*** 
(-3.99) 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
Pupil age 
-0.19*** 
(-10.88) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
-0.09*** 
(-4.02) 
-0.03* 
(-2.13) 
Has repeated at 
least one grade 
-0.17*** 
(-5.33) 
-0.19*** 
(-3.97) 
-0.36*** 
(-6.59) 
-0.38*** 
(-9.69) 
Days absent last 
month 
-0.09*** 
(-5.79) 
-0.15*** 
(-7.34) 
-0.09*** 
(-4.31) 
-0.08*** 
(-5.22) 
U
s
e
 o
f 
School 
resources1  
0.01 
(0.29) 
0.06 
(1.93) 
0.05 
(1.21) 
-0.04 
(-1.65) 
Teachers1 
-0.20*** 
(-6.07) 
-0.07 
(-1.52) 
-0.05* 
(-2.21) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
Classroom 
resources1 
0.01 
(0.29) 
0.03 
(1.10) 
0.04 
(1.69) 
0.01 
(0.14) 
Number of 
pupil-level 
resources 
0.01 
(0.23) 
0.03 
(1.26) 
0.07** 
(2.96) 
0.10*** 
(4.82) 
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t Receives extra 
tuition 
0.03 
(0.41) 
0.11 
(1.92) 
-0.00 
(-0.07) 
0.12** 
(2.65) 
Receives help 
with homework 
0.15** 
(3.29) 
0.03 
(0.67) 
0.12* 
(2.15) 
0.16*** 
(3.82) 
 N 7260 4701 3198 4886 
Notes: Estimates in national standard deviations; T-statistic in parentheses; 1 ratio of pupils 
per resource or teacher; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001  
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Table 1.5.1b: Final model for reading achievement (group 2 countries) 
 
 
Malawi Mauritius Namibia Seychelles South Africa 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s
 
Wave 2 
-0.02 
(-0.22) 
0.38*** 
(5.63) 
0.26*** 
(5.06) 
-0.13 
(-1.89) 
-0.17* 
(-2.38) 
School location 
0.03 
(0.40) 
0.00 
(-0.01) 
-0.08*** 
(-3.54) 
0.01 
(0.33) 
-0.12** 
(-2.85) 
Pre-service 
teacher training 
0.06 
(1.48) 
0.02 
(0.69) 
0.10*** 
(4.22) 
0.07 
(1.08) 
0.07** 
(2.65) 
In-service 
teacher training 
0.00 
(0.29) 
0.00 
(0.58) 
-0.00*** 
(-4.49) 
-0.00 
(-1.38) 
-0.01 
(-1.61) 
No leadership 
training (head) 
-0.21* 
(-2.37) 
0.10 
(1.46) 
-0.01 
(-0.21) 
0.03 
(0.46) 
0.01 
(0.22) 
Government 
school 
-0.11 
(-1.15) 
-0.14 
(-1.77) 
-0.52*** 
(-3.86) 
-1.03*** 
(-9.38) 
0.05 
(0.43) 
Pupil SES 
0.11*** 
(4.22) 
0.25*** 
(12.00) 
0.30*** 
(13.99) 
0.19*** 
(7.88) 
0.40*** 
(19.22) 
Female pupil 
-0.22*** 
(-6.41) 
0.14*** 
(4.41) 
0.03*** 
(3.93) 
0.22*** 
(14.18) 
0.12*** 
(6.03) 
Pupil age 
-0.10*** 
(-4.99) 
0.04* 
(2.00) 
-0.09*** 
(-7.86) 
0.04* 
(2.06) 
-0.10*** 
(-7.25) 
Has repeated at 
least one grade 
-0.21*** 
(-5.44) 
-0.72*** 
(-12.22) 
-0.31*** 
(-15.36) 
-0.24* 
(-2.39) 
-0.28*** 
(-10.86) 
Days absent last 
month 
-0.06** 
(-3.04) 
-0.12*** 
(-5.46) 
-0.04*** 
(-4.20) 
-0.10*** 
(-5.22) 
0.05* 
(2.05) 
U
s
e
 o
f 
School 
resources1  
-0.04 
(-1.33) 
0.09** 
(2.71) 
-0.05 
(-1.77) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
-0.08*** 
(-3.47) 
Teachers1 
-0.14*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.11 
(-1.29) 
-0.03 
(-1.21) 
0.07** 
(3.03) 
-0.11*** 
(-3.59) 
Classroom 
resources1 
0.02 
(0.84) 
0.10 
(1.17) 
-0.07** 
(-2.77) 
-0.02 
(-0.82) 
-0.00 
(-0.07) 
Number of 
pupil-level 
resources 
0.03 
(1.45) 
0.04 
(1.16) 
0.09*** 
(5.30) 
0.12*** 
(4.42) 
0.04* 
(2.42) 
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t Receives extra 
tuition 
-0.02 
(-0.31) 
0.47*** 
(7.77) 
-0.09** 
(-2.71) 
0.22*** 
(3.72) 
-0.10 
(-1.84) 
Receives help 
with homework 
-0.01 
(-0.29) 
0.00 
(0.10) 
-0.03 
(-1.00) 
0.22* 
(2.25) 
0.07* 
(2.02) 
 N 4822 3037 10813 2921 8683 
Notes: Estimates in national standard deviations; T-statistic in parentheses; 1 ratio of pupils 
per resource or teacher; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 1.5.2a: Final model for maths achievement (group 1 countries) 
 
 
Kenya Tanzania Zambia Zanzibar 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s
 
Wave 2 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(5.05) 
-0.11** 
(-2.90) 
0.16*** 
(5.00) 
School location 
-0.02 
(-0.58) 
-0.09* 
(-2.47) 
-0.07* 
(-2.20) 
-0.13*** 
(-4.97) 
Pre-service 
teacher training 
0.01 
(0.37) 
-0.09** 
(-2.77) 
0.03 
(1.21) 
0.03 
(1.17) 
In-service 
teacher training 
-0.03 
(-1.39) 
-0.01 
(-0.70) 
-0.01 
(-0.35) 
-0.00 
(-0.09) 
No leadership 
training (head) 
0.00 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(-0.28) 
0.00 
(0.14) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
Government 
school 
-0.10** 
(-2.94) 
N/A 
-0.10 
(-1.76) 
-0.13*** 
(-6.45) 
Pupil SES 
0.15*** 
(6.77) 
0.20*** 
(8.23) 
0.20*** 
(6.22) 
0.13*** 
(4.97) 
Female pupil 
-0.16*** 
(-10.99) 
-0.16*** 
(-8.33) 
-0.09*** 
(-4.51) 
-0.04* 
(-2.13) 
Pupil age 
-0.20*** 
(-11.12) 
0.00 
(0.08) 
-0.09*** 
(-4.19) 
-0.03 
(-1.50 
Has repeated at 
least one grade 
-0.07*** 
(-3.92) 
-0.09*** 
(-4.53) 
-0.16*** 
(-6.97) 
-0.12*** 
(-7.28) 
Days absent last 
month 
-0.07*** 
(-4.44) 
-0.11*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.07*** 
(-3.82) 
-0.06*** 
(-3.83) 
U
s
e
 o
f 
School 
resources1 
-0.02 
(-0.89) 
0.05 
(1.44) 
0.05 
(1.32) 
-0.05 
(-1.63) 
Teachers1 
-0.19*** 
(-4.91) 
-0.03 
(-0.57) 
-0.05 
(-1.80) 
0.04 
(1.04) 
Classroom 
resources1 
0.06* 
(2.30) 
0.01 
(0.44) 
0.05* 
(2.26) 
-0.01 
(-0.70) 
Number of 
pupil-level 
resources 
0.04* 
(1.98) 
0.03 
(1.33) 
0.07** 
(2.87) 
0.06*** 
(4.26) 
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t Receives extra 
tuition 
0.04 
(1.44) 
0.06* 
(2.22) 
0.00 
(0.08) 
0.07* 
(-2.44) 
Receives help 
with homework 
0.03 
(1.57) 
0.01 
(0.65) 
0.03 
(1.74) 
0.04* 
(2.34) 
 N 7272 4609 3214 4786 
Notes: Estimates in national standard deviations; T-statistic in parentheses; 1 ratio of pupils 
per resource or teacher; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 1.5.2b: Final model for maths achievement (group 2 countries) 
 
 
Malawi Mauritius Namibia Seychelles 
South 
Africa 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s
 
Wave 2 
0.07 
(1.44) 
0.18*** 
(5.05) 
0.15*** 
(5.99) 
-0.06 
(-2.00) 
-0.05 
(-1.31) 
School location 
0.03 
(0.46) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
-0.06** 
(-2.60) 
0.01 
(0.66) 
-0.11*** 
(-3.53) 
Pre-service 
teacher training 
0.02 
(0.60) 
0.02 
(0.79) 
0.08*** 
(3.56) 
0.05 
(0.78) 
0.08** 
(2.76) 
In-service 
teacher training 
0.03 
(1.10) 
0.00 
(0.08) 
-0.05*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.04 
(-1.14) 
-0.05* 
(-2.42) 
No leadership 
training (head) 
-0.07 
(-1.71) 
0.06 
(1.65) 
0.01 
(0.44) 
0.02 
(0.89) 
-0.01 
(-0.37) 
Government 
school 
-0.05 
(-1.27) 
-0.04 
(-1.49) 
-0.12*** 
(-3.77) 
-0.17*** 
(-11.83) 
0.01 
(0.55) 
Pupil SES 
0.09*** 
(3.43) 
0.25*** 
(12.02) 
0.30*** 
(13.68) 
0.20*** 
(7.99) 
0.39*** 
(16.31) 
Female pupil 
-0.14*** 
(-7.69) 
0.07*** 
(4.42) 
-0.00 
(-0.57) 
0.19*** 
(12.55) 
0.03** 
(3.01) 
Pupil age 
-0.09*** 
(-4.40) 
0.04* 
(1.98) 
-0.09*** 
(-8.49) 
0.04 
(2.00) 
-0.07*** 
(-5.40) 
Has repeated at 
least one grade 
-0.09*** 
(-4.68) 
-0.29*** 
(-12.21) 
-0.15*** 
(-13.58) 
-0.04 
(-1.69) 
-0.13*** 
(-10.69) 
Days absent last 
month 
-0.04* 
(-2.19) 
-0.12*** 
(-5.48) 
-0.04*** 
(-4.01) 
-0.10*** 
(-5.31) 
0.05 
(0.75) 
U
s
e
 o
f 
School 
resources1 
-0.01 
(-0.26) 
0.12*** 
(4.06) 
-0.04 
(-1.75) 
-0.05* 
(-2.05) 
-0.08** 
(-3.05) 
Teachers1 
-0.15*** 
(-4.25) 
-0.24** 
(-2.68) 
-0.05 
(-1.78) 
0.08** 
(3.29) 
-0.12** 
(-2.96) 
Classroom 
resources1 
0.04 
(1.20) 
0.22* 
(2.53) 
-0.03 
(-1.13) 
0.04 
(1.53) 
-0.01 
(-0.27) 
Number of 
pupil-level 
resources 
0.03 
(1.25) 
0.05 
(1.22) 
0.08*** 
(5.72) 
0.14*** 
(4.06) 
0.04* 
(2.03) 
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
ld
 
s
u
p
p
o
r
t Receives extra 
tuition 
0.03 
(0.96) 
0.18*** 
(7.92) 
-0.04* 
(-2.63) 
0.10** 
(3.38) 
-0.03 
(-1.11) 
Receives help 
with homework 
-0.01 
(-0.30) 
-0.00 
(-0.13) 
-0.00 
(-0.11) 
0.03 
(1.12) 
0.01 
(0.75) 
 N 4799 3042 10877 2865 8605 
Notes: Estimates in national standard deviations; T-statistic in parentheses; 1 ratio of pupils 
per resource or teacher; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Among the group 2 countries, estimates are more heterogenous. For example, while 
a one standard deviation increase in pupils sharing a teacher is associated with a 
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0.14 and 0.11 SD decrease in reading achievement in Malawi and South Africa, it 
is not associated with a change in achievement in Mauritius and Namibia, but is 
associated with a 0.07 SD increase in the Seychelles. Corresponding estimates for 
maths achievement are very similar. In addition, increasing the number of pupils 
sharing a maths teacher reduces pupil achievement (-0.24 SD). Analogously, while 
a standard deviation increase of the number of pupils sharing school resources is 
not associated with a change in pupil reading achievement in Malawi, Namibia and 
the Seychelles, it is associated with a 0.09 SD increase in Mauritius and an 0.08 
SD decrease in South Africa. For maths achievement the estimates again are 
similar for Mauritius and South Africa, but in addition, the estimated effect for the 
Seychelles is a statistically significant 0.05 SD decrease. 
As described above, equation (2) also includes the number of pupil-level resources. 
In Section 1.3 I describe that due to data limitations this variable is only available 
for the sampled pupils and it is not possible to obtain a variable of the number of 
pupils sharing a pupil-level resource in a given class that is not subject to classical 
measurement error. Nevertheless this variable is still interesting, for if these 
resources were to be shared among pupils in a class, an increase in class size 
ceteris paribus would lead to a decrease in this variable. The results indeed 
suggest that a reduction in the number of pupil-level resources can have an impact 
on achievement: For example a one standard deviation decrease is associated with 
a reduction in achievement in the Seychelles by 0.14 and 0.12 SD. A similar but 
weaker pattern exists also in Zambia, Zanzibar, Namibia and South Africa, but 
pupil level resources are not associated with pupil achievement in any subject in 
Tanzania, Malawi and Mauritius. 
Household support 
In respect to the correlation of household support behaviours with pupil 
achievement the data suggest different patterns for group 1 and 2 countries. 
Among group 1, receiving help with his or her homework is significantly associated 
with an increase in the pupil’s reading achievement by 0.15 SD in Kenya, 0.16 SD 
in Zanzibar and 0.12 SD in Zambia. In contrast receiving help with homework is 
only associated with maths achievement in Zanzibar (0.04 SD increase). Receiving 
extra tuition on the other hand is associated with an increase in achievement by 
0.06 SD in Tanzania for maths only, and in Zanzibar by 0.12 and 0.07 SD in 
reading and maths. Among group 2 receiving help with his or her homework is only 
associated with an increase in reading achievement in the Seychelles (0.22 SD) and 
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South Africa (0.07 SD), but it is not associated with maths achievement in any of 
these five countries. Receiving extra tuition on the other hand appears to be more 
consistent and is associated with increases in achievement of up to 0.47 SD in 
Mauritius. Namibia stands out as with estimates of a reduction in maths (0.09 SD) 
and reading (0.04 SD) achievement in respect to receiving extra tuition. The 
estimates may be due to the correlational nature of the multivariate analysis 
applied, so that the direction of causality may also be from the left hand side of the 
equation to the right. Thus, these estimates might indicate that in Namibia pupils, 
whose achievement is lower on average, receive extra tuition.  
1.5.2 Pooled model 
Although the reported estimates above demonstrate the important role the country 
context plays in framing human behaviour, the main aim of this paper is to gain a 
deeper understanding of class size mechanisms in general. As described in section 
1.4 I therefore complement the analysis above with a pooled model. The estimates 
reported in Table 1.5.3 show that across the sampled countries the usage of 
classroom resources is not associated with pupil achievement. The usage of school 
resources is only associated with a reduction in reading achievement (0.03 SD), but 
not in maths. Yet as above the usage of teachers, i.e. pupil-teacher-ratios are 
associated with a reduction in achievement in both subjects (0.03 SD in maths and 
0.04 SD in reading).  
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Table 1.5.3: Pooled model 
  Maths Reading 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s
 
MAL2 
-0.97*** 
(-23.37) 
-0.75*** 
(-17.47) 
MAU2 
-0.19** 
(-3.17) 
-0.62*** 
(-11.57) 
NAM2 
-1.09*** 
(-29.83) 
-0.74*** 
(-18.92) 
SEY2 
-0.64*** 
(-11.36) 
-0.42*** 
(-6.73) 
SOU2 
-0.96*** 
(-20.05) 
-0.87*** 
(-18.51) 
TAN2 
-0.12** 
(-2.99) 
0.31*** 
(7.51) 
ZAM2 
-1.14*** 
(-29.15) 
-0.86*** 
(-19.59) 
ZAN2 
-0.75*** 
(-19.6) 
-0.32*** 
(-8.34) 
Wave 2 
0.08*** 
(3.29) 
0.10*** 
(4.25) 
School location 
-0.04*** 
(-3.93) 
-0.07*** 
(-5.48) 
Pre-service training 
0.04*** 
(3.24) 
0.07*** 
(5.27) 
In-service training 
-0.02*** 
(-3.42) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.74) 
No leadership training 
(head) 
-0.01 
(-0.69) 
0.01 
(0.24) 
Government school 
-0.26*** 
(-5.17) 
-0.25*** 
(-5.09) 
Pupil SES 
0.24*** 
(22.52) 
0.29*** 
(28.78) 
Female pupil 
-0.10*** 
(-10.21) 
0.03** 
(2.87) 
Days absent last month 
-0.05*** 
(-5.48) 
-0.06*** 
(-5.46) 
Pupil has repeated at 
least one grade 
-0.22*** 
(-18.54) 
-0.28*** 
(-23.66) 
Pupil age 
-0.05*** 
(-8.16) 
-0.08*** 
(-12.07) 
U
s
e
 o
f 
School resources1 
-0.01 
(-1.45) 
-0.03** 
(-2.83) 
Teachers1 
-0.03* 
(-2.5) 
-0.04*** 
(-3.21) 
Classroom resources1 
-0.01 
(-0.9) 
-0.02 
(-1.24) 
Number of pupil-level 
resources 
0.06*** 
(8.39) 
0.07*** 
(8.53) 
H
o
u
s
e
-
h
o
ld
 Receives extra tuition 
0.06*** 
(3.34) 
0.04* 
(2.16) 
Receives help with 
homework 
0.02 
(1.26) 
0.03* 
(2.12) 
 N 49856 50321 
Notes: Estimates in standard deviations; T-statistic in parentheses; 1 ratio of pupils per 
resource or teacher; 2 estimates relative to Kenya; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Also the number of pupil-level resources is associated with achievement in both 
subjects and implies that any sharing of these resources with a pupil’s peers would 
harm the achievement of pupil sharing his or her pens, books and rulers, while 
benefiting the pupil receiving these resources.  
In the previous section the results showed that household behaviour could be 
associated with achievement both positively and negatively, which could be related 
to differing household preferences across the sampled countries. For example 
pupils may receive extra tuition not because they are struggling academically, but 
because their parents want to give them an additional advantage at school. The 
pooled model removes these differences. The findings show that in this sample 
receiving extra tuition is associated with an increase in achievement in maths by 
0.06 SD and by 0.04 SD in reading. On the other hand pupils receiving homework 
only seem to profit in respect to their reading achievement. 
The second question this sub-section wants to shed light on is the extent to which 
households can exacerbate or mitigate the effect of class size mechanisms located 
in the school. The findings of the pooled model show that households can indeed 
play an important role. Ceteris paribus, the findings suggest that the negative 
effect a standard deviation increase in class size can have on a pupil’s reading 
achievement through the usage of school resources and the teacher can be 
mitigated by supporting the pupil through extra tuition and helping them with 
their homework. For maths achievement, supporting the learner with extra tuition 
could even outweigh the negative effect of having to share the teacher with one 
standard deviation more peers.  
1.5.3 Summary 
The findings in sections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 show that the effect of an increased amount 
of pupils sharing school, classroom resources or teachers varies in magnitude and 
direction both within and across the nine countries. This underlines that the 
aggregate effect of a change in class size depends heavily on the individual country 
context, i.e. the preferences of households, teachers and school leaders as well as 
the incentives they are faced with. The pooled estimates show that when these 
country contexts are accounted for, sharing the teacher with an increased number 
of pupils is the main threat to a pupil’s achievement. Yet household behaviours 
such as providing the child with extra tuition in particular can counterbalance or 
even outweigh having to share the teacher with more peers.  
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1.6. Conclusion 
This paper explores the underlying mechanisms of class size effects and argues 
that a change in class size has a compositional effect and an effect on how school 
resources and teachers are used. The compositional effect combines two parts: First 
it is likely to change existing peer dynamics as literally individuals will either be 
removed or added to a class depending on the direction of change in class size. 
Second, if households care about the quality of their children’s education, they will 
need to reconsider the kind of school they send their children to, how much 
academic support such as extra tuition and help with homework to provide their 
children with, and the amount of education to invest in their children.  
A change in class size is also likely to require teachers to use the given physical 
school resources differently, i.e. apply different teaching methods when designing 
learning environments. Similarly school leaders will need to reconsider how they 
allocate resources to classrooms, and pupils and teachers to them. In this 
framework individuals do not need to behave optimally, so the directions of these 
mechanisms can be positive, negative, or zero and therefore require empirical 
estimation. 
It uses sub-Saharan African data of pupils in grade 6 from nine SACMEQ 
countries collected in the year 2000 and the year 2007. The paper employs 
multivariate linear regression to estimate the association of the school resource, 
classroom resource and teacher usage as well as households’ support towards their 
children with pupil achievement in maths and reading. The findings underline that 
the aggregate effect of changes in class size depend heavily on the specific country 
context as well as the directions and magnitudes of the individual underlying 
mechanisms. support the adopted framework, which expects estimates for the 
variables of interest to vary in magnitude and direction both within each country 
and between them. For example, estimates for the number of pupils sharing a 
teacher stand out especially, as these are associated with substantial reductions in 
Kenya at around 20 percent of a standard deviation, Malawi 14 and 16 percent of a 
standard deviation and South Africa at 10 and 12 percent of a standard deviation, 
but an increase of approximately 7 percent of a standard deviation in the 
Seychelles. These estimates indicate that teachers themselves are valuable 
resources that in Kenya, Malawi and South Africa, are unable to use themselves 
effectively when class size increases. At the same time the number of pupils 
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sharing a teacher is not associated with a change in learning in Tanzania, 
Zanzibar, Mauritius and Namibia.  
Estimates from a pooled model show that when these country contexts are 
accounted for, sharing the teacher with an increased number of pupils is the main 
threat to a pupil’s achievement. Yet household behaviours such as providing the 
child with extra tuition in particular can counterbalance or even outweigh having 
to share the teacher with more peers.  
Although this paper focuses on the sub-Saharan African context, it also has 
implications for class size studies in general. The findings here indicate that 
household support has the potential to counterbalance the effect of class size 
mechanisms located in schools or may be the main driving force. Furthermore the 
magnitude of household support effects is highly context specific and should be 
addressed accordingly. Thus Hanushek’s (2003) observation that the gap between 
pupils in smaller and larger classes in the Tennessee STAR randomised control 
trial does not increase over time could be explained by households adapting their 
support over time. Similarly studies based on Maimonides’ Rule (Angrist and Lavy, 
1999) should consider household support. Even without such information, 
providing longitudinal data is available, value-added approaches using lagged 
achievement may circumvent this issue.
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
 
 
Why do teachers differ in their quality? Pupil-fixed 
effects estimates from twelve sub-Saharan 
countries 
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2.1. Introduction 
There is common agreement that teachers matter in respect to pupil learning 
outcomes, and that there is substantial variation in estimated teacher quality in 
many countries. Empirically, teacher quality is usually explored in two ways. The 
first estimates the overall effect a teacher has on his or her pupils’ achievement in 
a subject. Such evidence is predominantly from the US and where researchers have 
access to large longitudinal datasets of pupils matched to teachers and schools. 
This data has enabled researchers to estimate the ‘total’ effect of a teacher on his 
or her pupil’s achievement and to isolate this estimate from school and pupil-level 
variables. The evidence shows between 0.06 and 0.15 SD of a pupil’s achievement 
in a subject is associated with their teacher and teachers appear to matter more for 
maths achievement than for reading achievement (cf. Nye et al, 2004; Rockoff, 
2004; Hanushek et al, 2005; Rivkin et al, 2005; Kane et al, 2006; Aaronson et al, 
2007; Clotfelter et al, 2007). Estimates from the UK are slightly higher suggesting 
that approximately 0.17 to 0.19 SD of pupils’ GCSE achievement can be associated 
with the teacher (Slater et al, 2011). 
Another line of research focuses on explaining why teachers differ in their 
effectiveness by estimating the association of teacher observable characteristics 
with pupil achievement (e.g. Vegas and De Laat, 2003; Bourdon et al, 2005; 
Aaronson et al, 2007; Metzeler and Woessmann, 2012). This allows exploring the 
skills teachers use when teaching and gauging their importance.  
This paper aims to explore this particular aspect of teacher quality in sub-Saharan 
Africa by examining the association of observable teacher characteristics and pupil 
achievement. Specifically, this paper focuses on characteristics that relate to 
teachers’ subject-matter competency, such as teachers’ academic education and 
their achievement in a subject-matter test in the subjects they teach, and their 
pedagogic competency, such as their pre- and in-service teacher training as well as 
their teaching experience.  
To date, developing countries lack the rich, high-quality datasets containing 
multiple observations of teachers matched to pupils that are available in the US. 
Thus the existing estimates for the African countries in particular are obtained 
from simple statistical methods and are therefore subject to more sources of bias 
than the US estimates.  
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In addition, although the US estimates are more robust, teacher labour markets in 
sub-Saharan southern and eastern Africa are likely to operate differently, leading 
to a very heterogeneously skilled teacher labour force, so that US estimates will 
not be suitable to inform policy in developing country contexts. Most strikingly, in 
developing countries teacher training and continual professional development may 
not be available to all teachers due to a lack of adequate financial and human 
resources. Especially in countries that are expanding their education systems to 
meet their Millennium Development Goals, many are forced to hire large numbers 
of new, potentially less well trained and qualified teachers due to a lack of choice. 
The financial constraints may also affect the quality of the skills teachers acquired 
when they were attending school, their teacher training and the professional 
development they have received. Mulkeen (2010) reports that teaching in sub-
Saharan countries tends to offer small salary increases that are determined by 
years of experience until a plateau is reached. Mulkeen reports that in Zambia and 
the Gambia a teacher’s salary is also partly determined by the qualifications he or 
she holds. Thus a different kind of people might be attracted into teaching in these 
countries compared to those in developed economies. In short, teachers in these 
countries may vary substantially in their quality and it is important to know which 
kind teachers’ skills explain teacher quality, i.e. a change in pupil achievement. 
In this paper I use data from the Southern African Consortium for the Monitoring 
of Educational Quality (SACMEQ) collected at two points in time either in the year 
2000/2002 or 2007 from twelve countries. The data are cross-sections of primary 
school pupils in grade 6 matched to schools and their respective teachers. In order 
to explore the association of teacher observable characteristics with pupil 
achievement I exploit the fact that pupils are tested in reading and maths at the 
same point in time, the scores on each of these tests are on the same scale, and that 
the respective teachers in each subject are also observed. I follow Clotfelter et al 
(2006) and allow for pupil-fixed effects, so that I associate the difference in the 
observable characteristics of the teacher who teaches a pupil maths and the 
teacher who teaches a pupil reading with the difference in a pupil’s maths and 
reading achievement score. In the SACMEQ countries used here pupils either have 
the same or two different teachers in maths and reading. I refer to estimating 
teacher quality when pupils are taught by different teachers. In the case when 
pupils are taught by the same teacher in both subjects, most teacher variables are 
the same for both subjects; hence the difference between them is zero. But in 
SACMEQ, as in other developing countries, teachers also sit an achievement test 
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in the subject they teach. If a teacher teaches both subjects, he or she is tested in 
both subjects. Thus I can estimate teachers’ differential teaching ability as a 
function of the difference in their subject-matter competency. As the pupils are 
tested at the same point in time, all variables that do not differ between these two 
subjects for a given pupil are removed in the differencing. The method thereby 
accounts for all school-level variables, the non-random matching of pupils to 
teachers, and all subject-invariant characteristics at the pupil level known or 
unknown, observed or unobserved. 
Although the focus of this study lies on cross-country patterns to gauge whether 
these patterns differ from those obtained from developed economy contexts such as 
the US, there is a second motivation for reporting estimates separately for each 
country. This reason is methodological as previous research by Fehrler et al (2009) 
and Zuze (2010) use the same data. I argue that these studies do not sufficiently 
address potential biases.  
My findings support the pattern emerging from the US, that there is no consistent 
pattern of teacher characteristics associated with pupil achievement. Furthermore, 
my findings suggest that the studies by Fehrler et al (2009) and Zuze (2010) who 
use the same SACMEQ data indeed suffer from endogeneity, as my findings do not 
reproduce their results. Moreover a number of findings are counterintuitive. As it 
is reasonable to assume that teachers need to combine both their subject-matter 
and pedagogic competency I then move on to examine the interaction of the two 
kinds of competencies. I do so by adding interactions between proxy variables of 
each kind of competency and find again that in most cases the interactions are not 
statistically significant. Nevertheless the evidence suggests that these two 
competencies are substitutes rather than compliments in six of the ten examined 
countries, i.e. pupil achievement suffers when these competencies are combined. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 introduces the 
reader to the existing literature and contrasts the substantive findings from 
developed country contexts with the few estimates from African contexts. It follows 
with an overview of the basic statistical methods employed so far. Section 2.3 then 
introduces the reader to the SACMEQ data and the implications arising for 
estimating the effect of observable teacher characteristics on pupil achievement. In 
Section 2.4 I present the method applied and discuss the associated strengths and 
weaknesses and argue that the pupil-fixed effects models applied here are the best 
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way, given the data, to eliminate as many potential sources of bias as possible. 
Section 2.5 presents my findings and the last section concludes. 
2.2. Literature 
To the best of my knowledge, the existing literature so far tends to estimate the 
association of teacher characteristics with pupil achievement in an ad hoc manner 
without specifying why certain characteristics should affect pupil achievement. For 
example, one might assume that the teacher effect T could be a function of their 
subject-matter competency W and their pedagogic competency D. I conceive 
teachers’ subject-matter competency as a function of their academic qualifications 
Q, and their pedagogic competency a function of their teaching experience, X, their 
pre- and in-service teacher training S, incentives M that motivate teachers to differ 
in their behaviour as well as their intrinsic motivation O.  
Tj = g(Wj(Qj), Dj(Xj; Sj), Mj, Oj)       (1) 
Apart from the observable characteristics mentioned in the previous paragraph, 
teacher achievement tests in the subjects is a proxy of W; teachers’ contractual 
status may incentivise them to differing behaviour. For example, teachers 
employed on temporary contracts may be more effective as they are trying to 
secure a permanent position. 
So far previous research approximates equation (1) assuming additive linearity, i.e. 
Tj is the sum of teacher j’s academic qualifications, teacher training, teaching 
experience, etc. Following equation (1) it is then reasonable to explore the 
compatibility of Wj and Dj. For example teachers with higher subject-matter 
competency may have a stronger impact on pupil achievement the better their 
pedagogic skills. I will return to this issue in section 3. 
2.2.1 What does previous research find? 
To aid the reader with this sub-section I will follow equation (1) and contrast the 
evidence from the developed countries with findings from the African context. 
In respect to subject-matter competency, teachers in developed countries do not 
tend to be tested in the subject-matter of the subjects they teach, so that 
researchers are limited to estimating the association of teachers’ academic 
qualifications and their pupils’ achievement. Aaronson et al (2007) find no 
significant impact of academic qualifications. By contrast, Clotfelter et al (2006) 
find a significant impact for teachers holding graduate degrees compared to 
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bachelor’s only and for teachers holding state licensure. In respect to pedagogic 
competency, Hanushek et al (2005) find that different kinds of teaching 
qualifications or passing scores on state licensure exams do not significantly 
predict pupil achievement.  
In respect to teachers’ pedagogical competency, Aaronson et al (2007) find that 
teachers holding a certificate in bilingual education are associated with a reduction 
in pupil achievement by 0.089 SD. There is conflicting evidence on how teachers’ 
work experience affects pupil achievement. Rockoff (2004) finds an effect of 0.15 to 
0.18 SD for a ten-year increase in work experience for pupils’ reading achievement. 
With pupils’ maths computation, he finds no experience effect after 8 years, and for 
pupils’ vocabulary and maths concepts test scores teachers do not seem to improve 
after being on the job for six years. In contrast Hanushek et al and Rivkin et al 
(both 2005) find that teachers do not improve after being on the job for five years. 
On the other hand Clotfelter et al (2007) find that a standard deviation increase in 
teachers’ work experience is associated with an increase in pupil achievement 
ranging from 0.06 to 0.12 SD in maths and 0.04 to 0.09 SD in reading. 
Corresponding estimates from sub-Saharan Africa are sparse as only few African 
datasets of teachers matched to pupils are available. Most notable are the 
Southern African Consortium for the Monitoring of Educational Quality (SACMEQ) 
datasets, from mainly English speaking sub-Saharan East African countries, and 
Program for the analysis of education systems of states and member-governments 
of the Conference of Ministers of Education of Countries sharing the French 
language (PASEC) datasets from French speaking West African countries. Both 
are repeated cross-sectional datasets and the findings vary according to the 
countries sampled.  
The literature from Africa suggests that incentives such as differing contractual 
status may play a role. Bourdon et al (2005) find that pupils of contractual teachers 
do not differ significantly in their achievement from pupils taught by regular civil 
servant teachers in Niger. In contrast, Vegas and De Laat (2003) find that pupils of 
regular civil servant teachers outperform pupils of contractual teachers in Togo. In 
respect to proxies of pedagogic skills, Vegas and De Laat find a negative impact of 
teacher experience. Fehrler et al (2009) conduct a cross-country analysis of 21 
countries form French (PASEC I) and English (SACMEQ II) speaking African 
                                                        
9 Computed from data provided in Aaronson et al (2007). 
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countries collected between 1996 and 2002. They find that academic qualifications 
are not significant in the French-speaking countries, but have an effect on pupil 
test scores of between 0.02 and 0.04 standard deviations in the English speaking 
ones. Further they find that teacher tests have an impact of between 0.21 and 0.32 
standard deviations in SACMEQ countries, but are not significant in PASEC 
countries10. Zuze (2010) analyses SACMEQ II and TIMSS data for Botswana and 
finds that both teacher academic education and teacher qualification are not 
significant in SACMEQ and none of the teacher characteristics are significant in 
the TIMSS data. The only highly significant predictor of pupil achievement in the 
SACMEQ data is the teacher test. Thus according to equation (1) the literature 
suggests that teachers’ subject-matter competency is more important than teachers’ 
pedagogic competency in the SACMEQ data. 
As will be shown below, these findings must be considered of inferior quality 
compared to those from the US, as the methods these authors use cannot 
convincingly remove many sources of bias. 
2.2.2 Which methods are used? 
The typical economic approach to estimating the effect of teacher observable 
characteristics on pupil achievement is to apply an education production function, 
according to which the achievement A of pupil i with teacher j in school k, is a 
function of the pupil P, the pupil’s household background H, the teacher T, the 
pupil’s peers C, school and classroom resources R, and school leadership L (cf. 
Hanushek, 1979). 
Aijk = f (Pi, Hi, Tj, Ck, Rjk, Lk)        (2). 
This model is often empirically approximated using OLS regression, which 
assumes additive linearity of the input vectors in equation (2).  
Aijk = α + β1Pi + β2Hi + β3Tj + β4Ck + β5Rjk + β6Lk + εijk    (3). 
When using observational data, such as SACMEQ, the T are likely to be correlated 
with the other right hand side variables. This is likely to be the case due to 
selection processes. For example teachers may prefer to apply to work in certain 
schools and schools may have preferences to hire certain teachers. Similarly 
governments might allocate teachers to schools where there is the greatest need for 
them. Within schools school leaders may decide to allocate their best teachers to 
                                                        
10 The reason for this could be due to the nature of the tests used in the different data sets. Whereas 
SACMEQ test the teachers on similar tests as the pupils are presented with, PASEC test teachers 
with a fictitious pupil’s French dictation and the teachers are required to identify the mistakes. 
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certain classes. These two selection effects may run in opposing directions. Thus, it 
is important that the other inputs in (3) are sufficiently controlled for. But even 
when equation (3) is estimated directly using all observable data available for the 
right-hand-side input vectors, as Fehrler et al (2009) and Zuze (2010) do, the β3 are 
likely to be subject to endogeneity as one does not tend to observe all elements of 
these input vectors, such as teachers’ intrinsic motivation. Econometrically, the 
error term in equation (3), ε, then contains unobserved variables, U, at all three 
levels 
εijk = Ui + Uj + Uk         (4). 
Alternatively one can extend this simple approach by simultaneously modelling the 
non-random matching of pupils and teachers as a function of parental school choice 
(cf. Vegas and De Laat, 2003; Bourdon, 2005). Again these matching approaches 
can only model matching on observable characteristics thereby ignoring any 
possible matching on unobservable characteristics, which may result in misleading 
findings. 
The key to addressing these endogenous biases in estimates of teacher 
characteristics is to have multiple observations of teachers and / or pupils. With 
longitudinal data on pupil achievement it is possible to include the pupil’s prior 
achievement in equation (3) as an element of Pi. Such ‘value-added’ approaches 
usually claim to simultaneously control for pupil ability, as well as for prior 
motivation of the pupil, family involvement and prior knowledge (cf. Todd and 
Wolpin, 2003). Following this line of argumentation, including prior achievement 
also controls for the effect of past teachers on a pupil’s achievement. In other words 
estimates of the impact of observable teacher characteristics T observed at a given 
point in time will contain the effect of other teachers if prior achievement is not 
controlled for and will therefore be biased. With longitudinal data only variables 
that change between these two points in time are potential sources for bias. 
Alternatively one might exploit the hierarchical structure of the data. One could for 
example exploit the fact that teachers teach more than one pupil. By assuming a 
teacher-fixed effect, i.e. that the teacher’s effect on achievement is the same for all 
of his or her pupils, one can estimate the average pupil achievement associated 
with the sampled teacher while allowing for pupil-level characteristics to influence 
pupil achievement. But as the teacher-fixed effects approach cannot estimate the 
association of variables at the teacher level, a second simultaneous regression is 
needed to estimate the association of teacher observable characteristics and the 
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teacher fixed-effects estimates (Aaronson et al, 2007). The disadvantage of this 
approach is that the teacher-fixed effects may also contain the effect of the school 
level. Thus, the estimates on T might be subject to endogeneity if one cannot 
sufficiently control for school-level factors. Aaronson et al (2007) also demonstrate 
that the number of observations for each teacher is crucial for the precision of the 
teacher-fixed effects estimates, and to minimise measurement error. 
Metzeler and Woessmann (2012) propose an alternative method to estimating the 
effect of teacher characteristics on pupil achievement. They use cross-sectional 
data on pupil-teacher matches in Peru, where the pupils are observed in reading 
and maths. They estimate equation (3) separately for each subject simultaneously 
as seemingly unrelated regressions allowing these two equations to be correlated 
for each pupil. The advantage of this method is that it accounts for each input in 
equation (2) to have a differential effect on pupil achievement in the two subjects. 
The disadvantage of this approach is that in order to interpret teacher estimates as 
causal, one needs to assume that all input vectors in equation (2) are sufficiently 
controlled for.  
In contrast to Metzeler and Woessmann (2012) Clotfelter et al (2006) argue that 
allowing for pupil-fixed effects addresses non-random matching of pupils to 
teachers. Algebraically, allowing for pupil-fixed effects, when pupils are observed 
in two subjects at the same point in time,  
Ai1k = α1 + β1Pi + β2Hi + β3T1 + β4Ck + β5Rjk + β6Lk + εi1k    (5a) 
Ai2k = α2 + β1Pi + β2Hi + β3T2 + β4Ck + β5Rjk + β6Lk + ε2k    (5b), 
can be achieved for example by solving equation (5b) for β1Pi + β2Hi and replacing 
this in equation (5a). This removes all variables that do not differ within pupils. 
Then the difference in pupil achievement in the two subjects is explained by the 
difference in intercepts and the difference in subject-level variables T and R 
Ai1 – Ai2 = (α1-α2) + β3(T1-T2) + β5(R1-R2) + (εi1-εi2)     (6). 
In summary, US researchers have access to rich longitudinal datasets that link 
teachers to pupils and annual measures of pupil scores, which allow them to 
address most sources of bias. The estimates produced in these papers can be 
considered the ‘gold-standard’ when it comes to estimating the effect of teachers on 
pupil achievement in the absence of data on random allocation of pupils to 
teachers, and have made a substantial contribution to our understanding of 
teacher labour markets. In contrast, developing countries do not have access to this 
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kind of data, so that simpler methods of data analysis prevail that cannot address 
the various sources of bias sufficiently.  
2.3. Method 
In this research I exploit the fact that in SACMEQ data, pupils and their 
respective teachers are observed at a given point in time in two subjects, which has 
not been done so far with this data to my knowledge. I apply a variation of 
equation (6) that can be summarised as 
Ai1 – Ai2 = (α1-α2) + γ(T1-T2) + µ(Z1-Z2) + (εi1-εi2)     (7)11, 
where the difference in maths (j=1) and reading (j=2) achievement A of pupil i is a 
linear function of the difference in intercepts α, the difference in teacher 
characteristics, as well as the difference in a vector of control variables Z, and the 
difference in errors ε.  
As I am examining differences within pupils, the fact that pupils are sampled at 
two points in time for each country does not play a role, as the sampled pupils are 
different individuals. Algebraically, the factor time is subsumed within the pupil-
fixed effects. Thus, I can pool pupils sampled at both points in time for each 
country. Especially as some of the examined countries’ education systems undergo 
substantial expansions, a rehiring of new teachers as well as a redistribution of 
teachers may accompany this. In other words the non-random distribution of 
teachers to pupils is likely to change. This might result in pupils being exposed to 
more different teachers and will thus improve precision of the estimated 
coefficients as well as of the corresponding standard errors, whereby the latter 
should reduce the chance of making a type-II error. 
In the SACMEQ countries used here pupils either have the same teacher or two 
different teachers for maths and reading. I therefore estimate equation (7) twice for 
each country; once for the sample of pupils taught by the same teacher and then for 
those taught by different teachers, providing the sample sizes of each pupil type is 
sufficient. I refer the reader to section 2.4 where I describe the sample used. I refer 
to estimating teacher quality when pupils are taught by different teachers. In the 
case when pupils are taught by the same teacher in both subjects, most variables 
are the same for both subjects, hence the difference between them is zero and these 
variables are dropped. In SACMEQ, as in other developing countries, teachers also 
sit an achievement test in the subject they teach. If a teacher teaches both subjects, 
                                                        
11 For simplicity I have changed the naming of the coefficients in equation (6). 
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he or she is tested in both subjects. Thus I can estimate teachers’ differential 
teaching ability as a function of the difference in their observed subject-matter 
competency. 
As described above, equation (6) nets out all confounders that are constant for each 
pupil at the given point in time with only differences at the classroom/subject level 
remaining. In other words, the estimates produced should contain less sources of 
bias than any previous estimates for these countries. Yet applying equation (6) to 
the SACMEQ data will not necessarily produce causal estimates of T for a number 
of reasons. In the following I will describe which reasons these are and how, if 
possible, these issues can be addressed with the data used. In other words, I will 
explain which variables are included in Zj and which should be included, but 
cannot.  
Endogeneity 
Evidence suggest that teachers may not be able to maximise the use of their 
pedagogic and subject-matter competency. This may be due to a number of 
variables, which, if these also directly affect pupil achievement, will lead to an 
endogenous bias in the coefficients of the teacher variables (cf. Wooldridge, 2002).  
First of all, while teaching, teachers will need to use classroom resources, such as 
school books. I therefore include the number of classroom resources as an element 
of Zj. Second, teachers might use their subject-matter and pedagogic skills more 
effectively with certain pupils (cf. Dee, 2005; Rawal and Kingdon, 2010). In 
SACMEQ it is possible to generate variables indicating whether the teacher is the 
same gender as the pupil and I include this variable in Zj. In the African context, 
the age of pupils differs substantially, as pupils do not all start school at the 
expected age and neither do all progress through the education system at the 
expected speed. I therefore also include the age difference between the pupil and 
the teacher in Zj. Teachers may also be able to use their competencies more 
effectively with pupils of differing ability or prior knowledge. This could be 
addressed if pupils’ prior achievement in both subjects were available. But as 
SACMEQ only observes pupils at one point in time, and no administrative data 
with a pupil’s performance on another test in the same subject is available, this 
potential source of bias cannot be addressed. Fourth, larger class sizes might be 
harder to manage, due to more sources of noise and commotion. This potential bias 
could be addressed by including class size in Zj, but as class size does not vary 
within pupil in any country in the SACMEQ data, i.e. the maths and reading 
classes have the same number of pupils, it is not possible to do so. 
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Apart from potential sources of endogeneity at the pupil and classroom level, the 
effectiveness of teachers’ competencies may also differ with teachers’ motivation. 
For example, if more highly motivated teachers receive better training and more 
motivated teachers teach better, there is reason to believe that omitting the 
difference in teachers’ motivation could be a source of endogeneity, if this has a 
direct effect on pupil achievement. Aslam and Kingdon (2011) explore the 
correlation of teacher classroom practices with pupil achievement using data from 
Pakistan and point out that apart from indicating how teachers teach, these 
variables may also proxy teacher motivation. SACMEQ contains questions on 
teachers’ teaching values, goals and practices, but the questions are designed in a 
way that does not generate sufficient variation in the data for two reasons: First, 
the respective variables are based on three-level Likert items corresponding to 1 
“Not very important”, 2 “Of some importance” and 3 “Very important”. Second, the 
questions themselves, to the eye of an educator, do not provoke variation in the 
data. For example, in respect to the goals of reading, the following have to be 
scored according to their importance: 
 Making reading enjoyable 
 Extending pupils’ vocabulary 
 Improving word attack skills 
 Improving pupils’ reading comprehension 
 Developing a lasting interest in reading 
It does not surprise that these items create very little variation, as these are all 
core goals of learning to read. 
Another source of endogeneity lies in different contractual status of teachers. As 
noted in equation (1), teachers’ effectiveness T may vary as a result of economic 
incentives. For example, teachers employed on temporary contracts might be more 
effective as they are trying to secure a permanent position. Similarly teachers on 
temporary contracts might also differ systematically in their observable 
characteristics, by for example being less well trained as their peers on permanent 
contracts. In SACMEQ information on teachers’ contractual status is not available 
at the teacher level, but only at the school level. Here the head teacher is asked to 
report the number of teachers either on permanent or temporary contracts. Due to 
the pupil-fixed effects strategy in the cross-sectional data, the school level is 
differenced out, but it is likely that an endogenous bias remains in the teacher 
estimates. 
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Apart from endogeneity, which will bias the magnitude and direction of the 
coefficients, the applied method is likely to face additional challenges due to 
measurement error on the continuous variables, the teacher test scores and their 
years of experience. 
Attenuation 
Observable teacher characteristics are potentially subject to random measurement 
error. If this is the case, observed teacher variables such as their years of 
experience will contain not only the true value but also an orthogonal disturbance. 
This disturbance will reduce the strength of the association between the difference 
of years of experience and the difference in pupil achievement. In other words the 
estimated mean association will be biased towards zero. The disturbance will also 
inflate the standard error associated with this estimate and could therefore 
encourage type-II errors. Common measurement error methods such Structural 
Equation Models (cf. for example Bentler and Chou, 1987) depend on multiple 
covariates of the “true” variable, for example repeated measurements of years of 
experience. These models estimate a latent, error free variable based on these 
multiple observations that is included in the estimation. In SACMEQ no such 
multiple observations of right-hand-side variables are available. 
To summarise, employing equation (5) with the SACMEQ data would purge the 
teacher estimates from more potential sources of endogeneity than any previous 
research using SACMEQ data, but a number of sources remain. Some of these 
potential biases can be addressed, so that I include a vector of control variables Zj 
for each subject that contains the teacher’s gender, the difference in the teacher’s 
and pupil’s age, whether the teacher is of the same gender as the respective pupil, 
whether the pupil receives extra tuition in the subject and the number of classroom 
resources.  
The main variables of interest here, T, are teachers’ academic education and their 
achievement in a subject-matter test in the subjects they teach, as proxies of 
teachers’ subject-matter competency, and their pre- and in-service teacher training 
as well as their teaching experience, as proxies for their pedagogic competency. As 
mentioned in section 2.2, it is also interesting to examine the interaction of these 
two kinds of competencies. In order to do so I run a separate model whereby I add 
interactions of the test score, as the proxy of subject-matter competency, with each 
of the three variables representing pedagogic competency discussed above (one 
year or more pre-service training, no in-service training, years of experience) to the 
vector X. 
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As the method described by equation (7) holds constant everything that does not 
vary within pupil, it is also possible to pool all countries together. I do not do so, as 
the obtained estimates from such a model will average across the entire sample, 
which may mask the cross-country heterogeneity or be dominated by large sample 
sizes. As the main foci of this study is to explore how useful evidence from 
developed countries is for individual countries, as well as to demonstrate the bias 
in previous research that provided estimates for separate countries, reporting 
pooled models does not add any value here and may even be misleading. 
 
2.4. Data 
2.4.1 Context and quality of the data 
The data used are from the second and third wave of SACMEQ, the Southern and 
Eastern Africa Consortium for the Monitoring of Educational Quality. The second 
wave was collected in the year 2000, the third in 2007. There are fifteen member 
countries taking part in total, of which twelve are used here. These countries are 
Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Tanzania-Zanzibar (from now on 
referred to as Zanzibar). In between these two time periods the education systems 
of Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Zanzibar especially underwent a large expansion, 
as substantial proportions of these countries’ school-aged population were not 
attending school. In other words, these countries lagged far behind reaching their 
Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education in the year 2000 (cf. 
UNESCO Global Monitoring Report, 2011). Other countries, such as Botswana, 
Mozambique and Swaziland, also needed to expand their education systems, but 
rather than suddenly abolishing all direct school fees and thereby encouraging a 
demand-shock of pupils wanting to attend schools, these latter countries gradually 
expanded access to their education systems. 
In each wave SACMEQ samples grade 6 pupils attending registered government or 
non-government schools. Thus the sampled data may not be representative for all 
schools if, as is the case in Kenya, private schools exist that are not registered with 
the government. Oketch et al (2010a) highlight that of their sample of low cost 
private schools in Nairobi, one quarter are not registered. But it is unknown how 
large this potential bias is for the entire country. The participating governments 
also have some leeway in the definition of the target population. For example, the 
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Tanzanian samples only contain individuals in government schools. In short, it is 
hard to ascertain the actual corresponding populations and the reader should keep 
this in mind. 
Pupils are sampled in two stages. In the first stage schools are stratified by region 
and number of grade 6 pupils, whereby the latter is truncated into two categories, 
small and large. Schools are then selected with probability proportional to the 
number of their respective grade 6 pupils. In the second wave, a maximum of 20 
pupils are sampled at random in each school in all countries except Namibia and 
Mauritius where a maximum of 40 pupils are sampled and the Seychelles, where 
all grade 6 pupils in the selected schools are sampled. In the third wave the 
maximum sample size for the second stage is increased in all countries apart from 
the Seychelles where again all pupils in grade 6 are sampled in the chosen schools. 
This time a maximum of 50 pupils are sampled in Namibia, Mauritius, Kenya and 
Zanzibar and a maximum of 25 pupils in all other countries. According to 
SACMEQ’s technical documents and country reports the response rates of pupils in 
the second wave are 89 percent in Kenya, 83 percent in Malawi, 93 percent in 
Mauritius, 92 percent in Namibia, 96 percent in the Seychelles, 85 percent in 
South Africa, 77 percent in Tanzania, 75 percent in Zambia and 83 percent in 
Zanzibar (Onsomu et al, 2005). In the third wave response rates are 91 percent in 
Kenya, 79 percent in Malawi, 89 percent in Mauritius, 91 percent in South Africa 
(Moloy and Chetty, 2010; Milner et al, 2011; Sauba and Lutchmiah, 2011; Wasanga 
et al, 2012). Response rates are not available for the other countries. Table 1 
reports the achieved sample size in each country. In total 81,185 pupils and 12,489 
teachers are sampled in these twelve countries. The sample sizes range from 2,964 
pupils and 217 teachers in the Seychelles to 11,446 pupils and 1,784 teachers in 
Namibia.  
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Table 2.1: Sample size of teachers and pupils 
Country Abbreviation Pupils Teachers Sample used 
Botswana BOT 7,190 877 7,186 
Kenya KEN 7,704 836 7,698 
Lesotho LES 7,395 546 7,383 
Malawi MAL 5,114 626 5,103 
Mozambique MOZ 6,480 2,845 6,422 
Namibia NAM 11,446 1,784 11,387 
Seychelles SEY 2,964 217 2,961 
Swaziland SWA 7,169 869 7,166 
Tanzania TAN 7,035 1,065 7,029 
Uganda UGA 7,920 891 7,891 
Zambia ZAM 5,463 724 5,429 
Zanzibar ZAN 5,305 1,209 5,247 
 
Total 81,185 12,489 80,902 
 
SACMEQ surveys consist of different parts: Head teachers are surveyed on their 
demographics and those of the school, as well as their own teaching. Similarly 
teachers are surveyed about their demographics and teaching. Finally the pupils 
are asked to fill in a questionnaire about themselves and their family.  
Pupils are tested in maths and reading in wave two and in a third subject 
‘health/science’ in wave three. Teachers are also tested in the subject they teach. 
For example if a teacher teaches maths, reading and ‘health/science’ in wave three, 
he or she will be tested in these three subjects. The pupil and teacher tests are 
similar, but not identical. SACMEQ pupil and teacher tests scores are based on 
multiple-choice items and are estimated using Rasch models (cf. Rasch, 1960). To 
make SACMEQ test score measures comparable over time, the tests in each subject 
in each wave contain common items. The test scores in both subjects are 
standardised to a SACMEQ-wide mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100 in 
wave 2. Thus the scores in both subjects are on the same scale, so that taking the 
difference between these two, as implied by equation (6) is valid. 
Rasch models (ibid), also known as one-parameter item response models, are 
commonly used to estimate competency in a specific subject and are also applied in 
the OECD PISA studies. Compared to the two and three parameter item response 
models, Rasch models neither account for guessing nor that items may differ in 
their quality to discriminate between higher and lower abilities (cf. van der Linden 
and Hambleton, 1997). Baird et al (2011) criticise the validity of PISA test scores 
because of the way pilot studies are conducted. Pilot studies are intended to 
identify items in which certain samples differ substantially from expected levels, so 
that such items can be improved or removed for the main study. As PISA tests are 
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not piloted in every participating country, it cannot be established whether all 
items used are valid. Kreiner and Christensen (2013) reanalyse PISA reading skills 
data from 2006 and provide evidence indicating that the Rasch models used by 
PISA are neither valid within nor across countries and that the produced rankings 
of countries are not robust.  
These weaknesses may also exist in SACMEQ, as the extent of piloting is unknown 
to the author. Further the language of testing may be a problem. SACMEQ tests 
are conducted in English, but English typically will not be the mother tongue of 
every sampled pupil within countries. Similarly children from wealthier 
households or from urban centres may come into contact with English sooner than 
poorer children. Also the age at which English is introduced as medium of 
instruction can differ across countries. In the light of these potential flaws in the 
provided Rasch scores, this research therefore assumes that their validity holds. 
In their technical documents SACMEQ acknowledge that item non-response exists 
‘occasionally’. In these cases, if less than 15 percent of the respective item is 
missing, SACMEQ impute the missing values by replacing continuous variables 
with the mean and categorical variables with the mode of the respective lowest 
level of aggregation in the data. In the case of this research, for most of the data 
used here the proportion of missing data is negligible or at maximum 5 percent in a 
given country. Only in Uganda there appears to have occurred a problem when 
surveying maths teachers in 2007. Here approximately 15 percent of observations 
are missing information on these teachers’ gender and subject-matter test, and 
approximately 9 percent of observations in Uganda lack information on the number 
of classroom resources and the number of years of teacher experience. For all cases 
with missing data I include missing dummies. For continuous variables, such as 
teacher test scores, I replace the missing information with the country mean for 
the respective year; for binary variables I categorise missing observations as “0” 
and include corresponding “missing data” dummies to correct for this arbitrary 
classification of the missing information. The only variables that are not imputed 
are the dependent variables, the pupils’ achievement in maths and reading. Thus 
the descriptive statistics and the findings reported below are based on the number 
of observations in the column titled “sample used” in Table 1. Comparing this 
column to the “total sample size” shows that the former, which indicates the 
number of observations without missing observations on either of the pupil scores, 
that missing observations on the pupil scores are negligible. 
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2.4.2 Which teachers are the pupils facing? 
As the title suggests, this sub-section describes the observable characteristics of 
the teachers the sampled pupils are exposed to. Thus the unit of analysis 
throughout this sub-section is the pupil. 
Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of pupils for each country that are taught by 
different teachers in the two sampled subjects. It shows two patterns. First, over 90 
percent of pupils are taught maths and reading by different teachers in 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zanzibar, Namibia, and the Seychelles in both 
SACMEQ II and III. In contrast a vast majority of pupils is taught by the same 
teacher in both subjects in Zambia, Botswana and Lesotho. Second, this graph 
shows that especially in Kenya, Malawi and Lesotho, there are substantial changes 
in how teachers are allocated to pupils. In Lesotho 4 percent of the sampled pupils 
are taught by the different teachers in the year 2000, while 35 percent of the pupils 
sampled in 2007 have different teachers in the two subjects. The data shows a 
similar change in Malawi, but in the opposite direction. Here 90 percent of the 
pupils sampled in the year 2000 have different teachers in maths and reading. Yet 
in 2007 this number has dropped to 50 percent. On the other hand, while 
practically all pupils in the year 2000 have different teachers in Kenya, only 7 
percent of pupils sampled in 2007 appear to have different teachers. This latter 
change might be due to the extreme demand-shock experienced by the Kenyan 
education system. Thus, in order to absorb the increased amount of pupils’ teachers 
who used to teach one subject might have been reassigned to teach more subjects.  
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Figure 2.1: Percentage of pupils taught by different teachers in maths and 
reading by year 
 
Note: Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence interval. Underlying standard errors account for 
clustering by school. Countries are sorted by values in the year 2000. 
As pointed out above, it is possible to run two models for each country, one for 
pupils taught by the same teacher and the other for pupils taught by different 
teachers, if the sample size for any of these two groups of pupils is large enough. I 
will therefore only report estimates for any of the two models if the sample size of 
pupils is at least 1,00012 to ensure I have sufficient statistical power. Thus I will 
report estimates for teachers’ differential teaching ability as a function of the 
difference in their subject-matter competency, for Botswana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia. Analogously, I will report estimates for teacher 
quality for all countries except Botswana and Zambia.  
The following paragraphs move the focus to describing the observable 
characteristics of the teachers that the sampled pupils face. For brevity I follow 
equation (1) and limit the focus to variables that relate to teachers’ subject-matter 
competency and pedagogic competency. 
                                                        
12 Although this threshold may appear arbitrary, sample sizes of approximately 1,000 individuals are 
typical in political science, for example when predicting elections and the popularity of political 
parties. 
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Due to the numerous constraints developing countries face especially in African 
contexts, not all teachers receive the full pre-service training that their country 
offers. Figure 2.2 therefore shows the percentage of pupils whose maths or reading 
teachers have experienced at least one year of teacher training. The graph shows 
that in eight countries 90 percent or more pupils have a teacher who has at least 
been trained for a year, this is not the case in Lesotho, Zanzibar, Mozambique and 
Malawi. In the latter three countries it appears that the amount of pre-service 
training a teacher receives correlates with the subject they teach as in Zanzibar 
and Mozambique the percentage of pupils whose teacher has received at least on 
year of pre-service training is higher in maths than for reading. 
Figure 2.2: Percentage of pupils whose teacher has more than 1 year of 
teacher training by subject 
 
Note: Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence interval. Underlying standard errors account for 
clustering by school. Countries are sorted by values of Maths teachers. The reported estimates are the 
intercepts obtained from linear regressions for each subject in each country that account for changes 
over time and missing data dummies. 
Analogously, not all teachers receive in-service training. Figure 2.3 illustrates the 
proportion of pupils whose teachers have experienced at least one day of in-service 
training. The graph shows that in none of the sampled countries are the figures 
above 80 percent. Most strikingly less than 40 percent of pupils are taught by 
teachers who have received any in-service training in Uganda, Botswana, and 
Namibia in both subjects, as well as Zanzibar and Kenya for reading. 
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Figure 2.3: Percentage of pupils whose teacher has no in-service training by 
subject 
 
Note: Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence interval. Underlying standard errors account for 
clustering by school. Countries are sorted by values of Maths teachers. The reported estimates are the 
intercepts obtained from linear regressions for each subject in each country that account for changes 
over time and missing data dummies. 
This pattern continues in respect to teachers’ academic qualifications. Whereas in 
developed countries teachers usually hold undergraduate or even postgraduate 
qualifications, developed countries tend to face a lack of adequately qualified 
teachers and therefore need to recruit individuals willing to teach, but who do not 
hold qualifications from higher education. Figure 2.4 shows the percentage of 
pupils whose teacher holds university entry qualifications or above. The graph 
shows that while in the Seychelles and Swaziland a majority of pupils are taught 
by teachers with such qualifications, in all other sampled countries this is not the 
case, especially in Malawi, Mozambique and Tanzania.  
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Figure 2.4: Percentage of pupils whose teacher holds university entry 
qualifications or higher by subject 
 
Note: Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence interval. Underlying standard errors account for 
clustering by school. Countries are sorted by values of Maths teachers. The reported estimates are the 
intercepts obtained from linear regressions for each subject in each country that account for changes 
over time and missing data dummies. 
According to the World Bank data from the year 2007, the three countries among 
these twelve with the lowest GDP per capita are Malawi, Mozambique and Uganda. 
Thus, one would expect that these countries lack sufficient resources to train their 
teachers as well as the other countries. Comparing Figures 2.2 to 2.4, Malawi and 
Mozambique follow this expected pattern and rank last in Figures 2.2 and 2.4, and 
respectively at the top in Figure 2.3. Uganda does not follow this expected pattern 
and ranks 7th in Figure 2.2, 3rd from the bottom in Figure 2.3 and 3rd in Figure 2.4, 
which suggests that teachers in this country are better trained and qualified as one 
may expect. 
I now move the focus to the left hand side of equation (6). Figure 2.7 documents 
mean pupil achievement scores for both subjects by country. The SACMEQ test 
scores are scaled to a SACMEQ-wide mean of 500 and a standard deviation of 100 
points. The figure shows, as one would expect, that of these twelve countries six 
countries better than the mean in both subjects. In Uganda, pupils on average 
appear to achieve slightly above the mean in maths, but not in reading. Figure 2.7 
also shows substantial differences between countries. Pupils in Malawi, for 
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example, are approximately 1.5 SD (153 test points) behind their peers in the 
Seychelles in reading. 
Figure 2.5: Mean years of teaching experience of pupils’ maths and reading 
teachers 
 
Note: Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence interval. Underlying standard errors account for 
clustering by school. Countries are sorted by values of Maths teachers. The reported estimates are the 
intercepts obtained from linear regressions for each subject in each country that account for changes 
over time and missing data dummies. 
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Figure 2.6: Mean subject-matter test score of pupils’ maths and reading 
teachers 
 
Note: Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence interval. Underlying standard errors account for 
clustering by school. Countries are sorted by values of Maths teachers. The reported estimates are the 
intercepts obtained from linear regressions for each subject in each country that account for changes 
over time and missing data dummies. 
As already mentioned, pupils in each country are either taught by two different 
teachers or by the same teacher in both subjects. Table 2 therefore reports the 
average difference in pupil maths and reading achievement separately, for these 
two groups of pupils. As before the estimates are scaled in SACMEQ test points. 
Negative estimates indicate that pupils tend to do better in reading than in maths, 
positive estimates indicate that pupils tend to do better in maths. The data shows 
that, apart from Zambia and Zanzibar, the magnitude of this difference in 
achievement is closer to zero when comparing pupils with different teachers to 
pupils with the same teacher in both subjects. For example in Kenya, pupils with 
different teachers in maths and reading tend to do 17 points better in their reading 
than in maths, compared to an 11 point gap for pupils with the same teacher. In 
Lesotho and Malawi pupils with two different teachers tend to do better in one 
subject, but this is not the case for those pupils with the same teacher in both 
subjects. This suggests that the variation between teachers, i.e. teacher quality 
may be larger than the variation within a teacher, i.e. differential teaching ability. 
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In Zanzibar on the other hand, pupils with two different teachers in maths and 
reading tend to do equally well on both tests. 
Figure 2.7: Mean pupil achievement test score in maths and reading 
 
Note: Error bars indicate 95 percent confidence interval. Underlying standard errors account for 
clustering by school. Countries are sorted by pupils’ performance in maths. The reported estimates are 
the intercepts obtained from linear regressions for each subject in each country that account for 
changes over time. As these variables are the dependent variables of my models, I do not mean – 
impute these variables. 
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Table 2.2: Mean difference in maths and reading achievement for pupils with 
the same or different teachers 
Country 
 
Different Teacher N Same Teacher N 
BOT -20*** 
(-4.14) 
857 
-7*** 
(-4.23) 
6329 
KEN 17*** 
(7.69) 
3749 
11*** 
(3.35) 
3949 
LES -22** 
(-2.80) 
1507 
-3 
(-1.34) 
5876 
MAL 4* 
(2.16) 
3424 
-2 
(-0.22) 
1679 
MOZ 13*** 
(5.99) 
6400 
11*** 
(4.26e15) 
22 
NAM -18*** 
(-10.97) 
10853 
-15*** 
(-4.09) 
534 
SEY -28*** 
(-8.72) 
2803 
-19 
(-1.75) 
158 
SWA -14*** 
(-5.95) 
5848 
-7 
(-1.26) 
1318 
TAN -25*** 
(-10.13) 
6748 
-3 
(-0.26) 
281 
UGA 25*** 
(4.37) 
7457 
8 
(0.52) 
434 
ZAM -4 
(-0.47) 
122 
-6** 
(-2.61) 
5307 
ZAN 0 
(0.07) 
4967 
-13* 
(-2.29) 
280 
Note: Reported estimates are scaled in SACMEQ test score points, with a SACMEQ-wide mean of 500 
and a corresponding SD of 100. T-statistic in parentheses. * = sig. at 95% C.I., ** = sig. at 99% C.I., 
*** = sig. at 99.9% C.I. Negative estimates imply that pupils tend to do better in reading than in maths, 
positive coefficients imply that pupils tend to do better at maths than reading. 
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2.5. Findings 
Having introduced the reader to the SACMEQ data and the kind of teachers the 
pupils in the sampled countries face, this section now analyses how these 
observable teacher characteristics correlate with the within-pupil difference in 
maths and reading. The main focus of this paper is to examine whether there are 
cross-country patterns and whether these patterns differ from US studies. In order 
to compare estimates across countries it is crucial that all estimates are on the 
same scale. Although the SACMEQ pupil and teacher test scores are on the same 
SACMEQ-wide scale, the variances are likely to differ across individual countries 
so that a one unit increase will be of different relative importance in each country. 
It is important to note at this point that I estimate the models reported in this 
section by computing the difference in pupil achievement and the individual 
subject-level variables manually before running equation (6) as a multiple linear 
regression. I therefore re-standardise all continuous variables in equation (6) to 
their national mean, coded as 0, and their respective national standard deviations 
as 1. Thus, the obtained estimates for these variables indicate the change in the 
dependent variable in national standard deviations, when the corresponding 
independent variable changes by one standard deviation. Another advantage of 
standardising is that it allows comparing the magnitude of the estimates obtained 
here with those of previous research13. One of these continuous variables that I 
standardise is the number of years of teachers’ teaching experience. Although a 
“year” is a scale of measurement common to all education systems, it is convenient 
to be able to compare the relative importance of estimates within each country. I 
therefore also standardise the number of years of teachers’ teaching experience.  
At the same time, the models estimated here include dummy variables. These are 
not standardised. Because the dependent variable is standardised, corresponding 
estimates represent the change in national standard deviations of the dependent 
variable when the respective dummy variable is “on”. 
Although the model applied here examines differences within pupil, the coefficients 
can be interpreted in the same way as if the model would regress, for example, 
pupil achievement in maths to the maths teacher’s test score. In order to aid 
readability of my findings I will report my findings in the following example for the 
association of teacher test scores: “teacher test scores are associated with an 
                                                        
13 Alternatively, I could standardise to the entire SACMEQ sample used. I prefer to treat each 
country as a different sample rather than as a sub-sample of the SACMEQ region. I also find it more 
intuitive to think of the effect of national SD changes in X on nationally standardised Y, rather than 
the effect of a SACMEQ-wide SD change in X on SACMEQ-standardised Y in a given sub-sample.  
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increase in ‘d’ standard deviations”. This statement though implies that a standard 
deviation change in the difference between a pupil’s maths and reading teacher’s 
subject-matter test score is associated with a change in the difference between the 
pupil’s maths and reading achievement by ‘d’ standard deviations. 
As described previously in section 2.2, the existing literature to date includes 
teacher observable characteristics in an ad hoc manner without explicitly 
specifying why these variables should be included and what they should proxy. In 
this paper I have therefore hypothesised how and why teacher observable 
characteristics may be related with pupil achievement in equation (1). Following 
this equation these variables can relate to teachers’ subject-matter, pedagogic 
competency, to incentives extrinsically motivating teachers to behave in certain 
ways as well as teachers’ intrinsic motivation (see for example Deci and Ryan, 1985 
for extrinsic and intrinsic motivation). In the absence of suitable data for incentives 
and teacher motivation, the following sub-sections will now concentrate on the 
former two kinds of inputs, teachers’ competencies. 
2.5.1 The association of teacher observable characteristics: 
Subject-matter competency 
As stated in the introduction, the main contribution of this paper is applying a 
pupil-fixed effects approach to estimating teacher quality, which reduces the 
number of sources of endogenous bias compared to previous research conducted in 
the African context. Thus, as the estimates are purged of more confounding factors 
more consistent trends may appear across countries. Additionally, because not all 
teachers in these countries have enjoyed a duration of teacher training or have 
achieved a level of academic education similar to developed countries such as the 
US or the UK, one might expect to also observe strong effect sizes. Yet the data 
does not support this expectation and some findings are counterintuitive as I will 
discuss below. 
For example, in respect to teachers’ subject-matter test scores one would expect a 
positive association, i.e. one would assume that the better a teacher has mastery of 
the content he or she teaches, the better they should be able to teach. Only the 
findings for the Seychelles (0.05 SD) and Zanzibar (0.08 SD) support this 
assumption (see Table 2.3). Yet in Uganda a one standard deviation increase in 
maths and reading teachers’ test scores is associated with a 0.06 SD decrease in 
the gap in pupils’ maths and reading achievement, thus suggesting that teachers 
with better mastery of their subject appear to be worse teachers. Where pupils 
have the same teacher in both subjects, I estimate whether the difference in a 
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teacher’s subject-matter competency explains variation in their differential 
teaching ability (Table 2.4). The data suggests that only in Lesotho is there a 
significant relationship; but again the coefficient is negative (-0.03 SD). 
Table 2.3: OLS estimates of teacher observable characteristics and teacher quality 
(equation (6) for pupils with different teachers) 
 Predictors 
(Xj; ΔZj) 
KEN LES MAL MOZ NAM 
S
u
b
je
c
t-
m
a
tt
e
r
 
c
o
m
p
e
te
n
c
y
 
Teacher 
Test score 
0.03 
(1.52) 
-0.02 
(-0.82) 
0.01 
(0.67) 
0.01 
(1.07) 
0.01 
(1.01) 
Graduated 
Primary 
school1 
-0.35* 
(-2.00) 
-0.02 
(-0.31) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
0.14* 
(2.14) 
0.04 
(1.50) 
Attended 
secondary 
school1 
0.03 
(0.83) 
0.21*** 
(3.21) 
0.25 
(1.44) 
-0.01 
(-0.32) 
0.01 
(0.62) 
P
e
d
a
g
o
g
ic
 c
o
m
p
e
te
n
c
y
 
1yr or more 
teacher 
training 
0.03 
(0.52) 
0.24** 
(3.14) 
0.06 
(1.76) 
-0.00 
(-0.06) 
-0.12*** 
(-3.84) 
No in-
service 
training 
0.03 
(0.73) 
-0.06 
(-1.26) 
-0.08* 
(-2.26) 
0.01 
(0.36) 
-0.03 
(-1.69) 
Years of 
experience 
-0.01 
(-0.36) 
-0.01 
(-0.59) 
0.02 
(1.31) 
-0.01 
(-0.94) 
-0.01 
(-1.24) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s
 Same 
gender as 
pupil 
0.13*** 
(4.52) 
0.05 
(1.17) 
0.02 
(0.44) 
0.04 
(1.61) 
0.03* 
(2.10) 
Teacher 
Gender 
-0.01 
(-0.46) 
-0.09 
(-1.81) 
0.16*** 
(4.05) 
0.03 
(1.04) 
0.03 
(1.83) 
# Classroom 
resources 
0.01 
(0.24) 
-0.01 
(-0.44) 
0.02 
(1.41) 
0.00 
(0.11) 
-0.01 
(-1.05) 
 
Constant 
0.00 
(0.50) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
-0.06*** 
(-3.09) 
-0.01 
(-0.97) 
0.00 
(0.03)  
 Ni 3749 1507 3424 6400 10853 
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Table 2.3: continued 
 Predictors 
(Xj; ΔZj) 
SEY SWA TAN UGA ZAN 
S
u
b
je
c
t-
m
a
tt
e
r
 
c
o
m
p
e
te
n
c
y
 
Teacher 
Test score 
0.05* 
(2.50) 
0.01 
(1.03) 
0.01 
(0.62) 
-0.06*** 
(-4.29) 
0.08*** 
(4.70) 
Graduated 
Primary 
school1 
0.05 
(0.53) 
-0.08 
(-1.61) 
-0.17* 
(-2.44) 
-0.11** 
(-3.15) 
0.55** 
(5.37) 
Attended 
Secondary 
school1 
-0.08 
(-1.80) 
-0.07 
(-1.47) 
-0.11 
(-1.75) 
-0.04 
(-1.73) 
0.17** 
(4.28) 
P
e
d
a
g
o
g
ic
 c
o
m
p
e
te
n
c
y
 
1yr or more 
teacher 
training 
0.24*** 
(3.43) 
-0.08 
(-1.64) 
-0.09** 
(-3.16) 
0.13** 
(2.60) 
0.03 
(0.68) 
No in-
service 
training 
-0.09** 
(-2.74) 
-0.04 
(-1.65) 
0.02 
(0.78) 
0.03 
(0.93) 
0.02 
(0.78) 
Years of 
experience 
0.05* 
(2.31) 
0.00 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.52) 
0.01 
(0.63) 
-0.09*** 
(-5.91) 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
v
a
r
ia
b
le
s
 Same 
gender as 
pupil 
0.20*** 
(5.32) 
0.07** 
(3.08) 
0.11*** 
(5.65) 
-0.04 
(-1.40) 
0.02 
(0.94) 
Teacher 
Gender 
-0.10* 
(-2.21) 
0.06* 
(2.55) 
0.05* 
(2.05) 
-0.01 
(-0.18) 
-0.01 
(-0.39) 
# Classroom 
resources 
0.03 
(1.29) 
-0.01 
(-0.67) 
-0.01 
(-0.69) 
0.02 
(1.74) 
-0.00 
(-0.07) 
 
Constant 
-0.06** 
(-2.92) 
-0.01 
(-0.53) 
0.02 
(0.28) 
0.03* 
(2.11) 
-0.03 
(-1.85)  
 Ni 2803 5848 6748 7457 4967 
Note: Estimates reported indicate change in national standard deviations. Continuous variables are 
nationally standardised to mean zero and SD=1, thus effect sizes are comparable across variables 
within countries and across countries. T-statistic in parentheses. 1 compared to “Graduated Secondary 
school and above”. * = sig. at 95% C.I., ** = sig. at 99% C.I., *** = sig. at 99.9% C.I. 
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Table 2.4: OLS estimates of teacher test scores and their differential teaching ability 
(equation (6) for pupils with the same teacher) 
Predictors 
(Xj; ΔZj) 
BOT KEN LES MAL SWA ZAM 
Teacher 
Test score 
-0.02 
(-1.68) 
-0.04 
(-1.94) 
-0.03* 
(-2.18) 
0.02 
(0.73) 
-0.03 
(-0.81) 
-0.01 
(-0.81) 
# 
Classroom 
resources 
0.00a 
(0.0) 
-0.04 
(-1.91) 
0.00a 
(0.0) 
0.00a 
(0.0) 
0.00a 
(0.0) 
1.27** 
(2.72) 
Constant 
0.04*** 
(3.34) 
0.01 
(0.30) 
0.02 
(1.45) 
0.07** 
(2.58) 
0.06* 
(2.15) 
0.02 
(1.04) 
Ni 6329 3949 5876 1679 1318 5307 
Note: Estimates reported indicate change in national standard deviations. Continuous variables are 
nationally standardised to mean zero and SD=1, thus effect sizes are comparable across variables 
within countries and across countries. T-statistic in parentheses. a variable is constant for all 
observations and is therefore automatically dropped. * = sig. at 95% C.I., ** = sig. at 99% C.I., *** = 
sig. at 99.9% C.I. 
The second proxy for teachers’ subject-specific competency is the level of their 
academic education. As this variable, and all the other variables discussed below 
only vary between teachers, the reported findings refer to samples where pupils 
have two different teachers for each subject. I report estimates for pupils whose 
teachers graduated from primary school or whose teachers attended secondary 
school compared to pupils whose teachers have university-entry qualifications or 
above. As teachers in developed countries usually hold an undergraduate or even a 
postgraduate qualification, one is tempted to expect the teachers holding university 
entry qualifications or above should outperform their peers who do not by a large 
margin. Yet the data shows that the teachers holding university entry 
qualifications and above do not appear to outperform their peers who have 
attended secondary school. Also they only appear to outperform their peers who 
have graduated from primary school by 0.35 SD in Kenya, 0.17 SD in Tanzania and 
0.11 SD in Uganda. Instead the estimates suggest that teachers with university 
entry qualifications might be outperformed by their academically less well-
educated peers by 0.14 SD in Mozambique and by more than half a standard 
deviation (0.55 SD) in Zanzibar, for primary school graduates, and by 0.21 SD in 
Lesotho and 0.17 SD in Zanzibar for secondary school attendees. SACMEQ data 
does not allow delving deeper into the causes for these findings. Thus it is 
impossible to explore whether have certain skills, such as using a more simpler 
vocabulary while teaching which may aid pupils’ comprehension of the content, or 
whether the reference category teachers differ in their motivation, for example 
because they are pursuing a career in the ministry and are using teaching as an 
entry path. 
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2.5.2 The association of teacher observable characteristics: 
Pedagogic competency 
In this sub-section I shift the focus to proxies of teachers’ pedagogic competency. In 
this study I consider teachers’ pre-service and in-service training, as well as their 
years of teaching experience as sources of pedagogic competency. Again one could 
expect that teachers with at least one year of pre-service training and those with 
in-service training should outperform their peers that do not meet these criteria. 
As above there are no consistent patterns across countries and some 
counterintuitive findings. In respect to teachers’ with at least one year of pre-
service training, although findings for Lesotho and the Seychelles (0.24 SD) and 
Uganda (0.13 SD) support the initial expectation, estimates for Namibia (-0.12 SD) 
and Tanzania (-0.09 SD) indicate that the teachers who do not meet this threshold 
outperform their peers who do. In respect to in-service training, teachers who do 
not have any in-service training appear to be 0.08 and 0.09 SD less effective in 
Malawi and the Seychelles, which supports the initial expectation, there is no such 
support in the other ten countries. 
In respect to teachers’ teaching experience one might expect that, because not 
every teacher in each of these countries has been as highly educated academically, 
nor do all teachers enjoy the same amount of in-service and pre-service teacher 
training, there may be returns to teaching experience throughout the teaching 
career and not only for the initial years as the literature from the US suggests. 
Interestingly the findings here follow the pattern of the US. In ten of the twelve 
countries is there no statistically significant association. Only in the Seychelles do 
teachers appear to improve throughout their career so that on average a standard 
deviation increase in maths and reading teachers’ experience is associated with a 
0.05 SD increase in the difference in a pupil’s maths and reading achievement. In 
contrast this association is negative (-0.09 SD) in Zanzibar, which may suggest for 
example that with increasing experience teachers lose their motivation or “burn 
out” (cf. Maslach et al, 2001). In order to test whether the statistically insignificant 
estimates for the ten countries may be due to the fact that, as in the US, teachers 
in their initial years are less effective than their more experienced peers, I replace 
the continuous measure of teaching experience with a dummy indicating teacher in 
their first 5 years of their career (table not reported). The findings suggest that 
these teachers are less effective by 0.1 SD in Uganda. In contrast this group of 
teachers outperforms their peers by 0.14 SD in Zanzibar. This counterintuitive 
finding may represent a cohort effect, such that these relatively inexperienced 
teachers have, for example, enjoyed better quality teacher training. 
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2.5.3 Illustrating the selection bias 
The main motivation driving the choice of method is to reduce selection bias in the 
estimators of interest. In this section I will therefore compare my findings reported 
above with two models, one for each subject, that include school-fixed effects which 
control for all school-level variables, observable and unobservable. In other words, 
these models control for the non-random matching of pupils and teachers to school, 
but do not control for the non-random matching within schools. As each of these 
models refers to one subject only, each contains all pupils regardless whether they 
are taught by the same or by different teachers in both subjects. The results of 
these models are reported in Table 2.5a and 2.5b. 
Table 2.5a: Within-school estimates of teacher quality for maths 
Predictors (Xj) 
 
BOT KEN LES MAL MOZ NAM 
Teacher Test score 0.01 
(0.35) 
0.04 
(1.28) 
-0.03 
(-0.65) 
-0.05 
(-0.25) 
0.02 
(0.69) 
-0.04 
(-1.03) 
Graduated Primary 
school1 
-0.16* 
(-1.99) 
-0.79*** 
(-6.21) 
0.17 
(1.35) 
a 
-0.26 
(-1.58) 
0.09 
(1.02) 
Attended Secondary 
school1 
-0.03 
(-0.57) 
-0.03 
(-0.45) 
0.19 
(1.9) 
0.45 
(1.5) 
0.03 
(0.31) 
0.01 
(0.11) 
1yr or more teacher 
training 
0.14 
(1.77) 
-0.10 
(-0.96) 
0.33*** 
(4.0) 
-0.11 
(-0.98) 
0.09 
(1.52) 
-0.21 
(-1.84) 
No in-service 
training 
0.06 
(1.14) 
-0.08 
(-0.89) 
-0.23*** 
(-3.26) 
-0.39 
(-1.36) 
-0.01 
(-0.27) 
0.11 
(1.82) 
Years of experience -0.08* 
(-2.44) 
-0.39*** 
(-6.98) 
-0.25*** 
(-4.36) 
-0.24*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.03 
(-0.89) 
-0.22*** 
(-5.96) 
Constant 
-1.02*** 
(-6.82) 
-1.88** 
(-2.92) 
-1.23*** 
(-3.62) 
-0.43 
(-0.86) 
-0.36* 
(-2.48) 
-0.89*** 
(-5.11) 
N 7186 7698 7383 5103 6422 11387 
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Table 2.5a continued 
Predictors (Xj) 
 
SEY SWA TAN UGA ZAM ZAN 
Teacher Test score -0.02 
(-0.25) 
0.19 
(1.12) 
0.04 
(0.79) 
-0.07 
(-0.87) 
-0.02 
(-0.71) 
0.11* 
(2.23) 
Graduated Primary 
school1 
-1.13*** 
(-4.49) 
a 
0.73* 
(2.13) 
0.52 
(1.77) 
-0.04 
(-0.44) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
Attended Secondary 
school1 
-0.55* 
(-2.42) 
0.89*** 
(8.10) 
0.31 
(1.47) 
0.38 
(1.61) 
-0.02 
(-0.33) 
-0.13 
(-1.21) 
1yr or more teacher 
training 
0.39 
(1.72) 
a 
-0.02 
(-0.20) 
-0.39 
(-0.58) 
-0.05 
(-0.62) 
-0.13 
(-1.04) 
No in-service 
training 
0.18 
(0.87) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.23* 
(2.02) 
-0.29 
(-0.87) 
0.06 
(0.99) 
-0.08 
(-0.96) 
Years of experience 0.15 
(0.22) 
-0.22 
(-1.28) 
0.18* 
(2.32) 
-0.36*** 
(-3.73) 
-0.09 
(-1.71) 
0.00 
(-0.01) 
Constant -3.75* 
(-2.11) 
-1.43* 
(-2.23) 
-0.82 
(-1.68) 
0.65 
(0.94) 
0.04 
(0.22) 
0.11 
(0.40) 
N 2961 7166 7029 7891 5429 5247 
Note: Estimates reported indicate change in national standard deviations. Continuous variables are 
nationally standardised to mean zero and SD=1, thus effect sizes are comparable across variables 
within countries and across countries. T-statistic in parentheses. 1 compared to “Graduated Secondary 
school and above”. * = sig. at 95% C.I., ** = sig. at 99% C.I., *** = sig. at 99.9% C.I. Estimates 
conditional on the number of days the pupil was absent in the month prior to testing, whether the pupil 
has repeated a grade, pupil SES, Teacher gender, whether the teacher is the same gender as the pupil, 
the number of classroom resources and the survey wave in which the pupil was observed. a variable is 
constant for all observations and is therefore automatically dropped. 
 
 
Table 2.5b: Within-school estimates of teacher quality for reading 
Predictors (Xj) 
 
BOT KEN LES MAL MOZ NAM 
Teacher Test score 0.02 
(1.03) 
0.08* 
(2.00) 
0.04 
(0.78) 
0.09 
(0.97) 
-0.02 
(-0.65) 
0.04 
(1.20) 
Graduated Primary 
school1 
-0.09 
(-1.31) 
-0.05 
(-0.28) 
-0.08 
(-0.71) 
-0.58 
(-1.41) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
-0.08 
(-0.49) 
Attended Secondary 
school1 
-0.04 
(-0.94) 
0.04 
(0.58) 
-0.24* 
(-2.11) 
-0.52* 
(-2.16) 
0.10 
(1.36) 
-0.08 
(-1.62) 
1yr or more teacher 
training 
0.09 
(1.06) 
-0.62*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.11 
(-0.6) 
-0.01 
(-0.05) 
-0.14** 
(-2.9) 
-0.09 
(-0.74) 
No in-service 
training 
0.03 
(0.77) 
-0.06 
(-0.83) 
-0.15 
(-1.48) 
-0.29 
(-1.24) 
0.03 
(0.63) 
-0.07 
(-1.05) 
Years of experience -0.09** 
(-3.05) 
-0.40*** 
(-4.91) 
-0.30*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.21 
(-1.38) 
-0.17*** 
(-4.39) 
-0.19*** 
(-4.35) 
Constant -1.08*** 
(-6.02) 
-2.03* 
(-2.62) 
-0.75 
(-1.68) 
-0.13 
(-0.19) 
-0.43*** 
(-3.28) 
-0.69** 
(-3.08) 
N 7190 7704 7395 5114 6480 11446 
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Table 2.5b continued 
Predictors (Xj) 
 
SEY SWA TAN UGA ZAM ZAN 
Teacher Test score 0.02 
(0.25) 
-0.46*** 
(-3.56) 
0.04 
(0.70) 
0.02 
(0.95) 
-0.01 
(-0.43) 
-0.01 
(-0.27) 
Graduated Primary 
school1 
-0.52 
(-1.45) 
a 
0.61 
(1.43) 
-0.27* 
(-2.42) 
-0.13 
(-1.50) 
0.43* 
(2.16) 
Attended Secondary 
school1 
-0.05 
(-0.34) 
0.90*** 
(3.58) 
0.47 
(1.26) 
-0.04 
(-0.47) 
-0.10 
(-1.26) 
0.23* 
(2.29) 
1yr or more teacher 
training 
0.18 
(0.48) 
a 
0.19 
(1.43) 
-0.04 
(-0.27) 
0.03 
(0.37) 
0.14 
(1.25) 
No in-service 
training 
0.24 
(1.61) 
0.91** 
(2.69) 
0.04 
(0.42) 
0.07 
(0.70) 
0.17* 
(2.25) 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
Years of experience -0.10 
(-0.37) 
-1.04*** 
(-6.67) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.20*** 
(-4.16) 
-0.11 
(-1.86) 
-0.13 
(-1.77) 
Constant -2.90*** 
(-3.63) 
-2.96*** 
(-5.48) 
-1.18** 
(-2.88) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.59** 
(-2.92) 
-0.61** 
(-2.60) 
N 2964 7169 7035 7920 5463 5305 
Note: Estimates reported indicate change in national standard deviations. Continuous variables are 
nationally standardised to mean zero and SD=1, thus effect sizes are comparable across variables 
within countries and across countries. T-statistic in parentheses. 1 compared to “Graduated Secondary 
school and above”. * = sig. at 95% C.I., ** = sig. at 99% C.I., *** = sig. at 99.9% C.I. Estimates 
conditional on the number of days the pupil was absent in the month prior to testing, whether the pupil 
has repeated a grade, pupil SES, Teacher gender, whether the teacher is the same gender as the pupil, 
the number of classroom resources and the survey wave in which the pupil was observed. a variable is 
constant for all observations and is therefore automatically dropped. 
If the pupil-teacher allocation were random within school, the estimates from both 
the school-fixed and the pupil-fixed effects models should be the same. Yet at first 
glance it becomes clear that this is not the case, as a completely different picture 
emerges. This finding strongly supports the hypothesis that previous research such 
as by Fehrler et al (2008) or Zuze (2010) does not sufficiently address the pupil-
teacher matching problem. Zuze (2010) applies a multilevel approach, as do 
Fehrler et al (2008), who also apply a country-fixed effects specification. Although 
the latter include many covariates for the pupil, teacher and school level, the 
results shown in Tables 5a and 5b suggest that the allocation of pupils to teachers 
contains a substantial unobservable part. Furthermore, comparing the school-fixed 
effects models to the pupil-fixed effects models reported above strongly supports 
the assumption that even within schools, the pupil-teacher matching process is not 
random and ignoring this will lead to completely different conclusions if such 
findings were to be used for the basis of education policies. 
Apart from differing from the pupil-fixed effects models, the estimates of the 
school-fixed effects models differ by subject. This pattern supports previous 
findings from the US (cf. Nye et al, 2004; Rockoff, 2004; Hanushek et al, 2005; 
Rivkin et al, 2005; Kane et al, 2006; Aaronson et al, 2007; Clotfelter et al, 2007; 
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Slater et al, 2011). The estimates here though suggest that years of teaching 
experience are the most consistent predictor for teacher quality; the coefficients are 
statistically significant at or below the five percent level in 7 countries for both 
subjects – but these are not necessarily the same countries in both models. The 
effect sizes in the school-fixed effect models are also surprisingly large. In 
Swaziland for example, a standard deviation increase in teaching experience is 
associated with 1.04 SD decline in pupil reading achievement.  
2.5.4 Interactions of teachers’ subject-matter and pedagogic 
competencies 
I now return to the pupil-fixed effects models. Having grouped the available 
teacher characteristics into proxies of either teachers’ subject-matter or pedagogic 
competency (see equation (1)), I now explore the interaction of these two kinds of 
competencies. I add a vector of interactions. Specifically these are interactions of 
the test score, as the proxy of subject-matter competency, with each of the three 
variables representing pedagogic competency discussed above (one year or more 
pre-service training, no in-service training, years of experience). A statistically 
significant and positive finding indicates complementarity, as combining these two 
competencies maximises pupil achievement. In contrast, a statistically significant 
negative estimates indicates the two competencies are substitutes, as trading off 
one competency in favour of the other maximises pupil achievement. Arguably, 
teaching involves combining both competencies, so that policy should strive to 
avoid these from being substitutes. 
The findings of these interactions are reported in the lower half of Table 2.6, the 
corresponding direct effects are reported in the top half of said table. Table 2.6 
reports estimates for the ten countries that have sufficient data of pupils taught by 
different teachers for maths and reading. Only these samples can be used, because 
when pupils have the same teacher for both subjects, the only variable that differs 
between subjects is the teacher’s respective subject-matter test score. Comparing 
the estimates for the interaction of teacher test scores and their years of experience, 
in 4 of these ten countries the combination of these two competencies does not 
appear to affect pupil achievement. In contrast in Mozambique and Swaziland 
(both 0.03 SD) these two competencies appear to fit together well, whereas in 
Malawi, the Seychelles and Uganda (each -0.04 SD) and Namibia (-0.02 SD) there 
appears to be a bad fit. In respect to the interaction of teacher test scores and 
having at least one year of pre-service training, findings suggest that these two 
competencies fit well in Kenya (0.16 SD), but in Mozambique and Tanzania this 
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interaction is associated with a reduction in pupil achievement by 0.08 and 0.11 SD 
respectively. 
 
  
  88 
Table 2.6: Interaction effects of Teacher Test score with proxies of teachers’ 
pedagogic competency (for pupils with different teachers) 
  KEN LES MAL MOZ NAM 
D
ir
e
c
t 
e
ff
e
c
t 
Teacher Test 
Score 
0.04* -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 
(1.97) (-0.48) (0.99) (0.32) (0.83) 
1yr or more 
Teacher 
Training 
-0.06 0.23** 0.06 -0.02 -0.12*** 
(-0.70) (3.07) (1.68) (-0.76) (-3.83) 
No In-service 
training 
0.03 -0.05 -0.08* 0.01 -0.03 
(0.79) (-1.04) (-2.48) (0.42) (-1.61) 
Years of 
teaching 
experience 
0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
(0.22) (-0.70) (0.23) (-0.69) (-1.24) 
In
te
r
a
c
ti
o
n
 e
ff
e
c
t 
Test Score*Ex-
perience 
-0.03 -0.01 -0.04*** 0.03* -0.02* 
(-1.67) (-0.34) (-3.50) (2.46) (-2.37) 
Test Score*1yr 
or more training 
0.16* 0.10 0.06 -0.08*** -0.02 
(2.36) (1.41) (1.73) (-3.26) (-0.68) 
Test Score*No 
In-service 
training 
0.01 -0.04 0.12*** -0.06** 0.03 
(0.21) (-0.98) (3.99) (-2.58) (1.88) 
 Ni 3749 1507 3424 6400 10853 
Note: Estimates reported indicate change in national standard deviations. Continuous variables are 
nationally standardised to mean zero and SD=1, thus effect sizes are comparable across variables 
within countries and across countries. T-statistic in parentheses; * = sig. at 95% C.I., ** = sig. at 99% 
C.I., *** = sig. at 99.9% C.I. 
 
Table 2.6 continued 
  SEY SWA TAN UGA ZAN 
D
ir
e
c
t 
e
ff
e
c
t 
Teacher Test 
Score 
0.05* 0.02 0.01 -0.05*** 0.08*** 
(2.50) (1.23) (0.40) (-4.24) (4.62) 
1yr or more 
Teacher Training 
0.21** -0.08 -0.10** 0.14** 0.03 
(2.91) (-1.78) (-3.26) (2.73) (0.76) 
No In-service 
training 
-0.09** -0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 
(-2.93) (-1.88) (0.67) (1.18) (0.67) 
Years of teaching 
experience 
0.06* 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.09*** 
(2.38) (0.03) (0.63) (1.38) (-5.63) 
In
te
r
a
c
ti
o
n
 e
ff
e
c
t Test 
Score*Experience 
-0.04* 0.03* 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 
(-2.28) (2.29) (0.76) (-3.22) (0.54) 
Test Score*1yr or 
more training 
0.02 -0.00 -0.11*** -0.04 0.03 
(0.21) (-0.14) (-3.63) (-1.43) (0.74) 
Test Score*No In-
service training 
0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05* 
(0.02) (0.73) (-1.13) (-1.60) (-1.98) 
 Ni 2803 5848 6748 7457 4967 
Note: Estimates reported indicate change in national standard deviations. Continuous variables are 
nationally standardised to mean zero and SD=1, thus effect sizes are comparable across variables 
within countries and across countries. T-statistic in parentheses. * = sig. at 95% C.I., ** = sig. at 99% 
C.I., *** = sig. at 99.9% C.I. Apart from the interactions included in this model, the same variables are 
included as reported in table 4, but these are omitted here to aid readability. 
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In respect to the interaction of teacher test scores and not having any in-service 
training, one would expect that if these two competencies were complimentary to 
one another the obtained coefficient should be negative. This is the case in 5 
countries, but the effects are only statistically significant at p≤0.05 in Mozambique 
and Zanzibar (-0.06 SD and -0.05 SD). In contrast there appears to be a bad fit of 
these two competencies in Malawi (0.12 SD). 
2.5.5 Summary 
In summary, the findings challenge the expectation that teacher effectiveness 
differs due to the same variables consistently across these sampled countries. This 
pattern mirrors the US findings. On the other hand, each country appears to have 
its own combination of crucial variables, which underlines the importance of each 
country’s respective context. This supports the notion the US findings are not 
suitable policy guidance. A number of individual estimates themselves are 
counterintuitive. For example returns to teachers’ subject-matter competency being 
negative on average rather than positive or not statistically different from zero, or 
that teachers with primary school education appear to outperform their peers with 
university entry qualifications or above by more than half a standard deviation, as 
in Zanzibar, are surprising. These findings warrant further investigation, which 
the scope of this paper as well as the SACMEQ data itself do not allow. Finally, the 
findings suggest that in six countries teachers’ subject-matter and pedagogic 
competency lacks compatibility. 
2.6. Conclusion 
This paper examines teacher quality for twelve sub-Saharan Southern and Eastern 
African countries. In contrast to previous studies around the globe that tend to 
examine the conditional correlation of observable teacher characteristics and pupil 
achievement in an ad hoc manner, i.e. they do not specify how and why certain 
variables should affect pupil achievement, I classify teacher observable 
characteristics as proxies of either subject-matter competency, pedagogic 
competency or incentives. In this study I focus on the conditional correlation of 
teacher tests scores and teachers’ academic education as proxies for subject-matter 
competency, and teachers’ pre and in-service training as well as years of experience 
as proxies of their pedagogic competency. 
The second and main contribution of this paper is the estimation method applied. 
Previous studies exploring teacher quality in the African context apply standard 
multivariate OLS or multilevel models with observational data, some of which use 
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the same data as used in this study. These models cannot adequately address the 
non-random matching of pupils to teachers. Neither can they observe all potential 
confounders, so that their estimates are subject to endogeneity. In this paper I 
exploit the fact that pupils are tested in reading and maths at the same point in 
time, the scores on each of these tests are on the same scale, and that the 
respective teachers in each subject are also observed. I follow Clotfelter et al (2007) 
who argue that pupil-fixed effects sufficiently address the non-random matching 
problem, thus in the cross-sectional SACMEQ data I associate the difference in a 
pupil’s maths and reading teacher’s observable characteristics with the difference 
in a pupil’s maths and reading achievement score. In essence, this method does not 
explore the absolute importance of teachers for pupil achievement. It rather 
explores whether observable characteristics, or as conceived here, different 
competencies explain the variation in teacher quality. The advantage of this 
method is that all potential confounders that do not vary within pupil are 
eliminated, these being the school level and many pupil and household variables. 
As time does not play a role in this approach, I combine two time-points of 
SACMEQ data, the first collected in the year 2000/2, the second in 2007, which 
effectively doubles the available sample size thereby increasing statistical precision. 
In the SACMEQ countries used here pupils in each country are either 
predominantly taught by the same or by different teachers in both subjects. I refer 
to estimating teacher quality when pupils are taught by different teachers. In the 
case when pupils are taught by the same teacher in both subjects, most variables 
are the same for both subjects, hence the difference between them is zero. In 
SACMEQ, as in other developing countries, teachers also sit an achievement test 
in the subject they teach. If a teacher teaches both subjects, he or she is tested in 
both subjects. Thus I can estimate teachers’ differential teaching ability as a 
function of the difference in their subject-matter competency. 
As my estimates in this study are purged of more confounding factors than any 
previous research using African data, more consistent trends may appear across 
countries. Additionally, because not all teachers in these countries have enjoyed 
teacher training or have achieved a level of academic education similar to 
developed countries, one might expect to also observe strong effect sizes. 
Interestingly the findings do not support this expectation. Instead the findings 
support the pattern emerging from the US, that there is no consistent pattern of 
teacher characteristics associated with pupil achievement.  
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I compare the findings from my pupil-fixed effects models with two school-fixed 
effects models, one of reach subject, to demonstrate the effect of not sufficiently 
addressing the non-random allocation of pupils to teachers. Comparing these two 
types of models shows that even within schools, pupil-teacher matching is not 
random. Lacking to address this sufficiently will lead to completely different 
conclusions, especially should these estimates be used as a basis for policy making.  
Moreover a number of findings are counterintuitive. For example, in Zanzibar 
teachers who have only graduated from primary school outperform teachers 
holding ‘university entry qualification or above’ by more than half a standard 
deviation. Also, in the same country, there appears to be a negative association of 
years of teaching experience and pupil achievement (-0.09 SD), which may suggest 
that more experienced teachers become less motivated or might be ‘burning out’. In 
respect to teachers‘ differential teaching ability, the estimates here suggest that 
only in one of the six countries, where a sufficient number of pupils has the same 
teacher for both subjects, does the difference in the teachers’ subject-matter test 
score explain the difference in pupil achievement in maths and reading. This 
country is Lesotho, where again there is a negative (-0.03 SD) rather than a 
positive association, which one might expect. 
As it is reasonable to assume that teachers need to combine both their subject-
matter and pedagogic competency I then move on to examine the compatibility of 
the two kinds of competencies. I do so by adding interactions of the test score, as 
the proxy of subject-matter competency, with each of the following proxies of 
pedagogic competency: 
1. one year or more pre-service training,  
2. no in-service training,  
3. Years of experience.  
From the perspective of complementarity, positive estimates indicate the 
competencies are complimentary, whereas negative estimates indicate that the two 
competencies are substitutes, i.e. that maximising pupil achievement requires a 
trade-off of one competency for the other. Again in most cases the estimates 
suggest a combination of these two competencies has a no statistically significant 
effect on pupil achievement. But in some cases combining these two competencies 
appears to have negative effects on pupil achievement. The interaction of teacher 
test scores and years of experience is associated with a decrease in pupil 
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achievement by 0.04 SD in Malawi, the Seychelles and Uganda, and by 0.02 SD in 
Namibia. The interaction of teacher test scores and pre-service training is 
associated with a decrease in pupil achievement by 0.08 SD in Malawi and 0.11 SD 
in Tanzania. Again in Malawi the interaction of teacher test scores and teachers 
who do not have received any in-service training is associated with an increase in 
pupil achievement by 0.12 SD and thus suggesting that the skills teachers acquire 
in in-service training hinder their effectiveness the better they master the subject-
matter of the subject they teach. 
Although most of the findings in this paper are not statistically significant, one 
should not conclude that teachers do not matter. Instead this paper adds additional 
weight to the evidence from the developed countries such as the US that teachers 
vary in their quality primarily due to their unobservable characteristics, and this 
appears to also be the case in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 
 
What is the connection between teachers’ 
workload and their job satisfaction? Evidence 
from 32 secondary education systems 
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3.1. Introduction 
Growing evidence from around the world shows us that teachers play a key role in 
explaining pupils’ achievement (cf. Hein and Allen, 2013; Slater et al, 2011; 
Clotfelter et al, 2007; Aaronson et al, 2007; Kane et al, 2006; Rivkin et al, 2005; 
Nye et al, 2004). This paper takes one step back from explaining teacher 
effectiveness and investigates the production of teachers’ wellbeing at work.  
According to Kahneman and Krueger (2006) job satisfaction measures the quality 
of an individual’s perceived experience at work and is therefore a suitable proxy for 
wellbeing at work. Evidence from across the social sciences demonstrates that job 
satisfaction is important for the efficiency of organisations. For example, job 
satisfaction is associated with burnout (cf. Prosser et al, 1997; Kalliath and Morris, 
2002; Piko, 2006). To psychologists burnout is a symptom characterised by 
individuals feeling overwhelmingly exhausted, detached from their job, cynical and 
ineffective (Maslach and Schaufeli, 2001). Burnt out individuals are therefore 
likely to be less productive in their jobs, for example due to extended periods of 
absence, and run the risk of incurring social costs in the form of health care 
expenses (Faragher et al, 2005). Fischer and Sousa-Poza (2009) find that job 
satisfaction predicts both subjective and objective measures of health and others 
find that job satisfaction predicts both workers’ intentions to leave their employer 
and actual turnover rates (for example see Hellman, 1997; Lambert et al, 2001; 
Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, 2007).  
This paper examines the association of teachers’ workload, proxied by the amount 
of hours teachers work per week, and their job satisfaction. But why should 
teachers’ workloads affect their job satisfaction, when classical microeconomic 
theory leads one to believe that individuals are maximising their utility by 
perfectly choosing the amount of time they work? First, it is likely that individuals 
in real life face contractual constraints that require them to work a certain amount 
of hours or only financially reward a certain amount of hours worked. Contracts 
may also specify how much time individuals need to spend on specific tasks while 
working, which may differ from the individual’s choice should these constraints not 
exist. Secondly Kahneman and Krueger (2006) emphasize that job satisfaction 
should not be mistaken for a measure of utility gained from work, but rather as a 
measure of the quality of the experience an individual has when working in their 
job. 
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Surprisingly, there is no evidence on the nature of the workload-job satisfaction 
relationship for teachers. Thus not only is the strength of the association unknown, 
but also whether or not the association is linear or even monotonic. The only known 
relevant research consists of Judge and Watanabe (1993) and Sousa-Poza and 
Sousa-Poza (2000). Both studies use labour force data and therefore may contain 
teachers, but cannot focus exclusively on teachers. Both studies test a linear 
relationship and find no statistically significant relationship.  
Yet their indicative quality for the teaching professions across the globe must be 
questioned for a number of reasons. First of all both studies use samples of the 
workforce containing a wide range of professions, so that their averaged estimates 
may be very different from that of the teaching profession at that time. The 
correlations may also change over time and individuals may gain satisfaction from 
certain tasks they perform while working, but experience a reduction from 
performing others. For example, teachers’ job satisfaction may rise or fall 
differently by the amount of time he or she spends planning lessons, actually 
teaching, marking, being involved with school leadership, doing administrative 
chores, counselling pupils or organising and running extracurricular activities for 
them. In short, very little can be said about how workload affects job satisfaction of 
contemporary teachers, and this paper fills this gap and reports findings for 32 
high and middle-income countries. 
From the perspective of statistically establishing causal relationships an ideal 
scenario would randomise the amount of hours teachers work, either ‘naturally’ 
due to a policy, or due to an intervention. Such data, especially internationally 
comparable data, is not available, so that in the existing observational data, such 
as the data used here, the amount of hours teachers work will be the result of an 
unknown process. Statistically, this means that bivariate OLS estimates of the 
workload-job satisfaction relationship are likely to be subject to endogeneity, as 
unobserved variables may not only be correlated with teachers’ workload, but also 
with their job satisfaction. The magnitude and direction of this potential bias is 
unknown and requires empirical estimation (cf. Wooldridge, 2002). 
This paper addresses this potential endogeneity problem theoretically and 
empirically. It first develops a production function for teachers’ job satisfaction 
based on the existing literature. This production function helps to identify which 
the unobserved confounders in the bivariate OLS regressions may be. Then the 
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paper uses data collected in 2013 for the OECD’s Teaching and Learning 
International Survey (TALIS), a cross-sectional survey of samples of colleagues in 
schools, collected in 32 national and sub-national education systems. TALIS 2013 
also surveys the head teachers and therefore comprises data on characteristics of 
the school, as well as demographics, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of both 
teachers and their head teachers. The paper exploits the richness of the TALIS 
2013 data, which allows including a range of potential confounding factors at both 
the school and individual level. The preferred model exploits the nested structure 
of the data with teachers nested in schools and removes all potential school-level 
confounders, whether observed or unobserved, by introducing school-fixed effects 
while controlling for potential observed individual-level confounders.  
The main aim of this paper is to uncover cross-country patterns among estimates of 
the workload-job satisfaction relationship. The findings show that across the 
different kinds of workload examined here, the majority of the 32 individual 
education systems do not have statistically significant estimates. When the 
estimates are significant, at or below the 5 percent level, they tend to be of 
negligible magnitude. Although a one-hour change is a small change in teachers’ 
workload in most cases, even a one standard deviation change in total weekly 
workload for example is associated at maximum with an 8 percent SD decrease in 
job satisfaction. The findings also support the expectation that teachers may gain 
job satisfaction from some activities and experience a reduction from others.  
In the light of all the heterogeneity and statistically insignificant estimates, I run 
pooled models in order to obtain estimates averaged across the 32 education 
systems whilst accounting for between-country differences. Evidence from these 
models supports the assumption that bivariate estimates of the workload-job 
satisfaction relationships proxy school and teacher-level variables. Here the 
observable school-level variables appear to be associated positively with job 
satisfaction; so are also the observable teacher-level variables, but the 
unobservable school-level variables appear to be associated negatively with job 
satisfaction. The estimates from the pooled models also indicate that a one hour 
increase in school leadership activities increases job satisfaction, could be 
approximately counterbalanced by a one hour increase in marking (-0.5 percent 
SD) and administrative workload (-0.6 percent SD) and could outweigh a two-hour 
increase in face-to-face teaching workload, which also reduces job satisfaction. 
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The paper then exploits additional data collected in England regarding the 
teachers’ perceptions of different stakeholders of their school, as well as their 
perception of their education systems’ national context, such as social prestige, 
accountability system, and fairness of salary and career opportunities. As argued 
above, bivariate estimates of the workload-job satisfaction relationship may also 
proxy these perceptions. The findings support this assumption. At the same time, 
there is no evidence for the teaching profession regarding the extent to which these 
perceptions are associated with teachers’ job satisfaction. This paper fills this gap 
by presenting these findings. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section outlines the 
production function framework applied and which factors may be potential sources 
of endogeneity for estimates of the workload-job satisfaction relationship. The third 
section introduces the reader to the TALIS 2013 data. The fourth section describes 
the econometric method applied to deal with the potential sources of endogeneity, 
before the fifth section explores the association of hours worked both in general as 
well as on different tasks and teachers’ job satisfaction among the 32 sampled 
education systems. The sixth section then focuses on England and the additional 
variables available, explores how the estimates of the workload-job satisfaction 
relationship change when controlling for teachers’ perceptions of the stakeholders 
in their school and of features of the education system, before presenting and 
discussing the estimated associations for these perception variables with job 
satisfaction. The seventh section concludes.  
3.2. Identifying sources of endogeneity 
3.2.1. A production function for teachers’ job satisfaction 
In order to analyse the workload-job satisfaction relationship, this paper applies a 
production function approach to teachers’ job satisfaction, which can be 
summarised as 
Sij = f(Xi, Pj, Hj, Tj, Cj, Rj)        (1), 
where the job satisfaction S of an individual i in school j is a function of the 
individual teacher X, the pupils P, their parents H, the head teacher T, the 
colleagues C and the equipment available in the building R. 
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The first advantage of equation (1) is that it combines the two predominant kinds 
of approaches to analysing subjective wellbeing, top-down and bottom-up (cf. 
Diener, 1984). Top-down approaches assume that differences in subjective 
wellbeing are due to individuals perceiving their environment differently, because 
of differences in their personality, goals and aspirations. In equation (1) these are 
elements of Xi.  
Bottom-up approaches on the other hand focus on the environment an individual is 
in, assuming that “[…] there are basic and universal human needs, and that if 
one’s circumstances allow a person to fulfil these needs, he or she will be happy” 
(Diener et al, 1999, p.278). In other words, bottom-up approaches model variation 
in satisfaction as a function of the conditions an individual is living in. Early 
bottom-up approaches in the US in the 1970s and 1980s use data on the general 
public to explore the association of life events, such as marriage or education, and 
demographic characteristics such as age, gender, ethnicity, with overall life 
satisfaction and find that at most 20 percent of the variation can be explained by 
these variables (Diener et al, 1999). Other research specifically examines 
individuals’ job satisfaction and therefore explains job satisfaction as a function of 
characteristics of the workplace an individual is in. Hulin (1985) assumes that job 
satisfaction results in the balance between an individual’s inputs into the job, i.e 
“pains”, and the pay-offs, i.e. “pleasures”, he or she receives. In other words an 
increase in a “pleasure” should, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase in job 
satisfaction, and vice-versa for the “pains”. Evidence suggests that “pleasures” go 
beyond pecuniary rewards and also are emotional such as self-efficacy14, or the 
feeling to do good to society and being in a job that has social prestige and career 
prospects (cf. Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, 2000; Caprara et al, 2006; Skaalvik and 
Skaalvik, 2010). Other bottom-up approaches use workforce samples to examine 
the correlation of an individual’s perceived working conditions. Notably autonomy, 
leadership, cooperation among co-workers appear to explain an individual’s job 
satisfaction (cf. Judge and Watanabe, 1993; Perie and Baker, 1997; Ma and 
MacMillan, 1999; Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, 2000; Bogler, 2001; Kim, 2002; 
Roelen et al, 2008; Kalisch et al, 2011; Collie et al, 2012 for pupil behaviour on 
teachers’ job satisfaction). Again in equation (1) these are elements of Xi.  
                                                        
14 Perceived self-efficacy refers to beliefs in one’s capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required 
to produce given attainments (Bandura, 1997, p.3). 
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Equation (1) also accounts for school-level factors indicated by subscript j. 
Michaelowa (2002) explores the extent to which class size and resources such as 
schoolbooks and teacher training influence teacher job satisfaction in French 
speaking Saharan and Sub-Saharan African countries. She argues in favour of 
increasing the availability of teaching equipment such as schoolbooks as these are 
associated with the strongest positive effects and are much cheaper than increasing 
teacher salaries or reducing class size. In contrast, the OECD TALIS 2013 official 
report (OECD, 2014) explores job satisfaction of school leaders. The authors find 
that the only two variables that predict head teachers’ job satisfaction in nearly all 
32 countries are mutual respect as a dimension of school climate, and a high 
workload and responsibility15.  
Yet although bottom-up approaches lead one to believe that an individual’s 
workplace substantially affects his or her job satisfaction, the evidence regarding 
the proportion of an individual’s job satisfaction associated with his or her 
workplace is limited to the teaching profession based on data from the 2008 sweep 
of TALIS (OECD, 2009). In their report, the OECD conducts an analysis of 
variance of a single-item indicator of job satisfaction on a four-point Likert scale 
ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree” pooling all available countries. 
They find that 4 percent of the variation lies between countries and 6 percent of the 
variation lies between schools, leaving 90 percent of the variation within schools. 
3.2.2. Potential sources of endogeneity 
The underlying principle of microeconomic theory is that individuals need to make 
choices. In contrast to factory-floor workers, teachers, like many other white-collar 
professionals nowadays, are not bound by strict working-time agreements with 
their employers. Thus the amount of time the teachers work will contain a 
substantial degree of choice; teachers will of course be bound to teach a specific 
amount of lessons due to contractual obligations, but teachers may choose how 
much time they invest in planning and marking lessons for example. Teachers may 
also vary the amount of time they work if they are incentivised16 to do so. Equation 
(1) suggests that teachers may face such incentives from the other stakeholders in 
their school or from factors within the individual him or herself. Statistically, 
                                                        
15 The authors separately test head teacher demographics, school characteristics, dimensions of school climate and 
perceived barriers to head teachers’ effectiveness. Thus the authors assume that these groups of variables are not 
correlated. 
16 Offered a pecuniary or non-pecuniary reward to motivate a change in an individual’s behaviour. 
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bivariate estimates of the workload-job satisfaction relationship will be subject to 
endogeneity if these incentives affect teachers’ job satisfaction directly in addition 
to their workload. In the following paragraphs I outline which factors may be both 
such incentives and sources for endogeneity: 
At the school level, for example, poor pupil behaviour may reduce teachers’ job 
satisfaction and also affect their workload as they may need to spend more time 
carefully planning lessons for classes prone to disruption. Also, “good” head 
teachers may motivate their staff to put in more hours, whereas “demanding” head 
teachers may oblige teachers to work longer. Simultaneously, teachers may 
experience an increase in their job satisfaction in the former case, but experience 
reduced job satisfaction from being pressured in the latter case.  
Similarly to the example of the head teacher above, there are a number of other 
factors that may affect teachers’ workloads, but where it is unclear at the outset in 
which direction such factors directly affect teachers’ job satisfaction. ‘Demanding’ 
parents may also require teachers to work longer in order to accommodate the time 
for parent-teacher meetings, which may directly affect teachers’ job satisfaction 
negatively. On the other hand, strong parental involvement in school decision-
making may relieve teachers from additional work. Teachers may directly gain job 
satisfaction from this if they appreciate the parents’ involvement, but the opposite 
may also be the case.  
Teachers may take longer planning lessons with alternative resources if the 
preferred resources are not available. Not having their preferred resources at their 
disposal may frustrate and directly reduce their job satisfaction. Also teachers 
lacking the skills they need to perform their job might take longer to prepare 
lessons or mark pupils’ work. This could make teachers feel overwhelmed and 
reduce their job satisfaction directly. Further, the extent to which teachers 
cooperate with their colleagues may play a role: for example teachers may need to 
spend less time preparing lessons if they share lesson plans among each other, but 
more staff or team meetings may imply longer working hours. If teachers feel 
teamwork is a burden, they may experience a direct reduction in their job 
satisfaction. 
In contrast, more senior teachers may experience more respect from their 
colleagues and part-timers may experience less stress, both of which may directly 
affect their job satisfaction positively in addition to affecting their workload. 
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Similarly teachers with higher levels of intrinsic motivation, i.e. they teach for 
enjoyment rather than for a separable reward are likely to trade-off more leisure 
time in favour of working and may also have higher levels of job satisfaction (cf. 
Deci and Ryan, 2000).  
As these potential sources of endogeneity may bias the bivariate estimates in 
different directions, empirical estimation is required to establish its magnitude and 
direction. In order to reduce this bias it is important to control for as many of these 
potential confounders, both at the teacher and school level, as possible. But before 
explaining the estimation strategy, I will introduce the reader to the data used in 
this research. 
3.3. The TALIS 2013 data 
3.3.1. Introduction 
The OECD TALIS datasets are repeated cross-sections of national and sub-national 
education systems. The 2013 round is the second after the first in 2008, and 
contains samples of 33 education systems in total. The OECD requires response 
rates of teachers and schools both to exceed 75 percent per country in order to be 
included in their official report (OECD, 2014); of the 33 sampled education systems 
in 2013, only the US sample does not meet this requirement. This paper follows the 
OECD’s standard and therefore also does not use the US data. The response rates 
are high in TALIS compared to surveys such as the Teachers’ Workload Diary 
Survey in England that has response rates around 15 percent (cf. DfE UK, 2014). 
The average response rate across all 32 sampled education systems is 92 percent 
for schools and 90 percent for teachers. 
As hinted above, TALIS contains representative samples of schools and multiple 
teachers within them. The participating countries were instructed by the OECD to 
sample 200 schools and a minimum of 20 teachers per school. Some participating 
governments oversampled the number of teachers; for some education systems the 
sampling strategy was adapted to account for high numbers of schools with less 
than 20 teachers. A school was included in the data if at least half of the sampled 
teachers responded. On average there are 16 responding teachers per school. 
Alberta, Chile, Denmark and Iceland form outliers where on average 
approximately 9 to 11 teachers per school are sampled. Table 3.1 also shows that 
the achieved sample sizes of teachers across all 32 education systems used here is 
103,862 which is equivalent to an average sample size of 3425 teachers in each 
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education system. Analogously, 6462 schools are sampled in total, which equals an 
average of 202 schools in each education system.  
Table 3.1: Sample size of teachers, schools and corresponding response rates 
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Australia 123 2,059 1,892 81 87 70 
Brazil 1,070 14,291 13,258 97 94 91 
Bulgaria 197 2,975 2,948 99 97 96 
Chile 178 1,676 1,541 91 93 85 
Croatia 199 3,675 3,628 99 96 95 
Czech Republic 220 3,219 3,199 100 98 98 
Denmark 148 1,649 1,582 81 77 62 
Estonia 197 3,129 3,056 100 99 99 
Finland 146 2,739 2,684 99 91 90 
France 204 3,002 2,815 82 75 61 
Iceland 129 1,430 1,217 95 80 76 
Israel 195 3,403 3,225 98 86 85 
Italy 194 3,337 3,271 98 90 88 
Japan 192 3,484 3,470 96 99 95 
Korea 177 2,933 2,819 89 88 78 
Latvia 116 2,126 2,088 80 96 77 
Malaysia 150 2,984 2,957 75 97 73 
Mexico 187 3,138 3,098 96 91 87 
Netherlands 127 1,912 1,778 81 75 61 
Norway 145 2,981 2,774 73 80 58 
Poland 195 3,858 3,819 100 97 97 
Portugal 185 3,628 3,583 93 92 86 
Romania 197 3,286 3,247 100 98 98 
Serbia 191 3,857 3,818 96 97 92 
Singapore 159 3,109 3,095 100 99 99 
Slovak Republic 193 3,493 3,454 99 96 95 
Spain 192 3,339 3,249 97 91 88 
Sweden 186 3,319 3,155 96 87 84 
 Sub-national education systems 
Abu Dhabi (UAE) 166 2, 433 2,220 89 83 74 
Alberta (Canada) 182 1,773 1,719 94 93 87 
England (UK) 154 2,496 2,341 75 83 63 
Flanders (Belgium) 168 3,129 3,043 84 89 75 
All education 
systems 
6,462 103,862 100,043 92 90 83 
Source: OECD TALIS 2013 report, 2014, Table A.2 and TALIS microdata
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TALIS 2013 surveys both head teachers and teachers about the teaching and 
learning process. In doing so it collects data on characteristics of the school, as well 
as demographics, attitudes, beliefs and behaviours of the teachers and the heads. 
As equation (1) suggests that the relationship of hours worked and teachers job 
satisfaction may be confounded also by pupils’, parents’ and co-workers’ 
characteristics and behaviours, the fact that TALIS only surveys teachers and 
their heads may appear insufficient. Yet the hierarchical data structure of multiple 
teachers observed in the same school allows one to address this apparent 
shortcoming, as will be seen below. 
3.3.2. Measurement of hours worked and job satisfaction 
TALIS 2013 collects data on the amount of hours teachers work in two different 
ways. The first asks teachers to indicate the total hours they worked on all tasks 
both in and out of school including evenings and at the weekend in the last full 
working week prior to data collection in one single question. The second method 
asks teachers to indicate separately how many hours he or she spent working on a 
range of eleven tasks, starting with face-to-face teaching and including planning, 
marking, etc., during the last full working week prior to data collection.  
Yet the average time teachers work in total using the sum over the eleven tasks 
differs significantly from the single question for each of the sampled education 
systems. In each case the sum over the individual tasks indicates a larger teachers’ 
workload in each education system: on average the sum over the individual tasks is 
8.2 hours higher (cf. Micklewright et al, 2014). It is hard to ascertain why these 
numbers differ and whether this is a problem. In their TALIS 2013 report for the 
Department for Education in England, Micklewright et al (2014) conclude that 
average teachers’ workload reported in TALIS for England is lower, but similar to 
that reported in the Teachers’ Workload Diary Survey conducted in England in 
2013. They also note that the data collected in the workload diaries should be more 
precise and that needing to recall information in TALIS may bias estimates 
downwards. For the case of this paper, I conclude that both ways TALIS employs to 
measure the number of hours teachers work are likely to be biased.  
The individual activity variables also contain many more missing observations (for 
example school leadership 14 percent; administrative tasks 9.7 percent) than the 
single question (2.8 percent). Although teachers were instructed to write “0” if they 
did not do a specific activity, the pattern of missingness in each country suggests 
that these respondents indeed did not engage in this activity, as the number of 
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respondents varies from item to item. Yet if I were to simply replace missing 
observations with the number zero that would imply making an assumption. 
Instead I mean-impute separately for each country and for each activity and 
thereby replace the missing values with the expected value. Thus, the variable 
indicating the sum of the different activities combines both raw and imputed data. 
In respect to teachers’ job satisfaction, TALIS 2013 contains eight items that are 
asked in each country. Each of these items is on a four-point Likert scale ranging 
from 1 representing “strongly disagree” to 4 representing “strongly agree”. The 
items are worded as follows: 
1. The advantages of being a teacher clearly outweigh the disadvantages. 
2. If I could decide again, I would still choose to work as a teacher. 
3. I would like to change to another school if that were possible. 
4. I regret that I decided to become a teacher. 
5. I enjoy working at this school. 
6. I wonder whether it would have been better to choose another profession. 
7. I would recommend my school as a good place to work. 
8. All in all, I am satisfied with my job. 
Based on these 8 items the OECD has created a continuous summary measure of 
teachers’ job satisfaction. Following Oshagbemi (1999) multi-item indicators of job 
satisfaction are preferable to single item equivalents (see for example Sousa-Poza 
and Sousa-Poza, 2000), as the latter must be assumed to have lower levels of 
reliability.  
Combining these items into a proxy measure for an individual’s overall job 
satisfaction faces two challenges. First it is unknown whether two individuals 
indicating the same response to the same item truly feel the same. Kahneman and 
Krueger (2006) note that this is unlikely as the two individuals will have different 
experiences and may also be comparing themselves to different groups of people. 
One method to deal with this problem is to use vignettes, by which one can 
benchmark an individual’s responses to a common reference point (cf. King, 2005). 
Such vignettes are not available in the TALIS data, so that it must be assumed 
that the same response to an item by different individuals is comparable.  
The second challenge to creating an overall measure of job satisfaction with these 
items is cultural variation. Asian countries such as Japan for example are known 
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for their modesty. Thus individuals may underreport the degree to what they can 
accomplish a task when being interviewed about their self-competence. Similarly 
there may be cultural factors influencing teachers’ responses to the job-satisfaction 
items. 
The OECD’s summary measure is the average of teachers’ satisfaction with the 
teaching profession (items a, b, d, f, h) and their satisfaction with their current 
school (items c, e, g, i, j). In order to explain the OECD’s procedure to obtain a 
variable comparable across countries, I will use teachers’ satisfaction with the 
teaching profession as an example:  
First the OECD randomly selects an equal number of observations from each 
education system and weights them equally, before performing a confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) using items a, b, d, f, h on this sample. Based on the 
estimates of this CFA, they then predict the factor scores for all observations in the 
entire dataset. The obtained variable is then rescaled so that the value ‘10’ 
represents the mid-point of the underlying Likert-scale. Thus, any value above 10 
implies average agreement with all underlying items. 
In their TALIS 2013 Technical Report, the OECD (2014) shows that the underlying 
items a, b, d, f, h meet common standards of reliability, i.e. the items relate to an 
underlying scale, as measured by Cronbach’s alpha, as the estimates for each 
education system exceed 0.80. The OECD (2014) also shows that a CFA of these 
five items run separately in each country all meet common standards of validity as 
all 32 models achieve satisfactory goodness of fit.  
This whole procedure implies that there is no systematic variation in teachers’ 
responses to the items across education systems, which may exist for example due 
to translation of the items, or due to cultural norms that affect how individuals in a 
given education systems respond to the items. The OECD (2014) tests whether the 
slopes and intercepts of the underlying items in the CFA are the same across 
countries and reports that the data rejects this hypothesis. Thus one must be 
aware of these differences when comparing levels of job satisfaction across 
countries. Interestingly, the OECD (2014) does not consider a multilevel CFA 
approach as an alternative. Multilevel CFAs yield ‘within-group’ estimators, thus it 
could be possible to purge the individual item loadings from systematic variation 
by country. As not to exceed the scope of this paper, I do not conduct multilevel 
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CFAs and assume that the variables provided by the OECD are satisfactory 
proxies. 
3.3.3. Descriptive statistics 
As already described above, the OECD’s measure of teachers’ job satisfaction is 
constructed to range from 5.88 to 14.05 where the value ‘10’ is equal to the 
midpoint of the Likert scale used for the underlying items. Estimates in Table 3.2 
are above the value of ‘10’ for all the 32 education systems. Teachers in Mexico 
appear to be the most satisfied with their job (mean = 13.3) and teachers in the 
Slovak Republic appear to be the least satisfied with their job (mean = 11.2). 
Nevertheless, the estimates for the Slovak Republic indicate substantial job 
satisfaction. To the lay reader these estimates might appear surprising as the job 
of a teacher will be subject to different legal contexts; the English education system 
is characterised by its decentralised quasi-market, which stands in stark contrast 
to highly centralised education systems such as Japan. Similarly social 
expectations will differ across countries creating differing degrees of social pressure 
on teachers. All in all, the high levels of teachers’ job satisfaction here resonate 
with the findings of Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza (2000) and are consistent with the 
literature exploring the connection of wealth and happiness. The latter suggests 
that individuals compare their own situation to others in their country or to their 
own past experiences (cf. Clark et al 2008). On the other hand general job 
satisfaction across countries for this one particular profession is to be expected, as 
individuals who are very dissatisfied with their job are likely to quit the profession 
(cf. Hellman, 1997; Lambert et al, 2001; Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, 2007) and 
thus would not be sampled.  
A more detailed analysis exploring the association of the school with teachers’ job 
satisfaction and weekly workload can be found in the appendix. For brevity this 
section limits the description of the data to the absolute minimum, i.e. the 
dependent as well as the most relevant independent variables that are at the core 
of this paper. 
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Table 3.2: Job satisfaction of teachers in TALIS countries 
 Mean 
Australia 12.3 
Brazil 11.9 
Bulgaria 11.7 
Chile 12.3 
Croatia 11.9 
Czech Republic 11.5 
Denmark 12.6 
Estonia 11.3 
Finland 12.4 
France 12.0 
Iceland 12.1 
Israel 12.5 
Italy 12.2 
Japan 11.3 
Korea 10.9 
Latvia 11.5 
Malaysia 12.8 
Mexico 13.3 
Netherlands 12.2 
Norway 12.2 
Poland 11.8 
Portugal 11.9 
Romania 12.0 
Serbia 12.1 
Singapore 11.3 
Slovak Republic 11.2 
Spain 12.4 
Sweden 11.4 
Sub-national education systems 
Abu Dhabi (UAE) 11.8 
Alberta (Canada) 12.5 
England (UK) 11.9 
Flanders (Belgium) 12.7 
Average (all education systems) 12.0 
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Table 3.3 (below) shows the distribution of teachers’ weekly working time across 
the five different tasks that are of interest here, which are face-to-face teaching, 
lesson planning, marking, school leadership and administrative tasks. To aid 
comparability across countries, the table reports the percentage of teachers’ total 
weekly workload. The final eighth column reports the average total weekly 
workload in hours. The table shows that on average teachers in Finland work the 
least number of hours (approximately 36 hours) and their peers in Malaysia work 
approximately 60 hours. The unweighted average shows that across all these 32 
education systems the average weekly workload is approximately 46 hours. The 
table also shows that across these education systems teachers spend approximately 
64 percent of their time working on the six tasks. Again there is substantial 
variation, as teachers in Italy, the Netherlands and Finland only spend 50 percent 
of their weekly workload on these tasks. In contrast teachers in Alberta, Canada, 
spend around 78 percent of their weekly workload engaged in these six tasks. 
Across all education systems, teachers spend on average around 34 percent of their 
weekly workload teaching in the classroom. The second most time-intensive task is 
lesson planning, followed by marking. 
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Table 3.3: Percentage of total hours worked on specific tasks 
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Abu Dhabi (UAE) 35 13 9 5 4 72 54.5 
Alberta (CAN) 44 12 9 4 4 78 57.7 
Australia 31 12 8 4 5 66 49.8 
Brazil 42 12 9 4 3 75 54 
Bulgaria 31 13 7 3 2 60 44.4 
Chile 44 10 7 4 4 74 53.2 
Croatia 33 16 6 3 1 62 45.4 
Czech Republic 30 14 7 4 2 61 42.4 
Denmark 31 13 6 2 1 58 43 
England (UK) 33 13 10 3 4 68 50.8 
Estonia 35 11 7 3 1 60 43.9 
Finland 34 8 5 2 1 53 35.9 
Flanders (BEL) 32 10 7 2 1 55 40 
France 31 12 9 2 1 58 39.9 
Iceland 32 12 5 2 2 58 42.2 
Israel 30 9 7 3 3 56 43.9 
Italy 29 8 7 2 2 53 36.3 
Japan 29 14 8 4 5 66 58 
Korea 31 13 6 7 4 66 53.3 
Latvia 32 11 8 5 2 62 44.1 
Malaysia 28 11 12 5 8 71 60.2 
Mexico 38 10 7 5 3 67 49 
Netherlands 28 8 7 3 2 53 40 
Norway 25 11 9 3 2 55 39.6 
Poland 31 9 8 3 1 56 42 
Portugal 35 14 16 4 3 78 57.2 
Romania 27 13 7 4 1 56 41.8 
Serbia 31 13 6 4 1 59 43.4 
Singapore 28 14 14 4 3 69 55.3 
Slovak Republic 33 12 6 3 2 60 43.8 
Spain 31 11 10 2 3 61 42.9 
Sweden 29 11 8 4 1 59 44.4 
Unweighted 
average 
32 12 8 4 3 64 46.4 
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3.3.4. Summary 
The purpose of this section was to introduce the reader to the data and to see 
whether the nature of the data has any methodological implications. In respect to 
the former, section 3.3.3 begins to explore how characteristics of education systems 
are associated with teachers’ job satisfaction and workload. The following analysis 
will now explore how teachers’ job satisfaction is produced using OLS regression to 
approximate equation (1). 
3.4. Method 
For causal estimation, in an ideal world, the amount of hours teachers work would 
be subject to randomisation, either ‘naturally’ due to a change in policy, or due to 
an intervention. Such data though is not available. Thus in the available TALIS 
2013 data described in the previous section, the amount of hours teachers work will 
be the result of an unknown, non-random process. Statistically, this means that 
bivariate OLS estimates of the workload-job satisfaction relationship may proxy 
the effect of other unobserved variables, if these are associated directly with job 
satisfaction as well as their workload. The magnitude and direction of this possible 
bias, often referred to as endogeneity, is unknown and requires empirical 
estimation (cf. Wooldridge, 2002). 
In section 3.2, I conceive teachers’ job satisfaction as a good that is ‘produced’ as a 
function of the teacher him or herself, the physical environment of the school and 
the other stakeholders in the particular school (see equation (1)). Following this 
production function, I then hypothesise which factors may both affect teachers’ 
workloads and their job satisfaction, and thus would lead to endogeneity in 
bivariate estimates of the workload-job satisfaction relationship.  
The TALIS 2013 data though does not contain all the variables I refer to in section 
3.2.2. For example head teachers may, either through motivating (“good head 
teacher”) or obliging (“demanding head teacher”), make their staff work longer 
hours. As such data for “good” or “demanding” head teachers is not available I am 
limited to using proxy variables. In this case TALIS 2013 contains data on head 
teachers’ leadership style. Also as TALIS 2013 only surveys teachers and head 
teachers, there is no information obtained from the other stakeholders, such as the 
parents and pupils. There is also no information on the physical resources 
available in the school. Further there is no variable indicating a teacher’s level of 
seniority. Instead I approximate this by including the teachers’ age, time in the 
profession and time at the current school. TALIS 2013 does contain proxy 
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measures for the intensity of teacher collaboration with their peers, as well as 
teachers’ self-efficacy. The latter proxies how competently teachers’ believe they 
teach (cf. Bandura, 1997). I follow Albion (1999) who argues that self-efficacy can 
be conceived to measure how well prepared an individual is for a given task. I 
assume that teachers’ self-efficacy in respect to teaching is not only a function of a 
teacher’s formal education, teacher training, continuous professional development 
and work experience, but also a better indicator of the adequacy of a teacher’s 
teaching skills. I therefore do not include a teacher’s formal education, teacher 
training, and continuous professional development in any of the models specified 
below. 
The model formulated in equation (1) does not make any assumptions regarding 
functional form. In the introduction I note that apart from not knowing the 
direction and magnitude of the workload-job satisfaction relationship for teachers, 
it is also unknown whether the relationship is linear or even monotonic. For 
example, teachers’ job satisfaction may reach a maximum at a certain number of 
hours, or the relationship might be linear for only certain parts of the distribution 
of teachers’ workload. Linear relationships have the advantage that they are easily 
interpretable and are therefore often preferred in the empirical literature. Yet 
modelling equation (1) using linear regressions implies making an assumption that 
a linear specification is a reasonable approximation. I test this assumption using 
three different methods, pooling all observations together. First, I test a linear 
specification, which yields a statistically significant estimate below the 5 percent 
level. I then include a quadratic term, to explore whether teachers’ job satisfaction 
might be maximised at a certain number of hours worked, or if the relationship 
increases at a decreasing manner similarly to the relationship of work experience 
and wages. I find that a quadratic specification is not statistically significant at or 
below the 5 percent level. Secondly, I estimate the workload-job satisfaction 
relationship replacing the continuous total workload variable with fourteen dummy 
variables indicating 10-hour increments. I find no statistically significant 
differences across these dummy variables. Last, local polynomial regression 
strongly supports the linearity assumption. 
I build the model in four steps addressing an increasing number of the potential 
sources of endogeneity by adding control variables in each step. As the main 
interest of this paper is to explore patterns across education systems, each of the 
following equations is applied separately to each of the 32 sampled education 
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systems. I consider two specifications of the following equations, the sum of the 
time spent on all activities17 (total workload), and the number of hours worked on 
five different activities: face-to-face teaching, lesson planning, marking, 
involvement in school leadership and administrative chores 18 . The latter 
specification relaxes the assumption that the kinds of activities teachers do while 
working do not matter. In other words this specification allows teachers to gain job 
satisfaction from one activity and experience a reduction in their job satisfaction 
from another. It is therefore preferred to a specification simply testing the total 
amount of hours worked per week. Nevertheless, both specifications will be 
reported in the following sections. 
The first model represents the baseline and consists of the main variable(s) of 
interest M, which are either the total hours worked or the amount of hours spent 
on different activities during the teachers’ working week. This baseline model is 
summarised in equation (2): 
Sij =  + 1Mi + uij       (2) 
The second model additionally controls for part-time status, the teachers’ 
involvement in mentoring, the degree of cooperation with their colleagues, whether 
or not they are on a permanent contract, their gender and their self-efficacy.  
Sij =  + 1Mi + 2Oi + uij      (3) 
The third model additionally includes proxy measures of potential school level 
confounders. I control for the degree of distributional and instructional leadership, 
as well as the head teacher’s gender, age as well as the ratio of teachers per 
administrative or pedagogic member of support staff. Thus M3 can be summarised 
as 
Sij =  + 1Mi + 2Oi + 3j + uij     (4) 
Although containing additional controls O and  the estimates of the 1 may still be 
confounded by unobserved variables at the school level (for example pupils, 
parents, physical resources) and individual level (for example teacher’s 
                                                        
17 As described in section 3.3, the values in this variable may be hybrids of raw reported data by the individual 
him or herself and imputed data. All in all, this variable is the sum of ten activities. I include a dummy for each of 
these activities, which is 1 if the value for this activity is imputed. 
18 I control for the amount of time spent on any other activities. 
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motivation). The final model therefore exploits the structure of multiple teachers 
observed in each school and introduces a dummy variable for each school, also 
known as school-fixed effects: 
Sij =  + 1Mi + 2Oi + Kj + uij     (5). 
This comes with the drawback of not being able to estimate coefficients of school-
level variables. On the other hand, school-fixed effects remove all between school-
variation, i.e. the observable as well as known and unknown unobservable school-
level confounders. Also, as already shown, despite removing all between-school 
variation in equation (4) the vast majority of the variation is still being exploited. 
But although equation (4) is preferred, the obtained estimates cannot be considered 
causal, as potential unobserved confounders at the individual level such as 
teachers’ motivation remain. More motivated teachers may have higher levels of 
job satisfaction and also work more hours, which will bias the obtained estimates 
upward. On the other hand the variables capturing the amount of time teachers 
work in total or spend on the different tasks may be measured with error. If this 
error is ‘classical’, the obtained estimates will be biased towards zero. Finally, as is 
always the case with observational data, the direction of effects must be assumed 
to go from the right to the left hand side of equations 2 to 5.  
The main aim of this paper is to have comparable estimates across countries. 
Usually, if one has one single regression with independent variables measured on 
different scales, one can standardise these variables in order to put them on the 
same scale, which allows making reasonable comparisons of effect sizes. In the case 
of this research the focus lies on comparing estimates across education systems. 
Here the main variables of interest are all measured in hours, a metric common to 
all education systems. In section 3.3 though I note that regardless of the OECD’s 
efforts, one still needs to make the assumption one can compare the level of 
teachers’ job satisfaction across these education systems. By standardising 
teachers’ job satisfaction separately for each education system, I relax this 
assumption as the dependent variable then is also on the same scale for all 
education systems. I therefore report regular regression coefficients that indicate 
the change of the dependent variable in standard deviations, when the workload 
changes by one hour.  
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3.5. Findings 
Before reporting the findings I would like to start with a comment on their 
presentation. The findings are presented in Figures 3.7, and 3.10 to 3.14. Each of 
these illustrates the estimates for the effect of a change in teachers’ total workload 
or specific kinds of workloads (also referred to as activities) as horizontal bars for 
models 1, 2 and 4 in descending order for each of the 32 sampled education 
systems. M1 refers to the baseline, bivariate OLS model, while M2 controls for 
teacher-level covariates, and M4 accounts for all possible school level variables by 
introducing school-fixed effects. The country estimates are ranked according to 
their estimate obtained from M4, which is the preferred model, as it controls for 
the largest number of potential confounders. But as the estimates in M4 will vary 
across the different kinds of workloads, the order the education systems are in will 
vary each time, and is simply intended to aid readability. The reported estimates 
indicate the marginal effect of an increase in teachers’ total workload by one hour 
on their nationally standardised job satisfaction. This standardisation ensures that 
teachers’ job satisfaction is on the same scale for each education system; at the 
same time teachers’ total weekly workload is measured in hours, thus the obtained 
estimates are comparable in size across education systems.  
The error bars indicate the 95 percent confidence interval. In their official TALIS 
report, the OECD (2014) apply a balanced repeated replication procedure (BRR) to 
estimate their standard errors (cf. Micklewright et al, 2014). I do not use this 
procedure, but instead use adaptations of the heteroskedasticity-robust estimators 
proposed by White (1980). These allow the errors to be correlated within school, but 
not between schools. The cluster-robust standard error procedure used in this 
research though yields very similar estimates of the standard errors to the BRR 
procedure and is less computationally intensive. In addition, I use post-
stratification weights provided in TALIS to account for teachers differing in their 
probability of being sampled.  
I consider parameter estimates to be statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
and below throughout the remainder of this paper. The sample sizes underlying 
each regression are the same as reported in the column headed “effective sample 
size” in Table 3.1. The “sample used” differs from the original sample size due to 
missing observations in the dependent variable and recoding teachers’ workloads 
larger than the number of hours per week (168 hours) as missing. Missingness in 
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all other right hand side variables is addressed using dummy variables and mean 
imputation.  
The reader should also be aware that the presented estimates may come across as 
small, as a one hour increase in face-to-face teaching for example may only be 
small compared to the standard deviation of hours in the respective education 
system. Table 3.3 shows the standard deviations associated with the different 
kinds of teachers’ workloads. According to Table 3.3, the unweighted average 
standard deviation of face-to-face teaching is 12 hours. In contrast a standard 
deviation ranges between 8 and 14 hours for planning lessons, ranges between 4 
and 14 hours for marking, ranges between 1 and 10 hours for leadership activities 
and ranges between 2 and 10 hours for administrative activities. 
3.5.1. Does working longer reduce teachers’ job satisfaction? 
The findings in the baseline model (M1) shown in Figure 3.1 do not clearly support 
this expectation as only 17 of the 32 education systems show a negative 
association. This association though is only statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level in Singapore (-0.3 percent of a SD), Flanders and Denmark (each -0.5 percent 
of a SD). On the other hand, 15 education systems show a positive association, 
suggesting that on average teachers gain job satisfaction from working more hours. 
Among these 15 the estimates for Brazil (0.2 percent SD) Israel and Mexico (both 
0.3 percent of a SD) are statistically significant.  
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Figure 3.1: Marginal effects of a one hour change - total weekly workload  
 
Notes: 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered by school. Countries ranked by M4 
estimate. Reported coefficients measured in SD. 
The adopted production function approach in this paper suggests that bivariate 
estimates of the workload-job satisfaction relationship might proxy teacher-level 
and school-level variables. When additionally controlling for the observable 
teacher-level variables (M2), there is a clear result: Figure 3.1 shows that the 
estimates for all education systems are reduced, i.e. become less positive or more 
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negative. I test the hypothesis that the joint effect of all the teacher-level 
covariates in the model, for example part-time status and self-efficacy, on job 
satisfaction is zero. The estimated coefficients from these tests are positive and 
statistically significant in each education system. I therefore conclude that jointly 
these variables are positively associated with teachers’ workload (cf. Wooldridge, 
2002). Furthermore, these findings suggest the workload job-satisfaction 
relationship may be negative as after controlling for the teacher-level covariates, 
estimates for 15 education systems are statistically significant; and for Israel and 
Mexico, the previously (M1) positive significant estimates are now not significantly 
different from zero.  
Following equation (1) I move the focus to the school level in models 3 and 4. In 
addition to the variables in M2, M3 additionally controls for the degree of 
distributional and instructional leadership, the head teacher’s gender and age, as 
well as the ratio of teachers per administrative or pedagogic member of support 
staff. Although F-tests19 indicate that including these variables improves model fit 
significantly at the 5 percent level in 10 cases, interestingly the coefficients on 
workload remain virtually unchanged for each education system. For ease of 
readability these estimates are not shown in the graph. Nevertheless, these 
findings are surprising as they suggest that these particular variables are not 
correlated with teachers’ workload.  
In M4 I introduce school-fixed effects, which control for both the observed school-
level variables in M3 and all unobservable school-level variables. Here the 
estimates increase in 20 cases, i.e. they become less negative or more positive. This 
suggests that the unobserved school-level variables appear to be negatively 
associated with teachers’ job satisfaction. But in 12 cases the unobserved school-
level variables appear to be positively associated with teachers’ job satisfaction. 
Including school-fixed effects, the estimates for Abu Dhabi and Alberta that are 
statistically significant in M2 are not statistically significant any more. Yet the 
expected negative relationship of workload and teachers’ job satisfaction remains 
statistically significant for 13 education systems and estimates range from -0.3 
percent to -1 percent of a SD. These education systems are Spain, South Korea, 
                                                        
19 STATA 13 cannot compute log-likelihood ratio tests when correcting for robust or clustered standard errors. I 
therefore use F-tests. 
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Estonia, the Czech Republic, Australia, Singapore, England, France, Denmark, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway and Flanders20.  
The pattern in the adjusted21 R2 moving from the baseline to the preferred model 
shows that it is M2 and M4 that substantially improve model fit. On average 
across all 32 countries the adjusted R2 is 0.4 percent in the baseline model (M1). 
With the introduction of the teacher-level covariates the adjusted R2 increases on 
average to 13.6 percent. Including the observable school-level variables in M3 
reduces the adjusted R2 slightly in 11 countries and increases in the remaining 
countries, but these changes are only very small so that on average the adjusted R2 
is 13.8 percent and ranges between 8.5 percent in Latvia to 19.9 percent in Abu 
Dhabi. Including the school-fixed effects increases model fit in every country, the 
increase ranging from 2.5 percentage points in Poland to 10 percentage points in 
Brazil. On average the R2 in M4 is 19.6 percent. 
So far, I have described how the estimates change when moving from model to 
model. One of my research interests is to explore the extent to which the baseline 
estimates proxy unobserved school and teacher level variables. Figure 3.2 sheds 
light into this issue and shows a scattergram of the estimates obtained in the 
baseline (M1) on the X-axis and the preferred model (M4) on the Y-axis. It clearly 
shows that whereas 18 baseline estimates are positive the graph also shows that 
29 M4 estimates are zero or negative. Also all but 3 data points are below the black 
45 degree line, i.e. 29 M4 estimates are less positive or more negative than the 
baseline model. Thus the baseline estimates appear to be biased upward. The 
reader should though be reminded that the location of these 32 data points in the 
graph are subject to substantial uncertainty, as is indicated by the large confidence 
intervals in Figure 3.7. Because of the uncertainty attached to these data points 
one would expect them to be further spread out. Interestingly these data points are 
well approximated by a regression line, which achieves an R2 of 0.6.  
                                                        
20 In section 3.3, I discuss that TALIS asks two different questions from which one can generate an indicator for 
teachers’ total weekly workload and that these variables are not the same. The variable used here is the sum over 
the individual activities teachers do during their working week. I run the preferred model using the single 
question asking teachers how many hours they worked in total in the last full week prior to data collection. Using 
the estimates from these two versions of M4 for all 32 education systems as data points, when summarising these 
data with a regression line I find that the estimates reported in Figure 3.7 are approximately on average 60 
percent the size of the estimates on the single question. The R-squared of this regression line is 0.61, which 
indicates that a substantial proportion of variance is not accounted for. This is not particularly surprising as a 
large proportion of estimates in both M4 versions are not statistically significant. This large proportion of 
uncertainty around each data point is likely to cause the data points to be scattered rather than be allocated close 
to a regression line.  
21 The adjusted R2 accounts for the number of variables included in the model, i.e. the degrees of freedom. I 
estimate this statistic by including dummy variables for each school into M3. 
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One possible explanation for the findings shown in Figure 3.1 could be that there is 
a correlation between the amount of time teachers work on average in an education 
system and the estimated effect of an increase in workload on their job satisfaction. 
Thus, it could be that the significant estimates reported above occur in education 
systems in which teachers have a high average workload. I explore this aspect in 
Figure 3.3 where I plot average total teachers’ workload (X-axis) by the estimated 
coefficients on total workload (Y-axis). Figure 3.3 does not suggest an association 
between these two variables. The 14 education systems with statistically 
significant estimates are also in the same range of average total teachers’ workload 
as those that do not have significant estimates. 
Figure 3.2: Correlation of Model 1 (baseline) and Model 4 (preferred) 
estimates – total weekly workload 
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Figure 3.3: Correlation of average workload and estimates for the workload 
job-satisfaction relationship 
 
 
Although all these estimates, even those that are statistically significant at 
conventional levels, are very small, the reader should be reminded that a change in 
total workload by one hour is a very small increase. The data shows, that the 
distributions of teachers’ total weekly workload vary across education systems 
(Table 3.4). And the unweighted average across education systems is a standard 
deviation of 22 hours. Among those with a statistically significant estimate in M4, 
the standard deviation of teachers’ workload is 16 hours in Latvia. Thus a teacher 
who works a standard deviation more than the average teacher will be expected to 
be 3.2 percent of a standard deviation less satisfied with their job. In Flanders a 
standard deviation is 8 hours, so that such an increase in total weekly workload is 
associated with an 8 percent decrease in job satisfaction. In short, even when 
comparing effect sizes for changes in workload by national standard deviations, the 
effect sizes are still very small. 
In summary, this sub-section aimed to uncover cross-country patterns for the 
association of teachers’ total weekly workload and their job satisfaction. It finds 
that support for equation (1), which suggests that bivariate estimates of this 
relationship are biased upward, because they proxy unobserved teacher and school 
level variables. Estimates from the preferred model (M4) also suggest that teachers 
suffer a reduction from an increased workload, but the effect sizes are very small. 
There is also substantial imprecision in most estimates, so that only 13 of the 32 
cases are statistically significant. 
  
-1.2%
-1.0%
-0.8%
-0.6%
-0.4%
-0.2%
0.0%
0.2%
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
C
o
ef
fi
ci
en
t
Total weekly workload
not significant
significant
  
121 
 
Table 3.4: Standard deviation of teachers’ workloads by country 
 Face-to-
face 
hours 
Planning Marking Leader-
ship 
Admin. Total 
weekly 
hours 
Australia 12 7 7 10 5 20 
Brazil 31 16 14 8 6 42 
Bulgaria 11 8 5 4 4 17 
Chile 17 10 6 4 5 26 
Croatia 8 8 5 1 4 17 
Czech Republic 8 7 4 3 4 18 
Denmark 8 6 4 4 2 13 
Estonia 13 7 6 4 4 24 
Finland 11 5 4 2 4 13 
France 4 7 5 1 2 12 
Iceland 9 6 4 4 3 12 
Israel 15 8 8 5 4 34 
Italy 6 6 5 3 3 16 
Japan 10 9 6 6 8 23 
Korea 10 8 6 4 8 18 
Latvia 16 9 8 4 5 27 
Malaysia 14 10 12 9 10 46 
Mexico 26 8 7 6 5 28 
Netherlands 8 5 5 5 2 18 
Norway 8 8 11 5 5 25 
Poland 16 6 7 3 5 29 
Portugal 8 13 13 7 10 17 
Romania 12 10 6 3 4 31 
Serbia 12 8 5 3 4 20 
Singapore 10 7 9 4 6 23 
Slovak Republic 10 9 5 5 5 22 
Spain 11 7 10 4 3 18 
Sweden 8 6 6 3 6 15 
Abu Dhabi (UAE) 16 14 10 7 7 24 
Alberta (Canada) 12 8 7 6 5 19 
England (UK) 9 7 7 5 5 18 
Flanders 
(Belgium) 
8 7 5 2 3 16 
Average 12 8 7 4 5 22 
Note: Standard deviations computed from standard errors clustered by school. 
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3.5.2. Is there heterogeneity across different activities?  
The findings for teachers’ total workload presented in the previous sub-section give 
rise to the question whether there is heterogeneity in the impact of additional 
hours across different kinds of activities teachers do. This could explain the large 
number of non-significant estimates if the effects of different activities cancel out 
each other. For example teachers might gain job satisfaction from being involved in 
school leadership activities, but their job satisfaction may be reduced from an 
increase in time spent marking. 
But before answering this question I will first present the estimates for teachers’ 
face-to-face teaching, planning, marking, administrative and school leadership 
workload, will examine whether the estimates point in the expected directions and 
will explore how and to which extent teacher and school-level variables are proxied 
in the baseline estimates. 
Do the estimates go in the expected directions? 
Face-to-face teaching is the activity that is predominantly associated with 
schoolteachers, and it is also likely to be the activity that attracts people to the 
profession itself. In the previous sub-section I note that measures of workload may 
in fact proxy human emotions. In the case of face-to-face teaching teachers might 
feel pride and responsibility as they have a key role in ensuring their pupils have 
the skills they need to succeed in the future. One might therefore assume that 
teachers gain job satisfaction from this. As before with overall workload, the 
estimates for M1 (Figure 3.4) indicate mixed support for this expectation. Fourteen 
of the 32 cases show positive associations, of which only that of Finland (0.2 
percent of a SD) is significant at conventional levels. Among the 18 remaining 
cases that show a negative association, the estimates for 6 education systems 
(Singapore, the Czech Republic, Norway and Denmark, Japan) are significant, 
ranging from -0.5 to -1.6 percent of a SD. This picture is similar to the baseline 
estimates for teachers’ total workload where there are 19 cases with negative 
estimates and 13 with positive estimates. 
When adding the available observable teacher-level variables the figure shows a 
shift in the estimates in both positive and negative directions. This suggests that 
these teacher-level covariates can be both positively and negatively associated with 
face-to-face teaching workloads. When controlling for these variables, Figure 3.4 
shows that the estimates for Estonia (-1 percent of a SD) and Korea (-0.8 percent of 
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a SD) have become significant, but the estimates for Finland and Japan are no 
longer statistically different from zero.  
As in the previous sub-section, when adding the available school-level variables, 
the estimates do not change. This is also the case for all other activities discussed 
here, which suggests that these particular variables are not associated with any of 
the activities examined. As before the estimates for M3 are not included in the 
graphs shown to aid readability.  
In the final preferred model, in 19 cases the estimates increase, i.e. become more 
positive or less negative, and decrease, i.e. become more negative and less positive 
in the remaining 12. Analogously there is one country, France, with a statistically 
significant positive coefficient (1 percent of a SD) and Spain with a statistically 
negative coefficient (-0.9 percent of a SD). In contrast to the findings for overall 
workload, where the unobservable school level factors are associated negatively 
with teachers’ workload, these estimates here suggest that these variables can be 
correlated positively and negatively with teachers’ workload depending on the 
respective education system.  
Planning lessons is another integral part of being a teacher. When planning lessons 
teachers need to develop a strategy and material with the aim to enable each of 
their pupils to achieve a specific learning outcome. As this process requires a 
certain degree of creativity from the teacher, one might expect that, similar to 
other creative activities such as art and music, teachers may gain job satisfaction 
from this activity. Estimates from M1 presented in Figure 3.5 though show that 
only 10 cases have positive estimates. Of these 10 education systems, only the 
estimate for Chile (0.8 percent SD) is statistically significant. When adding 
variables in models 2 to 4 the estimates change in both positive and negative 
directions, but of negligible magnitude. In none of the education systems do 
estimates become significant, and the estimate for Chile remains statistically 
significant in M4 with a mean of 0.9 percent SD. I conclude that there is little 
support that teachers’ planning workload is associated with their job satisfaction, 
nor do the baseline estimates appear to proxy the school level and the available 
teacher-level data. 
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Figure 3.4: Marginal effects of a one hour change - face-to-face teaching 
workload  
 
Notes: 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered by school. Countries ranked by M4 
estimate. Reported coefficients measured in SD. 
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As part of their job teachers may also be involved with school leadership activities. 
Following Harris and Muijs (2002) involving teachers in school leadership 
activities is commonly referred to as “Teacher Leadership”, which apart from being 
given the opportunity also entails teachers being entrusted to take over certain 
responsibilities. One may therefore expect that being involved in school leadership 
activities will be associated positively with teachers’ job satisfaction. Estimates in 
Figure 3.6 show strong support for this expectation, as that the baseline 
association is positive in 29 cases, of which 17 are statistically significant. When 
introducing the teacher-level variables the coefficients for all 32 education systems 
are reduced, thus indicating that the teacher-level variables are positively 
associated with teachers’ leadership workload. In M2, coefficients that had been 
statistically significant in the baseline are now not statistically different from zero 
in Finland, Poland, Chile, Bulgaria, Australia, Singapore and Brazil. In the 
preferred model estimates are reduced further in 13 cases and 13 others increase 
suggesting that the unobservable school-level variables may either be associated 
positively or negatively with teachers’ job satisfaction. In this model specification 
the estimates for Abu Dhabi (0.9 percent of a SD) and Poland (1.3 percent of a SD) 
become significant again compared to the corresponding estimates obtained in M2. 
Another common activity teachers do during their job is to mark students’ work. 
But in contrast to the previous activities one might expect that this repetitive work 
might be associated negatively with teachers’ job satisfaction. The findings 
presented in Figure 3.7 appear to support this expectation, as in 25 of the 32 
education systems the estimates are negative. In eight of these education systems 
the associations are statistically significant at the 5 percent level and range from -1 
to -2.2 percent of a SD. When adding all available teacher-level variables in M2, 
which are jointly positively associated with job satisfaction, I conclude that they 
are positively correlated with marking workload, as the estimates are reduced in 
18 cases (cf. Wooldridge, 2002). Here Norway (-0.9 percent of a SD) and Bulgaria (-
1.5 percent of a SD), two education systems whose estimates in M1 are not 
significant become significant. In the final model estimates are also reduced in 17 
cases, but in 15 cases the estimates increase, yet for none of the education systems 
do the estimates become statistically significant or cease being so. These changes 
nevertheless support equation 1 and the underlying assumption that the baseline 
estimates proxy, in this case, unobservable school-level characteristics.  
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The last activity examined here is teachers’ administrative workload. According to 
the National Union of Teachers, a British teachers’ union, administrative work is 
widely perceived to be “unnecessary”22. One might therefore expect a negative 
association with job satisfaction. Interestingly the estimates here presented in 
Figure 3.8 support this expectation in the baseline model. Here 23 education 
systems have a negative association, of which 9 are statistically significant and 
range from -1.2 to -3.2 percent of a SD. None of the positive associations are 
statistically significant. The available teacher-level variables also appear to be 
positively correlated with the administrative workload, as this variable is 
positively associated with job satisfaction and the coefficients on administrative 
workload is reduced for 22 cases, but the estimates increase in 10 cases. When 
controlling for these teacher-level variables the estimate for Poland becomes 
statistically significant and the estimate for Serbia is now not statistically different 
from zero. In the preferred model estimates increase for 15 cases and reduce for 17 
cases, but in none of these cases do estimates become or cease to be statistically 
significant. Nevertheless, these changes support the assumption that the baseline 
estimates proxy, in this case, unobservable school-level characteristics. 
In summary, the findings show mixed support for the expected directions of the 
respective estimates. The statistically significant estimates for marking, 
administrative and school leadership activities point in the expected direction for 
each activity. In contrast, I find the expected increase in teachers’ job satisfaction 
when their face-to-face teaching workload increases in only one of the 8 significant 
cases, which is France. The fact that there are 7 countries with significant negative 
estimates suggests that although teachers may be drawn into the profession by the 
joy of teaching, they are more satisfied the less hours they do this activity. Yet, as 
for each kind of activity the majority of estimates are not statistically significant it 
is hard to make stronger claims.  
  
                                                        
22 http://www.teachers.org.uk/node/20645, last accessed on the 27th of January 2015 
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Figure 3.5: Marginal effects of a one hour change - lesson planning 
 
Notes: 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered by school. Countries ranked by M4 
estimate. Reported coefficients measured in SD. 
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Figure 3.6: Marginal effects of a one hour change - leadership activities 
 
Notes: 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered by school. Countries ranked by M4 
estimate. Reported coefficients measured in SD. Estimates for France are 5.5% in M1, 5% in M2. 
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Figure 3.7: Marginal effects of a one hour change - marking  
 
Notes: 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered by school. Countries ranked by M4 
estimate. Reported coefficients measured in SD. 
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Figure 3.8: Marginal effects of a one hour change - administrative activities 
 
Notes: 95 percent confidence intervals based on robust standard errors clustered by school. Countries 
ranked by M4 estimate. Reported coefficients measured in SD. 
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How do baseline and preferred estimates correspond? 
So far, the narrative in this sub-section has focused on whether the estimates point 
in the expected direction and how the estimates change moving from the baseline 
to the preferred model. In order to get a better understanding of the direction of the 
bias in the baseline estimates by not controlling for the available teacher-level and 
all school level covariates, I plot the baseline estimates for each of the different 
activities against the corresponding estimates obtained in the preferred model. As 
in Figure 3.2 there are 32 data points plotted in each graph (Figure 3.9-3.12) as 
well as a black 45 degree line. If data points are located on this line the estimates 
for both models 1 and 4 are the same. Accordingly if data points are above this line, 
the corresponding M4 estimate is larger than the baseline; if data points are below 
this line, the corresponding M4 estimates are lower than the baseline.  
In the previous section I find that for teachers’ total weekly workload the baseline 
estimates appear to overstate the workload effect, i.e. all data points are below the 
45 degree line. I find this general pattern for face-to-face teaching (17 data points 
below the line, see Figure 3.9), marking (21 data points below the line, Figure 
3.10), leadership (27 data points below the line, Figure 3.11). Thus, the baseline 
estimates for these activities tend to be overstated (Figure 3.12), but this pattern is 
not as clear as for total weekly workload. In contrast, the estimates for 
administrative activities tend to be understated, as in 24 data points are above the 
45 degree line meaning that the M4 estimate is more positive or less negative than 
the corresponding baseline estimate.  
Figure 3.9: Correlation of baseline (M1) and preferred (M4) estimates – face-
to-face teaching 
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Figure 3.10: Correlation of baseline (M1) and preferred (M4) estimates - 
marking 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Correlation of baseline M1) and preferred (M4) estimates – 
school leadership activities 
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Figure 3.12: Correlation of baseline (M1) and preferred (M4) estimates – 
administrative activities 
 
 
Do the effects of the different activities cancel out? 
I now turn to the interplay of the individual activities. The estimates for teachers’ 
total weekly workload encompass the effect of more activities than the just the five 
focused on in this research. Therefore I first need to estimate the joint effect of 
these five activities, i.e. their linear combination, on teachers’ job satisfaction. I do 
so using the STATA 13 lincom command, which takes into account the variance 
and covariance of the parameter estimates of each of the five activities (face-to-face 
teaching, planning lessons, marking, leadership involvement and administrative 
tasks) to test the null that the effect of the sum of these five activities on teachers’ 
job satisfaction is zero. The results can be found in the column titled “Sum of 5 
activities” in Table 3.5, which summarises all the estimates reported in section 3.5 
so far; the letter “p” indicates positive and an “n” indicates negative estimates, each 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level or below.  
I first compare the estimates for teachers’ total weekly workload with those of the 
linear combinations. The Table shows that there are 13 negative estimates for total 
weekly workload, but only 7 for the linear combinations. Yet, for 2 of these seven 
significant linear combination estimates, Japan and Mexico, the corresponding 
estimates for total weekly workload are not statistically significant. This implies 
that the extra activities included in total weekly workload add uncertainty and 
mask the joint effect of the 5 activities focused on here. In contrast the Table shows 
significant estimates for both total weekly workload and the linear combinations 
for the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands, England and Flanders. 
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Moreover, nine of the 13 cases with significant estimates for total weekly workload 
have insignificant estimates for the linear combinations. In six of these cases, 
Australia, Estonia, France, Latvia, Norway and Sweden, at least one of the 
individual activities is has a statistically significant estimate. In other words, the 
individual activities jointly cancel out. 
Interestingly, I observe the opposite for Mexico and Japan. Here none of the 
individual activities has a statistically significant estimate, but jointly they are. 
England and Flanders are also interesting. The Table shows that teachers in these 
countries gain job satisfaction from school leadership activities, but their job 
satisfaction suffers a reduction from their marking and administrative workloads. 
The linear combinations of these estimates though are negative which suggests 
that a change in marking and administrative workloads is the driving force. 
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Table 3.5: Summary table of significant estimates at 95% confidence (M4) 
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Total # 
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Note: “n” and “p” indicates a significant negative or positive estimate respectively. 
Average estimates across education systems: a pooled model 
With all this heterogeneity and imprecision among the findings reported above it is 
hard to make more general claims about the importance of teachers’ workload for 
their job satisfaction. In order to obtain estimates averaged across the 32 education 
systems, I pool all 99,459 observations together and include country-dummies in 
  
136 
 
models 1 to 3; the school-fixed effects pick up the both the between-country and 
between-school variation in M423. By doing so I obtain estimates that account for 
all the uncertainty in the data. I present the estimates in Table 3.5.  
Table 3.6: The association of workloads and job satisfaction (pooled model) 
Workload Model 1 
(baseline) 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
(preferred) 
Total weekly 0.1*** 
(3.22) 
-0.2*** 
(-5.08) 
-0.2*** 
(-5.07) 
-0.1*** 
(-3.27) 
Face-to-face 
teaching 
-0.1 
(-1.27) 
-0.3*** 
(-3.88) 
-0.2*** 
(-3.82) 
-0.2*** 
(-3.38) 
Planning -0.1 
(-1.14) 
-0.1 
(-0.66) 
-0.1 
(-0.70) 
-0.2 
(-1.33) 
Marking -0.6*** 
(-4.56) 
-0.5*** 
(-4.16) 
-0.5*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.5*** 
(-3.84) 
Leadership 1.2*** 
(8.32) 
0.6*** 
(4.40) 
0.6*** 
(4.45) 
0.5** 
(2.82) 
Administrative  -0.7*** 
(-4.69) 
-0.7*** 
(-4.48) 
-0.7*** 
(-4.48) 
-0.6*** 
(-3.11) 
Sum of activities -0.3 
(-1.22) 
-0.8*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.9*** 
(-3.60) 
-0.1** 
(-3.07) 
Note: Estimates in percent of a standard deviation; T-statistic in parentheses 
The findings in Table 3.6 generally point in the expected directions. The estimates 
for marking, administrative and leadership workloads are all statistically 
significant and point in the expected directions. Although the estimate for teachers’ 
total weekly workload in M1 indicates a positive relationship (0.1 percent SD) from 
M2 onwards the estimates are negative (-0.1 percent SD), in other words in the 
expected direction. A similar pattern is observed for face-to-face teaching workload. 
Here the estimate in M1 is not statistically different from zero, but the estimate (-
0.1 percent SD) is in the expected direction. From M2 onwards the coefficients are 
statistically significant. In contrast, although the estimates for planning are in the 
expected negative direction, they are not statistically significant for any of the four 
models. 
Comparing the estimates from the baseline to the preferred model further supports 
the patterns observed earlier. The change between models 1 and 2 for total weekly 
workload, face-to-face teaching and leadership activities mirrors the cross-country 
pattern described above and thus adds further support to the assumption that the 
baseline estimates proxy teacher-level variables. But there is very little support 
                                                        
23 The TALIS 2013 school identifier (IDSCHOOL) does not uniquely identify all schools, as some schools in 
different countries share the same number. I therefore manually compute a unique school identifier combining the 
country and school ID. 
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that school-level observed and unobservable variables accounted for in models 3 
and 4 are a source of endogeneity in the respective baseline estimates.  
But when comparing the change in the linear combination of the five activities (last 
row) across the four models a clearer pattern emerges. While in M1 the estimate is 
negative (-0.3 percent SD) but not statistically significant, when controlling for 
teacher-level covariates the estimate changes to -0.8 percent SD, which is 
statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level. Controlling for the available school-
level covariates, the estimate remains statistically significant and decreases 
further to -0.9 percent SD. Another jump in coefficients occurs when adding school-
fixed effects, which eliminates all observable and unobservable school-level 
confounders. Here the estimate is -0.1 percent SD, which implies two things. First, 
it suggests that the unobservable school-level variables appear to be negatively 
correlated with teachers’ job satisfaction. Second, this estimate is of the same 
magnitude and direction as the coefficient on teachers’ total workload, which 
suggests that these five activities drive the latter estimate. 
I now return to the question whether the individual activities may cancel out each 
other. Comparing the estimates for the individual activities reported in the 6th 
column (M4) shows that the effect of a one hour increase in leadership workload is 
associated with a 0.5 percent SD increase in nationally standardised job 
satisfaction of teachers. The table shows that this change could be approximately 
counterbalanced by an increase in marking (-0.5 percent SD) and administrative 
workload (-0.6 percent SD). In contrast a one-hour increase in school leadership 
activities appears to be able to outweigh a two-hour increase in face-to-face 
teaching workload. 
3.5.3. Summary 
This section has focused on cross-country analyses of the workload-job satisfaction 
relationships and aimed to uncover the emerging cross-country patterns as well as 
exploring the extent to which corresponding bivariate estimates proxy teacher and 
school level variables as suggested by equation (1). 
The findings presented are marginal effects and represent the effect of a one-hour 
increase in workload on nationally standardised job satisfaction, so that the 
obtained estimates are comparable across countries. The findings show that for 
each of the different kinds of workload examined here, the majority of the 32 
individual education systems do not have statistically significant estimates. When 
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the estimates are significant at or below the 5 percent significance level they tend 
to be of negligible magnitude. Although a one-hour change is a small change in 
teachers’ workload in most cases, even a one standard deviation change in total 
weekly workload for example is associated at the very maximum with an 8 percent 
SD decrease in job satisfaction in the case of Flanders. 
The findings also support the expectation that teachers may gain job satisfaction 
from some activities and experience a reduction from others. The statistically 
significant findings support the expectation that teachers experience a reduction in 
their job satisfaction from increases in their marking and administrative 
workloads. Yet although one might expect teachers to enjoy face-to-face teaching, 
the findings suggest that teachers are less satisfied with their jobs the more 
lessons they teach. The findings also show that teachers gain job satisfaction from 
being involved in school leadership. Lesson planning on the other hand appear to 
be a special case. Although one might expect teachers to enjoy this, as lesson 
planning involves being creative, this is only the case in Chile. 
As the estimates from the cross-country models are heterogeneous and especially 
most estimates are subject to substantial imprecision, I pool all observed teachers 
together to obtain averaged estimates across all countries. I include country-
dummies in models 1 to 3 to pick up the between-country variation; in M4 this 
between-country variation is included in the between-school variation that is 
accounted for by the school-fixed effects. Comparing the estimates for the 
individual activities obtained from the pooled version of M4 indicates that changes 
in the individual workloads could be compensated by changes in others. 
Particularly a one hour increase in school leadership activities could be 
approximately counterbalanced by a one hour increase in marking (-0.5 percent 
SD) and administrative workload (-0.6 percent SD). In contrast a one hour increase 
in school leadership activities appears to outweigh a two-hour increase in face-to-
face teaching workload. 
Interestingly the findings presented in section 3.5 show that the observable school-
level variables are not correlated with teachers’ workload. Instead the findings 
suggest that the unobservable variables are. In section 3.6 I will therefore move 
the focus to the English sample, which contains relevant additional data. First, the 
English sample is linked to the English National Pupil Database (NPD), so that 
extra administrative school-level information is available, which might be part of 
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the unobserved variables in the school-fixed effects in section 3.5. The English 
sample also contains information on teachers’ perceptions of their workplace and 
the stakeholders in them as well as perceptions of their job in society. Although 
these variables represent the individual teachers’ subjective perspective, they are 
nevertheless valuable as they relate to the school-level and are consistent with the 
adopted production function approach formulated in equation (1).  
3.6. TALIS England 2013 
3.6.1. The data 
As already hinted above, TALIS England 2013 contains additional information that 
is of interest here. In the previous discussion of the cross-country data, the school-
level variables included in M3 are head teachers’ age, gender, self-reported 
leadership styles as well as teacher to administrative or pedagogic support staff 
ratios. Before my obtaining access to the English data, it was linked to the English 
National Pupil Database (NPD) so that it contains a few additional school-level 
variables: 
 School type, 
 Ofsted rating at the most recent inspection, as a measure of overall school 
quality as measured by the independent Office for Standards in Education 
(Ofsted). Ofsted classify schools into one of the following four categories: 
outstanding, good, satisfactory and inadequate. 
 The percentage of pupils receiving free school meals (FSM) as an indicator 
of poverty, 
 The percentage of pupils achieving 5 A* to C grades in their age 16 General 
Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE), 
 The average Key Stage 2 test score of pupils entering the school as an 
indicator of pupils’ ability. 
In short, these school level data cover a wider range of stakeholders in a school. 
The Ofsted rating in particular may be more valid than the head teachers’ self-
reported leadership styles, as this survey data may represent their aspirations 
rather than their true leadership styles. In spite of these advantages, the 
additional NPD variables may be weak proxies. For example, a poverty index such 
as the proportion of pupils receiving free school meals may be a poor indicator of 
the parental behaviour the teachers might be exposed to. 
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The English TALIS sample also contains information on teachers’ perceptions of 
their workplace and the stakeholders in them as well as perceptions of their job in 
society. The data was collected as an additional question, teacher question 47, and 
is unique to England. Although these variables represent the individual teachers’ 
subjective perspective, they complement the previous analysis reported in section 
3.5 as they relate to the school-level. They are consistent with the adopted 
production function approach formulated in equation (1), because they combine 
both the bottom-up approach, that individuals’ job satisfaction is the effect of 
external influences such as the working environment they are in, and the top-down 
approach, which assumes that individual’s perceive the environment they are in 
differently due to different psychological factors. In equation (1) these variables are 
elements of Xij.  
For the selected items teachers are asked to rate their agreement with a statement 
on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 representing “strongly disagree” to 4 
representing “strongly agree”. For the purpose of this research these items are 
collapsed to two categories representing agreement and disagreement. These 
statements are: 
1. The students I teach are generally well behaved. 
2. The school has an effective school management team. 
3. The school management team gives clear vision and direction. 
4. I do not have the autonomy I need to do a good job as a teacher. 
5. Teachers are underpaid compared to other qualified professionals with 
similar levels of responsibility. 
6. My own pay is fair given my performance. 
7. The accountability system (Ofsted, league tables, etc.) does not add 
significantly to the pressure of my job. 
8. Parents are supportive of my role as their children’s teacher. 
9. The accountability system does not add significantly to my workload. 
10. I have scope to progress as a classroom teacher. 
11. I have scope to progress into a leadership role. 
12. I have scope to progress to a higher pay level. 
13. My workload is unmanageable.  
In this sample of teachers in England, 27 percent work in “outstanding”, 44 percent 
in “good”, 25 percent in “satisfactory” and approximately 4 percent work in 
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“inadequate” schools as deemed by Ofsted. In 2013 the English education system 
consists of a number of different kinds of schools, which can be summarised into 
three broader categories: Academies, Independent Schools and Maintained Schools. 
In this sample approximately 45 percent of teachers work in Academies, 6 percent 
in Independent (private) Schools and the remaining 49 percent in Maintained 
Schools. At the point of data collection, Maintained Schools could become 
Academies. Both school types are government-funded, but the latter are not 
administered by Local Authorities, enjoy more legal freedom, for example in 
respect to staffing and do not need to follow the National Curriculum. On average 
18 (95 percent C.I. 16 to 21) percent of pupils in a school receive free school meals 
and can therefore be considered living in relative poverty. On average 63 (95 
percent C.I. 59 to 67) percent of pupils achieve five or more A star to C grades in 
their GCSE exams at age 16.  
Figure 3.13 shows the sample average proportions of teachers agreeing with the 13 
statements listed above. The estimates are ranked according to their magnitude, 
and the error bars indicate the 95 percent confidence interval. I will integrate the 
results from further analyses into the discussion of this graph to show that 
teachers’ perceptions correlate with characteristics of their workplace. In this sub-
sample 47 percent of teachers agree that their workload is unmanageable. Further 
analysis shows that these teachers work approximately 3.7 hours more per week 
on average than their peers who disagree. This estimate appears to be robust to 
contractual status, as controlling for the latter reduces the estimate only slightly, 
so that teachers who believe their workload is unmanageable work 3.5 hours more 
per week than their peers who disagree. 
  
  
142 
 
Figure 3.13: Proportions of teachers in England agreeing with the following 
statements 
 
Note: Standard errors adjusted for clustering by school. 
Figure 3.13 also shows that 88 percent of teachers perceive their pupils to be well 
behaved. Additional analyses of the data indicate that this perception differs by the 
proportion of FSM pupils. On average teachers who agree that their pupils are well 
behaved tend to work in schools with 5 percentage points less FSM pupils. 
Similarly the proportion of teachers feeling supported by the pupils’ parents also 
varies by the proportion of FSM pupils in the school. While 85 percent of teachers 
agree on average, agreement is highest in the second (90 percent) and first (87 
percent) quartile of the distribution of FSM, i.e. in schools with lower proportions 
of poor pupils. Only 82 and 84 percent of teachers feel supported by their pupils’ 
parents in the third and fourth FSM quartiles. These differences are significant at 
the 0.1 percent level. 
Figure 3.13 also shows that 70 percent of teachers believe that their senior 
leadership team (SLT) is effective. I explore if this belief resonates with Ofsted 
ratings, as these are supposed to indicate the quality of a school. A chi-squared test 
suggests that while 95 percent of teachers in outstanding and good schools believe 
their SLT is effective, only 75 percent do so in satisfactory and inadequate schools. 
The reader should be reminded though that teachers may in part base their 
answers on their school’s Ofsted rating. 
The accountability system itself, of which Ofsted ratings are a central part, may 
also affect teachers’ perceived workload and pressure. One would expect teachers 
in satisfactory and outstanding schools to be more affected than their peers in 
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better ranked schools, as satisfactory and inadequate schools will be desperate to 
achieve a better rating. The data shows that on average only a minority feel no 
additional pressure (12 percent) or workload (21 percent). As expected the 
percentage of teachers feeling this way is significantly lower in satisfactory and 
inadequate schools for both perceived workload (18 compared to 22 percent) and 
pressure (9 compared to 13 percent). 
On average 73 percent of teachers believe they are underpaid compared to 
professions with similar levels of responsibility and 53 percent feel underpaid given 
their performance. I explore whether these beliefs differ across school types, as the 
pay teachers receive is likely to differ between public and private schools, and the 
recent Academy schools are more independent than traditional state schools. The 
data though suggests that these beliefs do not differ by school type. 
3.6.2. Controlling for teachers’ perceptions of school-level 
confounders 
I now explore how the estimates for England reported in section 3.5 change, when 
adding the NPD variables and teachers’ perceptions variables available in TALIS 
England 2013. I follow the stepwise approach outlined in section 3.4. I add a 
variation to M3, the model controlling for observed teacher and school 
characteristics, which I name M3b. Thus, this model controls for part-time status, 
the teachers’ involvement in mentoring, the degree of cooperation with their 
colleagues, whether or not they are on a permanent contract, their gender and 
their self-efficacy at the teacher level, and the degree of distributional and 
instructional leadership, as well as the head teacher’s gender, age as well as the 
ratio of teachers per administrative or pedagogic member of support staff in 
addition to the NPD variables described above. I also run M4b, which includes 
school-fixed effects, all the teacher-level variables included in M3b as well as the 
twelve dummy variables indicating teachers’ perceptions of their job.  
Figure 3.14 summarises the estimates from all six models for teachers’ total 
workload and the individual activities. As before in section 3.5, the error bars 
indicate the 95 percent confidence interval. The fourth bar in descending order for 
each group of estimates, represents M3b; the last bar represents M4b. Comparing 
models 3 and 3b one can see that the estimates only vary slightly, as in model 3 the 
observable school-level variables are not correlated with teachers’ workload. 
Moreover, none of the NPD variables are significantly correlated with job 
satisfaction. In model 3 only one school-level TALIS 2013 variable, the head 
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teachers’ distributed leadership style, is significantly associated with teachers’ job 
satisfaction. Here a one standard deviation increase in distributed leadership 
increases teachers’ job satisfaction by 0.06 SD. This association though becomes 
statistically insignificant in model 3b. It may be the case because head teacher 
leadership styles proxy similar behaviours to the Ofsted rating variable. To test 
this, I remove the head teacher leadership style variables from the model. The 
estimates (not shown) remain identical, as still all NPD variables do not 
significantly predict teachers’ job satisfaction24.  
Comparing models 4 and 4b model fit improves significantly at the 0.1 percent 
significance level. Jointly the teacher perception variables added in M4b are 
associated positively with teachers’ job satisfaction. These perceptions appear to be 
negatively associated with teachers’ total, administrative and face-to-face teaching 
workload, as their corresponding estimates are less negative or more positive in M4 
and the estimates for total and administrative workload are not statistically 
significant anymore. In contrast these perceptions appear to be positively 
associated with leadership and planning workloads as the estimates in M4 are less 
positive or more negative. For example, the coefficient on teachers’ marking 
workload falls in absolute size from -2 to -0.9 percent of a SD.  
  
                                                        
24 Linear combination test yields a t-statistic of 1.41, and model fit does not improve significantly at the 5 percent 
level as the F-test yields a p-value of 0.06. 
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Figure 3.14: Comparing models for the workload-job satisfaction 
relationship in England 
 
Note: 95 percent confidence interval based on standard errors that are adjusted for clustering by school. 
3.6.3. The association of teachers’ perceptions of their job and 
their job satisfaction  
Having established so far that the association of teachers’ workload and their job 
satisfaction is weak at best, I now focus on teachers’ perceptions of their job and 
how these are associated with their job satisfaction. The estimates reported in 
Figure 3.15 are obtained from M4b. As before, the error bars indicate the 95 
percent confidence interval.  
Model 4b explores the within-school variation, i.e. the variation between teachers 
in the same school. It controls for part-time status, the teachers’ involvement in 
mentoring, the degree of cooperation with their colleagues, whether or not they are 
on a permanent contract, their gender and their self-efficacy at the teacher level. 
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As the variables in question are binary, the estimates indicate the average change 
in job satisfaction when agreeing with the respective statement, conditional on the 
other covariates. All the perception variables are added at once to form M4b. The 
reader should be reminded at this point that although the reported estimates are 
purged of any between-school variation, they still are only correlations and should 
not be considered causal. The estimates may for example be subject to endogeneity, 
as “grumpy” teachers may both indicate low levels of job satisfaction and tend to 
perceive their school and the other stakeholders within it more negatively. 
Figure 3.15: The association of teacher perceptions and their job satisfaction 
in England 
 
Note: 95 percent confidence interval based on standard errors that are adjusted for clustering by school. Estimates 
obtained from model 4b, which includes school-fixed effects as well as part-time status, the teachers’ involvement in 
mentoring, the degree of cooperation with their colleagues, whether or not they are on a permanent contract, their 
gender and their self-efficacy. 
As before in models M2 and M4, including teachers’ perceptions again increases 
overall model fit in M4b. Compared to M4, the adjusted R2 is 17 percentage points 
higher in M4b so that overall 37.6 percent of the variation in job satisfaction is 
explained in this sample. 
I rank the estimates in ascending order according to their magnitude. This 
hierarchy suggests that how teachers perceive their job is valued in society, as 
indicated by the question “teachers are underpaid compared to other qualified 
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professionals with similar levels of responsibility”, does not statistically 
significantly predict their job satisfaction. Instead the findings show that teachers 
appear to value well-behaved pupils (0.38 SD), having sufficient autonomy to do 
their job (0.30 SD), having the scope to progress as a teacher (0.28 SD) the most, as 
well as an effective school-leadership team (0.31 SD). 
Further, teachers appreciate supportive parents (0.19 SD), a school management 
team that gives clear vision and direction (0.16 SD) and having the scope to 
progress to higher pay (0.13 SD). Interestingly, the accountability system appears 
to affect teachers’ job satisfaction through causing a perceived greater workload 
(0.12 SD), but not through causing perceived increased pressure. Similarly 
perceived scope to progress into school leadership positions is not associated with a 
significant change in job satisfaction. The findings also show that although 
teachers who feel they are receiving fair pay given their performance are more 
satisfied with their job, it is the weakest of all the statistically significant 
predictors at an estimated 0.09 SD. 
More importantly, the findings clearly show that teachers who believe their 
workload is unmanageable are 0.32 SD less satisfied with their job than their peers 
who disagree. As this estimate is obtained from model 4b, the estimate is not 
confounded by any school-level factors, as well as the actual amount of hours the 
teachers work, part-time status, the teachers’ involvement in mentoring, the 
degree of cooperation with their colleagues, whether or not they are on a 
permanent contract, their gender and their self-efficacy. 
3.6.4. Summary 
Following the pattern of section 3.5 this section has focused on England and first 
exploits additional school level information obtained from a link with the National 
Pupil Database, which are school type, the proportion of pupils receiving free 
school meals, the school’s Ofsted rating, the average pupil Key Stage 2 score and 
the proportion of pupils achieving 5 grade A* to C in their GCSE. Adding these 
NPD variables to those in M3, the former do not correlate significantly with job 
satisfaction and therefore do not change the estimates compared to the model 
omitting the NPD variables.  
The England data also contains information on teachers’ perceptions of their 
workplace and their role as a teacher in society. When adding these variables to 
the fourth model, which includes school-fixed effects and a number of teacher-level 
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characteristics and behaviours, significant estimates in the previous models 
disappear, which supports the assumption that teachers’ perceptions of their 
workplace and people in them are sources of bias. 
Moreover, the data shows that teachers’ perceptions of their workplace, the people 
in it as well as of their status in society are strongly associated with their job 
satisfaction. The obtained estimates range from 9 to 39 percent of a standard 
deviation and are thus much stronger than the association of their workload. Most 
importantly teachers seem to value well behaved pupils, sufficient autonomy to do 
their job and scope to progress as a teacher. An effective school leadership team is 
similarly important to them, but supportive parents, school leaders providing clear 
vision and direction, scope to progress to higher pay and fair pay given a teacher’s 
performance are also significant but increasingly less important. Last, the results 
clearly show that teachers who believe that their workload is unmanageable are 
0.32 SD less satisfied than their peers and this estimate is robust to all potential 
school-level confounders as well as a number of teacher-level observable 
characteristics. 
3.7. Conclusion 
This paper is the first of its kind to explore the connection of teachers’ workload 
and their job satisfaction. Before using cross-sectional, observational data from 32 
education systems from the OECD’s TALIS 2013 dataset, the paper applies a 
production function approach to job satisfaction. The main advantage of this 
approach is that it unifies the two prevailing streams of literature, namely Top-
Down and Bottom-Up approaches (cf. Diener, 1984). Thus it combines the notion 
that a teacher’s job satisfaction might be determined by the environment he or she 
is in (Bottom-Up) with the notion that individuals process their environment 
differently (Top-Down). Based on this production function I identify potential 
groups of stakeholders that could both directly affect teachers’ job satisfaction as 
well as their workload and thereby bias endogenously bivariate OLS estimates of 
the workload – job satisfaction relationship. These groups of stakeholders are the 
teachers themselves, the pupils, the parents, the other teachers in the school, the 
head teacher and the physical resources available in the school.  
The paper then applies this production function to 32 education systems sampled 
in the OECD’s TALIS dataset collected in 2013. It applies a stepwise regression 
approach, increasing the number of variables of either the teacher or school-level in 
  
149 
 
4 steps. The first specification is a bivariate OLS model, the final preferred model 
exploits the fact that multiple colleagues are observed in the same school and 
contains school-fixed effects to capture observable and unobservable school-level 
variables as well as part-time status, the teachers’ involvement in mentoring, the 
degree of cooperation with their colleagues, whether or not they are on a 
permanent contract, their gender and their self-efficacy.  
This paper further contributes to the literature being the first to consider the 
association of not only total weekly workload, but also explores heterogeneity of 
effects for five different activities teachers do while working; face-to-face teaching 
hours, time spent planning, marking, doing administrative tasks as well as the 
time they are engaged in school leadership activities.  
The findings presented are marginal effects and represent the effect of a one-hour 
increase in workload on nationally standardised job satisfaction, so that the 
obtained estimates are comparable across countries. The findings show that across 
the different kinds of workload examined here, the majority of the 32 individual 
education systems do not have statistically significant estimates. When the 
estimates are significant at or beyond the 5 percent significance level they tend to 
be of negligible magnitude. Although a one-hour change is a small change in 
teachers’ workload in most cases, even a one standard deviation change in total 
weekly workload for example is associated at maximum with an 8 percent SD 
decrease in job satisfaction in the case of Flanders. The findings also support the 
expectation that teachers may gain job satisfaction from some activities 
(leadership) and experience a reduction from others (marking, administrative 
tasks).  
As the estimates from the cross-country models are heterogeneous and especially 
most estimates are subject to substantial imprecision, this paper runs pooled 
models to obtain averaged estimates across all countries. The evidence indicates 
that a one hour increase in school leadership activities could be approximately 
counterbalanced by a one hour increase in marking (-0.5 percent SD change in job 
satisfaction) and administrative workload (-0.6 percent SD) and could outweigh a 
two-hour increase in face-to-face teaching workload. 
The paper then moves its focus to England and uses additional administrative 
school-level information obtained from a link with the English National Pupil 
Database, which are school type, the proportion of pupils receiving free school 
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meals, the school’s Ofsted rating, the average pupil Key Stage 2 score and the 
proportion of pupils achieving 5 grade A* to C in their GCSE. Adding these 
variables to part-time status, the teachers’ involvement in mentoring, the degree of 
cooperation with their colleagues, whether or not they are on a permanent 
contract, their gender and their self-efficacy at the teacher level, and the degree of 
distributional and instructional leadership, as well as the head teacher’s gender, 
age as well as the ratio of teachers per administrative or pedagogic member of 
support staff, the NPD variables do not correlate significantly with job satisfaction 
and therefore do not change the estimates compared to the model omitting the 
NPD variables.  
In contrast to the negligible estimates for teachers’ workloads and their job 
satisfaction, the English data suggests that teacher perceptions of their workplace 
and the people in them are strongly associated with their job satisfaction and 
estimates range from 9 to 39 percent of a standard deviation. Most importantly 
teachers value well behaved pupils, sufficient autonomy to do their job and scope to 
progress as a teacher. An effective school leadership team is similarly important to 
them, but supportive parents, school leaders providing clear vision and direction, 
scope to progress to higher pay and fair pay given a teacher’s performance are also 
statistically significant, but increasingly less important. Moreover, the results 
clearly show that teachers who believe that their workload is unmanageable are 
0.32 SD less satisfied than their peers and this estimate is robust to all potential 
school-level confounders as well as a number of teacher-level observable 
characteristics. Future research should focus on which unobserved teacher-level 
variables in the research presented here explain teachers perceiving their 
workload as unmanageable. 
The policy implications of these findings are that changes in teachers’ workloads 
only have a small impact on their job satisfaction. Yet the school level does appear 
to play an important role determining teachers’ job satisfaction. The findings 
suggest that their school leaders play a central role, as they can help bridge the 
gap between parents and teachers so that the parents are supportive of their 
children’s teachers. School leaders can also help incentivise the pupils to better 
behaviour, can help teachers develop professionally, and may be able to develop 
means to reduce teachers’ perceived workload caused by accountability systems. 
The findings also show that school leaders and their leadership teams play an 
important role in determining their teachers’ job satisfaction, and that teachers 
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particularly value effective school management teams that give a clear vision and 
direction. 
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Concluding remarks 
In this final section of the thesis, I would like to take the opportunity to reflect on 
and highlight the contribution of the presented work as well as potential avenues 
for future research.  
 The first chapter delves into explaining why even the most robust estimates 
for class size effects from around the world do not provide a conclusive 
picture. It is often argued that pupil achievement will decrease as class 
sizes increase. I challenge this widespread belief and argue that a change in 
class size will have both a compositional and a resource usage effect. The 
compositional effect consists of a change in peer dynamics, as pupils will, 
quite literally, be either added to or removed from the class, (depending on 
the direction of the change in class size), and a household effect, whereby 
parents may choose different schools or adapt their academic support for 
their children. Within schools physical resources such as schoolbooks, 
blackboards, desks and chairs and teachers need to be allocated to pupils, 
and this allocation process may change with the number of pupils. Drawing 
on data from a range of sub-Saharan African countries, I provide evidence 
that these different mechanisms can indeed have opposing directions and 
thus may cancel out each other. This can explain the observation that the 
gap between pupils in larger and smaller class sizes does not grow after the 
first year, as the households the children are in may adapt their behaviour 
(cf. Nye et al, 1999).  
 The resource usage effect also has direct implications for the specification of 
education production functions (cf. Hanushek, 1979). Production functions 
have been used by economists for many years to relate inputs to outputs. 
Education production functions are adaptations of this approach to 
educational contexts. Thus it is understandable that physical resources such 
as schoolbooks are considered a separate input from all others. In contrast, I 
argue that physical classroom resources such as schoolbooks do not have an 
“innate” effect on pupil achievement of their own. Rather their effect 
depends on how the teacher uses them. Analogously the effect of school-level 
resources is the result of how school leaders use them. In short, education 
production functions should consider including physical school and 
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classroom resources as elements of the school leader or classroom teacher. 
Thus a change in how teachers allocate schoolbooks to pupils can explain 
why in Kenya over time schoolbooks do not appear to affect pupil 
achievement anymore (cf. Glewwe et al, 2009) 
 The second chapter’s contribution to the field is mainly methodological. In 
this chapter I argue that previous research analysing the association of 
teachers’ observable characteristics and pupil achievement in sub-Saharan 
African contexts do not sufficiently address either the non-random matching 
of teachers to schools or the matching of pupils and teachers within them 
and argue that allowing pupil-fixed effects is the best way to address this 
issue. I contrast my estimates with school-fixed effects models for each 
subject that only account for the non-random matching of pupils and 
teachers to schools. The results from these different types of model contrast 
rather sharply. Two conclusions may be drawn from this: 1) pupil teacher-
matching within schools is also a non-random process and 2) the findings 
from previous studies using the same data are not suitable bases for policy 
making. The emerging patterns of my pupil-fixed effects models also differ 
from the US patterns, which suggests that neither should US evidence 
automatically be used as a basis for policy in sub-Saharan African countries, 
because of their different contexts. Together with the US evidence, my 
findings contribute to an emerging picture, which suggests that although 
teachers matter, they differ in their quality predominantly due to their 
unobservable characteristics. 
 The second chapter breaks new ground by categorising teachers’ observable 
characteristics into proxies for two different kinds of teachers’ skills and 
then explores whether they are complementary to one another or if they are 
substitutes. While the findings here focus on African countries, this kind of 
analysis could also be done in a developed country context, opening up a 
new avenue for research aimed at helping teachers maximise their 
effectiveness. Future research might extend to exploring interactions of 
these different teacher skills with different incentives as well as proxies for 
their motivation.  
 The third chapter reports the first study to explicitly examine the 
association of teachers’ workload and their job satisfaction and to do so 
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using cross-country data sampling 32 distinct education systems. In this 
chapter I formulate a production function that combines the two prevailing 
strands of research in occupational psychology. This approach combines the 
notion that a teacher’s job satisfaction might be determined by the 
environment he or she is in (Bottom-Up) with the notion that individuals 
process their environment differently (Top-Down). Based on this production 
function I identify potential sources for endogeneity of bivariate OLS 
estimates of the workload – job satisfaction relationship when using 
observational data. These potential sources of bias are the teachers 
themselves, the pupils, the parents, the other teachers in the school, the 
head teacher as well as the physical resources available in the school. In 
addition, I consider not only the association of total weekly workload with 
job satisfaction, but also explore heterogeneity of effects for five different 
activities teachers do while working; face-to-face teaching hours, time spent 
planning, marking, doing administrative tasks as well as the time they are 
engaged in school leadership activities. Interestingly there is no consistent 
cross-country pattern supporting the expectation derived among others from 
the UK media that teachers’ workload affects their job satisfaction to a 
worrying degree. In most countries the estimated effects are not significant, 
and those that are, appear to be of negligible magnitude. 
 I then move on to using data of teachers’ perceptions of their job and their 
workplace available only in the English sub-sample. I find while holding 
constant the school-level and a number of observed teacher characteristics 
that teachers who believe their workload is unmanageable are almost a 
third of a standard deviation less satisfied with their job than their peers 
who do not share this view. It is hoped that future research will explore 
further which teacher-level variables that could not be included in this 
research here affect teachers perceiving their workload as unmanageable in 
order to understand better how teachers’ wellbeing at work can be 
improved. 
 In addition, using the English data on teachers’ perceptions of their 
workplace shows that the teacher’s working environment, comprising their 
school and its staff, indeed affects their job satisfaction. I find that teachers 
value well-behaved pupils, sufficient autonomy to do their job and scope to 
progress as a teacher. An effective school leadership team is similarly 
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important to them, but supportive parents, school leaders providing clear 
vision and direction, scope to progress to higher pay and fair pay given a 
teacher’s performance are also statistically significant, but of decreasing 
importance. It is to be hoped that future research will follow this avenue. 
The next round of OECD TALIS surveys could include similar questions in 
their main survey in order to compare these findings across countries. The 
UK School Workforce Census could also include such questions. This would 
enable monitoring of how policy changes affect teacher job satisfaction and 
provide an opportunity to explore causality. As will have been abundantly 
clear throughout this thesis, good data are essential if educational 
researchers are to robustly identify causal effects. 
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Appendix for chapter 1 
Context 
Table A1.1: GDP per capita in 2005 US Dollars 
  2000 2007 Difference % Difference 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
Kenya 501 565 64 12.7 
Tanzania 304 405 101 33.1 
Zambia 562 669 107 19.0 
Unweighted Average 456 546 90 21.6 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
Malawi 221 224 3 1.4 
Mauritius 4555 5488 933 20.5 
Namibia 3007 3937 930 30.9 
Seychelles 11492 13057 1566 13.6 
South Africa 4652 5706 1054 22.7 
Unweighted Average 4786 5683 897 17.8 
Source: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all last accessed on the 27th of March 2014 
Table A1.2: Population in millions  
  2000 2007 % Difference 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
Kenya 31.2 37.8 20.7 
Tanzania 34.0 41.1 20.9 
Zambia 10.1 12.1 19.9 
Unweighted 
Average 
25.1 30.3 20 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
Mauritius 1.2 1.3 6.2 
Malawi 11.3 13.7 21.1 
Namibia 1.9 2.1 9.6 
Seychelles 0.081 0.085 4.8 
South Africa 44.0 48.3 9.7 
Unweighted 
Average 
11.7 13.1 10 
Source: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all last accessed on the 27th of March 2014 
Table A1.3: HIV prevalence 
  2000 2007 Difference 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
Kenya 8.9 6.4 -2.5 
Tanzania 
7.8 5.8 -2 
Zambia 15.3 13.4 -1.9 
Unweighted 
Average 
10. 7 8.5 -2.1 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
Mauritius 0.9 1.2 0.3 
Malawi 
15.8 12.4 -3.4 
Namibia 14.2 14.3 0.1 
South Africa 14.1 17.3 3.2 
Unweighted 
Average 
11.3 11.3 0.05 
Source: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all last accessed on the 27th of March 2014 
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Table A1.4: Proportion of age cohort reaching last grade of Primary School 
  1999 2008 Difference 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
Kenya N/A N/A N/A 
Tanzania 69.7 73.9 4.2 
Zambia 66.3 53.1 -13.2 
Unweighted 
Average 
68.0 63.5 -4.5 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
Mauritius 98.5 96.2 -2.3 
Malawi 36.3 41.9 5.7 
Namibia 82.3 82.6 0.3 
Seychelles 96.1 92.0 -4.1 
South Africa 57.5 N/A N/A 
Unweighted 
Average1 
78.3 78.2 -0.1 
Source: World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all last accessed on the 27th of March 2014; 1 excludes South Africa 
 
Detailed descriptive statistics of country contexts 
 
Table A1.6: Average number of teachers per school 
  2000 2007 Difference 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
Kenya 
15.6 
(0.6) 
16.0 
(0.7) 
0.5 
(0.9) 
Tanzania 
17.2 
(1.9) 
16.1 
(1.0) 
-1.2 
(2.1) 
Zambia 
23.5 
(1.9) 
19.5 
(1.8) 
-4.0 
(2.6) 
Zanzibar 
44.4 
(2.4) 
53.4 
(2.5) 
8.9* 
(3.5) 
Unweighted 
Average 
25.2 26.2 1.0 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
Malawi 
21.9 
(2.1) 
17.6 
(1.6) 
-4.2 
(2.6) 
Mauritius 
24.3 
(1.3) 
24.4 
(1.3) 
0.1 
(1.8) 
Namibia 
18.8 
(0.6) 
19.5 
(0.7) 
0.7 
(0.9) 
Seychelles 
40.7 
(3.8) 
36.0 
(4.3) 
-4.7 
(5.8) 
South Africa 
19.2 
(0.8) 
19.9 
(0.6) 
0.7 
(1.0) 
Unweighted 
Average 
25.0 23.5 -1.5 
Notes: Estimated means, Standard Errors clustered by school in parentheses; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table A1.7: Average number of school resources per school 
  Number of resources 
  
2000 2007 Difference 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
Kenya 
7.2 
(0.2) 
6.6 
(0.2) 
-0.6* 
(0.3) 
Tanzania 
5.3 
(0.2) 
4.5 
(0.2) 
-0.8** 
(0.3) 
Zambia 
6.6 
(0.4) 
4.8 
(0.3) 
-1.8*** 
(0.5) 
Zanzibar 
6.1 
(0.2) 
6.1 
(0.2) 
-0.1 
(0.3) 
Unweighted 
Average 
6.3 5.5 -0.8 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
Malawi 
4.3 
(0.2) 
3.4 
(0.2) 
-0.9*** 
(0.3) 
Mauritius 
11.0 
(0.2) 
10.4 
(0.3) 
-0.6 
(0.3) 
Namibia 
8.5 
(0.3) 
9.6 
(0.3) 
1.1** 
(0.4) 
Seychelles 
12.1 
(0.2) 
12.3 
(0.3) 
0.2 
(0.4) 
South Africa 
9.1 
(0.4) 
9.5 
(0.3) 
0.3 
(0.5) 
Unweighted 
Average 
9.0 9.0 0.0 
Notes: Estimated means, Standard Errors clustered by school in parentheses; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001; The variable used is a 
summative measure based on whether or not the head teacher reports the presence of a school library, a hall, a staff room, a head 
teacher’s office, a store room, a first aid kit, a sports ground, water supply, electricity, a telephone, a fax machine, a school garden, a 
typewriter, a duplicator, radio and tape recorder. 
 
Table A1.8: Average number of classroom resources 
  Reading Maths 
  2000 2007 Difference 2000 2007 Difference 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
Kenya 
2.7 
(0.1) 
2.8 
(0.1) 
0.1 
(0.2) 
2.7 
(0.1) 
2.8 
(0.1) 
0.2 
(0.1) 
Tanzania 
2.2 
(0.1) 
3.3 
(0.1) 
1.1*** 
(0.2) 
2.0 
(0.1) 
3.2 
(0.1) 
1.3*** 
(0.2) 
Zambia 
2.7 
(0.1) 
2.7 
(0.1) 
0.0 
(0.2) 
2.7 
(0.2) 
2.7 
(0.1) 
-0.1 
(0.2) 
Zanzibar 
2.2 
(0.1) 
2.5 
(0.1) 
0.3* 
(0.1) 
2.1 
(0.1) 
2.4 
(0.1) 
0.3* 
(0.1) 
Unweighted 
Average 
2.2 2.5 0.3 2.4 2.8 0.4 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
Malawi 
2.8 
(0.1) 
2.7 
(0.1) 
-0.1 
(0.2) 
2.7 
(0.1) 
2.7 
(0.1) 
-0.0 
(0.2) 
Mauritius 
4.2 
(0.2) 
4.9 
(0.1) 
0.7*** 
(0.2) 
4.2 
(0.2) 
4.9 
(0.1) 
0.7*** 
(0.2) 
Namibia 
3.5 
(0.1) 
3.3 
(0.1) 
-0.2 
(0.1) 
3.5 
(0.1) 
3.3 
(0.1) 
-0.2 
(0.2) 
Seychelles 
5.5 
(0.1) 
5.8 
(0.1) 
0.3 
(0.2) 
5.2 
(0.2) 
5.9 
(0.1) 
0.7*** 
(0.2) 
South Africa 
4.2 
(0.2) 
3.8 
(0.1) 
-0.4* 
(0.2) 
3.8 
(0.2) 
3.6 
(0.1) 
-0.2 
(0.2) 
Unweighted 
Average 4.0 
4.1 0.1 3.9 4.1 0.2 
Notes: Estimated means, Standard Errors clustered by school in parentheses; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001; The variables used are 
summative measures based on whether or not the classroom has a wall chart, cupboard, bookshelves, classroom library, a desk and 
chair for the teacher as well as a blackboard and chalk. 
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Table A1.9: Average number of pupil materials 
 
 
2000 2007 Difference 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
Kenya 
5.9 
(0.1) 
5.9 
(0.1) 
-0.0 
(0.1) 
Tanzania 
5.5 
(0.1) 
6.2 
(0.1) 
0.8*** 
(0.1) 
Zambia 
4.2 
(0.2) 
4.6 
(0.1) 
0.4* 
(0.2) 
Zanzibar 
5.5 
(0.1) 
6.5 
(0.1) 
1.1*** 
(0.2) 
Unweighted 
Average 
5.3 5.8 0.6 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
Malawi 
4.6 
(0.1) 
5.5 
(0.1) 
1.0*** 
(0.1) 
Mauritius 
6.7 
(0.1) 
6.3 
(0.2) 
-0.4* 
(0.2) 
Namibia 
5.5 
(0.1) 
5.8 
(0.1) 
0.3*** 
(0.1) 
Seychelles 
6.5 
(0.1) 
7.3 
(0.1) 
0.8*** 
(0.1) 
South Africa 
5.3 
(0.2) 
6.5 
(0.1) 
1.3*** 
(0.2) 
Unweighted 
Average 
5.7 6.3 0.6 
Notes: Estimated means, Standard Errors clustered by school in parentheses; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001; The variable used is a 
summative measure based on whether the pupil has an exercise book, a notebook, a pencil, a sharpener, an eraser, a ruler, a 
ballpoint pen and a file. 
 
Table A1.10: Average school size per shift attended by grade 6 pupils and average number of shifts per school 
  School size Shifts 
  2000 2007 Difference 2000 2007 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
Kenya 
510 
(5) 
666 
(6) 
156*** 
(7) 
1.0 
(0.0) 
1.0 
(0.0) 
Tanzania 
659 
(18) 
826 
(9) 
168*** 
(20) 
1.2 
(0.0) 
1.1 
(0.0) 
Zambia 
498 
(9) 
424 
(8) 
-75*** 
(12) 
2.8 
(0.0) 
2.8 
(0.0) 
Zanzibar 
896 
(13) 
1023 
(16) 
127*** 
(21) 
2.0 
(0.0) 
1.7 
(0.0) 
Unweighted 
Average 
641 735 94 1.75 1.65 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
Malawi 
1198 
(22) 
1165 
(16) 
-33 
(27) 
1.1 
(0.0) 
1.1 
(0.0) 
Mauritius 
650 
(8) 
533 
(7) 
-117*** 
(11) 
1.0 
(0.0) 
1.0 
(0.0) 
Namibia 
557 
(4) 
572 
(4) 
15** 
(5) 
1.1 
(0.0) 
1.1 
(0.0) 
Seychelles 
691 
(8) 
509 
(6) 
-182*** 
(10) 
1.0 
(0.0) 
1.0 
(0.0) 
South Africa 
692 
(7) 
680 
(4) 
-12 
(8) 
1.0 
(0.0) 
1.0 
(0.0) 
Unweighted 
Average 
758 692 -66 1.04 1.04 
Notes: Estimated means, Standard Errors clustered by school in parentheses; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table A1.11: Average grade 6 class size and average number of pupils per classroom per shift 
  Grade 6 class size Pupils per classroom per shift 
  2000 2007 Difference 2000 2007 Difference 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
Kenya 
37.0 
(0.9) 
44.5 
(1.2) 
7.5*** 
(1.5) 
34.3 
(0.8) 
44.0 
(1.2) 
9.6*** 
(1.4) 
Tanzania 
42.3 
(1.7) 
53.8 
(2.6) 
11.5*** 
(3.1) 
67.5 
(3.5) 
80.5 
(3.2) 
13.0** 
(4.7) 
Zambia 
36.9 
(1.2) 
46.6 
(1.5) 
9.7*** 
(1.9) 
73.7 
(31.9) 
42.6 
(2.0) 
-31.1 
(32.0) 
Zanzibar 
49.8 
(1.1) 
55.4 
(1.6) 
5.6** 
(1.9) 
58.8 
(4.2) 
59.7 
(2.0) 
0.9 
(4.6) 
Unweighted 
Average 
41.5 50.1 8.6 58.6 56.7 -1.9 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
Malawi 
56.6 
(2.2) 
66.3 
(2.7) 
9.7** 
(3.5) 
84.0 
(3.5) 
89.0 
(3.5) 
5.0 
(5.0) 
Mauritius 
36.3 
(0.8) 
34.9 
(0.6) 
-1.4 
(1.0) 
42.0 
(11.6) 
26.3 
(0.7) 
-15.6 
(11.6) 
Namibia 
38.4 
(0.8) 
35.7 
(0.5) 
-2.7** 
(0.9) 
33.9 
(0.7) 
35.1 
(2.1) 
1.2 
(2.2) 
Seychelles 
27.4 
(0.9) 
25.3 
(0.8) 
-2.1 
(1.2) 
24.3 
(1.7) 
21.4 
(1.3) 
-2.9 
(2.1) 
South Africa 
42.2 
(1.4) 
43.1 
(0.9) 
0.9 
(1.6) 
48.2 
(8.5) 
40.6 
(1.4) 
-7.5 
(8.6) 
Unweighted 
Average 
40.2 41.1 0.9 46.5 42.5 -4.0 
Notes: Estimated means, Standard Errors clustered by school in parentheses; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
 
Table A1.12: Average ratio of pupils to school resources and teachers 
  Pupils per school resource Pupils per teacher 
  2000 2007 Difference 2000 2007 Difference 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
KEN 
74.9 
(3.3) 
114.0 
(6.4) 
39.1*** 
(7.2) 
33.3 
(0.8) 
42.9 
(1.0) 
9.6*** 
(1.3) 
TAN 
125.3 
(8.6) 
209.2 
(13.9) 
83.8*** 
(16.4) 
45.9 
(2.1) 
61.9 
(3.5) 
16.0*** 
(4.1) 
ZAM 
78.1 
(4.5) 
79.8 
(5.7) 
1.7 
(7.2) 
32.0 
(2.7) 
34.4 
(4.0) 
2.3 
(4.8) 
ZAN 
168.0 
(10.1) 
199.7 
(15.9) 
31.7 
(18.8) 
20.8 
(0.6) 
20.0 
(0.6) 
-0.8 
(0.9) 
Unweighted 
Average 
111.6 150.7 39.1 33.0 39.8 6.8 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
MAL 
315.2 
(24.5) 
460.8 
(43.8) 
145.6** 
(50.2) 
70.2 
(2.9) 
86.2 
(3.8) 
16.0*** 
(4.8) 
MAU 
61.3 
(4.5) 
51.0 
(3.2) 
-10.3 
(5.5) 
28.4 
(2.8) 
21.6 
(0.7) 
-6.9** 
(2.8) 
NAM 
81.8 
(3.9) 
64.2 
(2.2) 
-17.6*** 
(4.5) 
31.5 
(0.6) 
30.0 
(0.4) 
-1.5* 
(0.7) 
SEY 
57.5 
(6.9) 
41.9 
(4.6) 
-15.6 
(8.3) 
16.6 
(0.8) 
14.2 
(0.6) 
-2.4* 
(1.0) 
SOU 
90.3 
(6.4) 
86.3 
(3.9) 
-4.0 
(7.5) 
36.1 
(0.7) 
34.8 
(0.4) 
-1.3 
(0.8) 
Unweighted 
Average 
121.2 140.8 19.6 36.6 37.4 0.8 
Notes: Estimated means, Standard Errors clustered by school in parentheses; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table A1.13: Average ratio of pupils per classroom resources 
  Reading Maths 
  2000 2007 Difference 2000 2007 Difference 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
KEN 
15.2 
0.9 
18.7 
1.0 
3.5** 
1.3 
15.8 
0.8 
18.3 
1.0 
2.5 
1.3 
TAN 
39.4 
2.8 
29.0 
1.6 
-10.4*** 
3.2 
38.9 
2.8 
28.4 
1.5 
-10.4*** 
3.2 
ZAM 
24.7 
9.1 
20.1 
1.9 
-4.6 
9.3 
22.6 
7.0 
20.1 
1.9 
-2.5 
7.3 
ZAN 
30.4 
2.7 
27.2 
1.5 
-3.2 
3.0 
33.1 
4.2 
28.4 
1.6 
-4.7 
4.5 
Unweighted 
Average 
27.4 23.8 -3.7 27.6 23.8 -3.8 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
MAL 
40.0 
3.1 
42.2 
3.5 
2.1 
4.7 
38.4 
3.0 
42.2 
3.6 
3.8 
4.7 
MAU 
10.3 
3.2 
5.7 
0.3 
-4.6 
3.3 
10.3 
3.2 
5.7 
0.3 
-4.6 
3.3 
NAM 
13.9 
0.9 
12.3 
0.9 
-1.6 
1.3 
13.2 
0.7 
14.1 
2.4 
0.9 
2.5 
SEY 
5.0 
0.8 
3.7 
0.2 
-1.3 
0.8 
4.4 
0.3 
3.7 
0.2 
-0.7 
0.4 
SOU 
12.2 
1.6 
12.5 
0.7 
0.3 
1.7 
11.3 
0.7 
13.8 
0.8 
2.6* 
1.1 
Unweighted 
Average 
16.3 15.3 -1.0 15.5 15.9 0.4 
Notes: Estimated means, Standard Errors clustered by school in parentheses; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Table A1.14: Average socioeconomic status 
  
2000 2007 
Raw 
Difference 
Diff. in % S.D. 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
Kenya 
11.59 
(0.23) 
11.72 
(0.21) 
0.13 
(0.30) 
1.5 
Tanzania 
9.70 
(0.31) 
9.73 
(0.15) 
0.03 
(0.34) 
0.4 
Zambia 
11.61 
(0.25) 
11.24 
(0.23) 
-0.37 
(0.34) 
-4.3 
Zanzibar 
10.21 
(0.27) 
10.95 
(0.23) 
0.74* 
(0.36) 
8.6 
Unweighted 
Average 
10.78 10.91 0.13 1.55 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
Malawi 
10.27 
(0.26) 
9.89 
(0.17) 
-0.37 
(0.31) 
-4.9 
Mauritius 
16.59 
(0.18) 
16.46 
(0.16) 
-0.13 
(0.24) 
-2.0 
Namibia 
11.82 
(0.20) 
12.59 
(0.21) 
0.78** 
(0.29) 
8.2 
Seychelles 
16.78 
(0.20) 
17.99 
(0.15) 
1.21*** 
(0.25) 
19.3 
South Africa 
13.69 
(0.37) 
14.50 
(0.22) 
0.81 
(0.43) 
7.2 
Unweighted 
Average 
13.83 14.29 0.46 5.56 
Notes: Estimated means, Standard Errors clustered by school in parentheses; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001; This variable is a 
summed score ranging from 0 to 25, combining parental education, quality of the house the pupil lives in and 10 household items. 
See section 1.4 for details. 
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Table A1.15: Average proportion of pupils receiving extra tuition and help with their homework 
  Extra tuition Help with homework 
  2000 2007 Difference 2000 2007 Difference 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
Kenya 
87.7 
(1.9) 
70.2 
(3.3) 
-17.5*** 
(3.8) 
85.5 
(1.4) 
84.2 
(1.4) 
-1.3 
(1.9) 
Tanzania 
88.9 
(1.2) 
41.6 
(3.7) 
-47.3*** 
(3.9) 
79.8 
(1.5) 
52.0 
(2.8) 
-27.9*** 
(3.2) 
Zambia 
55.0 
(3.7) 
13.5 
(1.9) 
-41.5*** 
(4.1) 
82.1 
(1.7) 
88.7 
(1.3) 
6.6** 
(2.2) 
Zanzibar 
55.9 
(3.2) 
16.4 
(1.9) 
-39.5*** 
(3.8) 
82.0 
(1.7) 
81.5 
(1.4) 
-0.5 
(2.2) 
Unweighted 
Average 
71.9 35.4 -36.4 82.4 76.6 -5.8 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
Malawi 
79.7 
(3.4) 
14.3 
(1.9) 
-65.4*** 
(3.9) 
49.7 
(3.1) 
62.0 
(2.8) 
12.3*** 
(4.2) 
Mauritius 
86.9 
(1.5) 
80.8 
(2.1) 
-6.1* 
(2.6) 
87.4 
(1.6) 
83.8 
(2.3) 
-3.5 
(2.8) 
Namibia 
44.7 
(2.4) 
20.9 
(2.3) 
-23.8*** 
(3.3) 
84.3 
(0.9) 
92.5 
(0.7) 
8.2*** 
(1.2) 
Seychelles 
47.7 
(3.3) 
29.0 
(4.4) 
-18.6** 
(5.5) 
90.7 
(1.1) 
96.8 
(0.6) 
6.1*** 
(1.2) 
South Africa 
59.3 
(3.3) 
15.0 
(1.9) 
-44.3*** 
(3.8) 
85.6 
(2.0) 
90.7 
(0.8) 
5.1* 
(2.2) 
Unweighted 
Average 
63.6 32.0 -31.6 79.5 85.2 5.6 
Notes: Estimated means, Standard Errors clustered by school in parentheses; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
 
Table A1.16: Average number of days absent in month prior to survey and average pupil age in months 
  Days absent Age in months 
  2000 2007 Difference 2000 2007 Difference 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
Kenya 
1.96 
(0.10) 
1.29 
(0.11) 
-0.67*** 
(0.15) 
168.4 
(0.8) 
165.1 
(0.8) 
-3.3** 
(1.1) 
Tanzania 
2.36 
(0.22) 
2.06 
(0.12) 
-0.31 
(0.25) 
180.3 
(1.1) 
173.6 
(1.0) 
-6.7*** 
(1.5) 
Zambia 
2.50 
(0.12) 
2.54 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.17) 
166.2 
(1.4) 
168.6 
(1.0) 
2.4 
(1.7) 
Zanzibar 
1.98 
(0.11) 
1.78 
(0.12) 
-0.20 
(0.15) 
179.1 
(0.8) 
169.7 
(0.7) 
-9.4*** 
(1.1) 
Unweighted 
Average 
2.20 1.92 -0.29 173.5 169.3 -4.2 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
Malawi 
2.00 
(0.16) 
1.66 
(0.10) 
-0.34 
(0.18) 
174.0 
(1.2) 
169.5 
(0.9) 
-4.5** 
(1.5) 
Mauritius 
1.85 
(0.12) 
2.01 
(0.10) 
0.16* 
(0.16) 
135.9 
(0.2) 
136.7 
(0.2) 
0.8** 
(0.3) 
Namibia 
1.49 
(0.09) 
0.97 
(0.06) 
-0.52*** 
(0.11) 
166.4 
(0.7) 
163.2 
(0.6) 
-3.1*** 
(0.9) 
Seychelles 
0.86 
(0.07) 
1.70 
(0.08) 
0.85*** 
(0.11) 
138.8 
(0.2) 
138.6 
(0.1) 
-0.2 
(0.2) 
South Africa 
1.66 
(0.15) 
1.15 
(0.15) 
-0.51* 
(0.21) 
157.2 
(0.9) 
155.5 
(0.5) 
-1.7 
(1.0) 
Unweighted 
Average 
1.57 1.50 -0.07 154.4 152.7 -1.8 
Notes: Estimated means, Standard Errors clustered by school in parentheses; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table A1.17: Average achievement by subject 
  Reading Maths 
  2000 2007 Difference 2000 2007 Difference 
G
r
o
u
p
 1
 
Kenya 
546 
(5) 
543 
(5) 
-3 
(7) 
563 
(5) 
557 
(4) 
-6 
(6) 
Tanzania 
542 
(6) 
575 
(4) 
33*** 
(7) 
522 
(5) 
546 
(4) 
24*** 
(6) 
Zambia 
442 
(5) 
436 
(4) 
-6 
(6) 
436 
(4) 
436 
(3) 
0 
(4) 
Zanzibar 
478 
(4) 
534 
(4) 
56*** 
(5) 
478 
(4) 
486 
(2) 
8 
(4) 
Unweighted 
Average 
502 522 20 500 506 6 
G
r
o
u
p
 2
 
Malawi 
429 
(3) 
433 
(3) 
5 
(4) 
433 
(2) 
447 
(3) 
14*** 
(4) 
Mauritius 
529 
(7) 
556 
(7) 
27** 
(10) 
575 
(8) 
598 
(8) 
23* 
(11) 
Namibia 
449 
(4) 
497 
(4) 
48*** 
(6) 
431 
(4) 
471 
(3) 
40*** 
(5) 
Seychelles 
582 
(7) 
575 
(7) 
-7 
(10) 
554 
(6) 
551 
(5) 
-4 
(8) 
South Africa 
486 
(10) 
489 
(5) 
3 
(11) 
480 
(8) 
492 
(5) 
11 
(9) 
Unweighted 
Average 
495 510 15 495 512 17 
Notes: Estimated means, Standard Errors clustered by school in parentheses; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Appendix for chapter 3 
 
How do schools affect teachers’ job satisfaction and workload? An additional exploration 
As outlined in the introduction, bottom-up approaches lead one to believe that the school a teacher works in will affect his or her 
job satisfaction. The following paragraphs set out to explore the support for this assumption in the data.  
As TALIS data contain multiple teachers observed in each school within a country, it is possible to use ANOVAs to explore the 
percentage of job satisfaction that lies between schools. Compared to the teachers’ job satisfaction variable available in TALIS 
2008, a single item on a 4-point Likert scale, the OECD’s measure in TALIS 2013 is on a continuous scale and therefore more 
suitable for an analysis of variance. The OECD’s measure is also a composite measure consisting of 9 indicators. According to 
Oshagbeni (1999) such multi-item measures have higher reliability than single-item measures in the same sample. Compared to 
the single-item measure in TALIS 2008, the 2013 measure might pick up differences in the variation between-schools more easily 
and yield higher results. The estimates in Table 3.2 show that only 9 to 22 percent of the variation in teachers’ job satisfaction lies 
between schools. Compared to the estimated 6 percent between-school variation for the 28 participating education systems 
reported in the 2008 OECD TALIS report (OECD, 2009), the findings here are indeed higher. My findings suggest that although 
schools may be very heterogeneous in their composition of stakeholders, the vast majority of the variation in teachers’ job 
satisfaction is associated with the teacher level. These findings are in stark contrast to wages, a traditional microeconomic  
variable, for which the variation is predominantly associated with time-invariant factors that vary across individuals rather than 
within individuals over time.  
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Table A3.1: Between-school variance in teacher’s job satisfaction 
 Between-school 
variance (%) 
Australia 13 
Brazil 22 
Bulgaria 19 
Chile 21 
Croatia 10 
Czech Republic 14 
Denmark 20 
Estonia 11 
Finland 9 
France 14 
Iceland 19 
Israel 16 
Italy 12 
Japan 13 
Korea 13 
Latvia 11 
Malaysia 14 
Mexico 14 
Netherlands 12 
Norway 14 
Poland 11 
Portugal 13 
Romania 14 
Serbia 10 
Singapore 9 
Slovak Republic 12 
Spain 14 
Sweden 13 
Sub-national 
education systems 
Abu Dhabi (UAE) 21 
Alberta (Canada) 20 
England (UK) 14 
Flanders (Belgium) 13 
Average (all education 
systems) 
-- 
Estimates of the between-school variation are equivalent to the R-squared obtained from linear regression that includes a dummy 
variable for each school. 
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It may be that my estimates are biased upwards or even an artefact of selection processes. Non-random distribution of teachers to 
schools is likely to be the case here, as teachers will prefer to apply to different schools and schools will differ in which candidates 
they choose. Such processes may lead to teachers within schools being more similar than between schools, thus exacerbating the 
between-school variation. 
Schools may also affect the overall variance in teachers’ job satisfaction in an education system. For example, the more schools are 
associated with teachers’ job satisfaction, the larger the overall variance may be, as teachers are being subjected to an increased 
diversity of schools. Figure 3.1 shows a scatterplot with the percentage of variation explained by the school level on the x-axis and 
the standard deviation on the y-axis, with the 32 education systems as the observations. The graph does not support this 
expectation and instead suggests no association. 
Figure A3.1: Does between-school variation in job satisfaction correlate with the variance in job satisfaction? 
 
 
TALIS 2013 also contains information on the degree of school autonomy, from which the OECD create a summary measure for 
school autonomy in respect to staffing decisions. One might expect that the more schools and teachers can influence where they 
work, the more similar teachers will be in their characteristics. Top-down approaches would lead one to expect that teachers with 
similar characteristics should perceive their environment more similarly. Thus, the more autonomous schools are at hiring 
teachers, the larger the between school-variation should be in an education system. This correlation across education systems is 
shown in Figure A3.2 and tentatively supports this expectation, as the correlation is weakly positive. 
Figure A3.2: School autonomy in respect to staffing and between-school variation in job satisfaction 
 
In order to estimate the between-school variation in teachers’ total weekly workload, I estimate ANOVAs for each country 
controlling for part-time status and gender, as females especially may have different preferences in respect to their working time 
than males, for example due to child-rearing commitments. Allowing for this, Figure A3.3 shows that, at the bottom end of the 
distribution, 6 percent of the variation in the total amount of hours teachers work on school matters in or outside the school 
building in Singapore and by 23 percent in Malaysia at the top end of the distribution. As with job satisfaction, these estimates 
suggest that only a minority of the variation in the time teachers work is associated with school-level factors, and that there may 
be many variables at the individual level driving differences in the their workload. 
This leads to the question whether teachers work longer hours in education systems with higher-between school variation. Figure 
A3.4 though suggests a negative correlation, i.e. that teachers work less hours in education systems with higher between-school 
variation in teachers total weekly workload, but this correlation is negligible. 
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Figure A3.3: Percentage of between-school variation in teachers’ total weekly workload 
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Figure A3.4: Between-school variation in total weekly workload and average total hours worked per week 
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The following tables report the estimates nationally standardised coefficients (national standard deviations) with T-statistics in 
parentheses. Estimates are statistically significant at the 5 percent level when T>1.96. The estimates are listed alphabetically by 
country in each table. 
 
Table A3.2: Chapter 3 – baseline Model (M1) 
Country Constant Weekly workload 
Australia 0.008 
(0.09) 
0.000 
(-0.00) 
Brazil 0.003 
(0.08) 
0.002 
(2.78) 
Bulgaria -0.033 
(-0.43) 
0.000 
(0.26) 
Chile -0.048 
(-0.56) 
0.002 
(1.31) 
Croatia -0.066 
(-1.1) 
0.002 
(1.53) 
Czech Republic 0.054 
(0.87) 
-0.001 
(-1.08) 
Denmark 0.261 
(2.37) 
-0.005 
(-2.05) 
Estonia 0.137 
(2.4) 
-0.003 
(-1.95) 
Finland -0.018 
(-0.24) 
0.002 
(0.77) 
France 0.124 
(1.65) 
-0.002 
(-1.3) 
Iceland 0.009 
(0.1) 
-0.001 
(-0.45) 
Israel -0.087 
(-1.56) 
0.003 
(2.81) 
Italy -0.044 
(-0.69) 
0.001 
(0.86) 
Japan 0.010 
(0.15) 
0.000 
(0.37) 
Korea 0.001 
(0.02) 
0.000 
(0.37) 
Latvia 0.036 
(0.67) 
-0.001 
(-0.45) 
Malaysia -0.001 
(-0.02) 
0.000 
(0.41) 
Mexico -0.146 
(-2.99) 
0.003 
(3.05) 
Netherlands 0.059 
(0.57) 
-0.002 
(-0.65) 
Norway 0.158 
(1.54) 
-0.004 
(-1.47) 
Poland -0.043 
(-0.7) 
0.002 
(1.1) 
Portugal 0.013 
(0.18) 
0.000 
(-0.23) 
Romania -0.044 
(-0.64) 
0.001 
(0.84) 
Serbia 0.039 
(0.83) 
0.000 
(-0.15) 
Singapore 0.207 
(4.12) 
-0.003 
(-4.18) 
Slovak Republic 0.055 
(0.91) 
-0.001 
(-0.63) 
Spain -0.082 
(-1.36) 
0.002 
(1.81) 
Sweden 0.193 
(1.99) 
-0.004 
(-1.94) 
Abu Dhabi (UAE) 0.186 
(2.25) 
-0.002 
(-1.78) 
Alberta (CAN) 0.129 
(1.59) 
-0.002 
(-1.38) 
England (UK) -0.005 
(-0.06) 
0.000 
(0.28) 
Flanders (BEL)  0.232 
(3.17) 
-0.005 
(-2.77) 
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Table A3.3: Chapter 3 – Model 2 
Variable  Australia Brazil Bulgaria Chile Croatia Czech 
Republic 
Denmark Estonia 
Constant -3.281 
(-14.08) 
-3.127 
(-20.25) 
-3.316 
(-11.8) 
-3.237 
(-12.79) 
-4.007 
(-20.63) 
-2.673 
(-11.26) 
-3.721 
(-10.74) 
-2.956 
(-12.34) 
Cooperation with 
colleagues index 
0.077 
(5.01) 
0.059 
(7.44) 
0.027 
(1.98) 
0.077 
(7.21) 
0.105 
(7.84) 
0.086 
(6.69) 
0.065 
(3.85) 
0.101 
(6.2) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.097 
(5.87) 
0.116 
(11.07) 
0.135 
(9.07) 
0.089 
(5.64) 
0.154 
(12.21) 
0.118 
(7.32) 
0.149 
(6.28) 
0.079 
(5.81) 
Teacher’s age 0.002 
(0.66) 
0.002 
(1.25) 
-0.004 
(-1.06) 
0.012 
(3.16) 
0.006 
(2.31) 
0.000 
(-0.11) 
0.006 
(1.22) 
0.004 
(1.68) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.009 
(1.51) 
0.000 
(0.15) 
-0.003 
(-0.85) 
-0.002 
(-0.45) 
0.000 
(-0.16) 
0.003 
(1.16) 
0.015 
(3.12) 
-0.001 
(-0.53) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.007 
(-1.7) 
0.002 
(0.77) 
0.003 
(0.96) 
-0.004 
(-1.04) 
-0.002 
(-0.72) 
-0.007 
(-1.74) 
-0.017 
(-3.08) 
-0.001 
(-0.2) 
Female 0.028 
(0.46) 
0.000 
(-0.01) 
-0.060 
(-1.17) 
0.135 
(2.76) 
0.178 
(5.05) 
0.079 
(1.59) 
-0.005 
(-0.09) 
0.025 
(0.47) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.002 
(0.02) 
0.022 
(0.71) 
-0.042 
(-0.47) 
0.049 
(0.75) 
-0.006 
(-0.1) 
-0.084 
(-1.46) 
0.086 
(0.91) 
0.074 
(1.7) 
Is mentee -0.056 
(-0.87) 
0.006 
(0.09) 
0.027 
(0.39) 
0.056 
(0.5) 
0.021 
(0.43) 
0.148 
(2.04) 
0.015 
(0.2) 
0.033 
(0.51) 
Is mentor 0.352 
(4.51) 
0.081 
(2.6) 
0.277 
(4.47) 
-0.058 
(-0.48) 
0.246 
(3.16) 
0.179 
(2.1) 
0.077 
(0.47) 
-0.077 
(-0.71) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.059 
(-0.75) 
-0.050 
(-1.32) 
-0.106 
(-1.51) 
-0.020 
(-0.31) 
-0.062 
(-0.99) 
-0.055 
(-0.85) 
0.032 
(0.21) 
0.005 
(0.1) 
Total weekly 
workload 
-0.003 
(-2.26) 
0.000 
(-0.34) 
-0.002 
(-1.37) 
0.000 
(0.06) 
-0.002 
(-1.93) 
-0.005 
(-3.05) 
-0.010 
(-4.05) 
-0.006 
(-4.42) 
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Table A3.3 continued 
Variable  Finland France Iceland Israel Italy Japan Korea Latvia 
Constant -2.972 
(-13.15) 
-3.394 
(-11.56) 
-2.329 
(-6.78) 
-3.681 
(-17.72) 
-2.925 
(-11.36) 
-2.570 
(-10.82) 
-2.528 
(-8.52) 
-3.063 
(-9.71) 
Cooperation with 
colleagues index 
0.061 
(4.29) 
0.112 
(6.4) 
0.100 
(5.25) 
0.082 
(5.27) 
0.083 
(6.94) 
0.069 
(5.09) 
0.023 
(1.88) 
0.083 
(4.58) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.134 
(11.32) 
0.128 
(8.33) 
0.047 
(2.34) 
0.116 
(9.61) 
0.127 
(9.12) 
0.122 
(9.03) 
0.091 
(9.47) 
0.106 
(4.76) 
Teacher’s age -0.001 
(-0.26) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
0.004 
(0.75) 
0.026 
(7.93) 
-0.009 
(-2.39) 
0.006 
(1.48) 
-0.004 
(-0.94) 
0.008 
(1.92) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.003 
(0.72) 
0.012 
(3.42) 
-0.005 
(-0.91) 
-0.004 
(-1.21) 
0.011 
(3.55) 
0.004 
(0.96) 
-0.005 
(-1.37) 
-0.005 
(-1.8) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.002 
(-0.39) 
-0.010 
(-1.87) 
-0.004 
(-0.66) 
-0.013 
(-3.46) 
0.000 
(-0.03) 
-0.011 
(-2.8) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
Female 0.050 
(1.07) 
0.086 
(2.13) 
0.268 
(4.12) 
-0.008 
(-0.15) 
-0.007 
(-0.16) 
-0.063 
(-1.84) 
-0.052 
(-1.22) 
0.115 
(1.55) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.153 
(1.74) 
0.050 
(0.87) 
0.073 
(0.8) 
0.047 
(0.72) 
-0.088 
(-1.2) 
-0.466 
(-4.49) 
0.162 
(1.01) 
-0.035 
(-0.51) 
Is mentee 0.052 
(0.49) 
0.054 
(0.56) 
0.086 
(1.04) 
0.055 
(1.28) 
0.042 
(0.55) 
-0.017 
(-0.35) 
0.115 
(2.47) 
0.106 
(1.25) 
Is mentor 0.056 
(0.53) 
0.123 
(1.03) 
0.361 
(2.5) 
-0.067 
(-1.43) 
0.030 
(0.27) 
0.210 
(5.32) 
0.228 
(4.98) 
0.042 
(0.4) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.167 
(-3.01) 
-0.244 
(-2.57) 
-0.109 
(-1.24) 
-0.081 
(-1.47) 
0.016 
(0.27) 
-0.111 
(-2.17) 
-0.157 
(-2.49) 
0.028 
(0.34) 
Total weekly 
workload 
-0.003 
(-1.31) 
-0.005 
(-2.61) 
-0.004 
(-1.68) 
-0.002 
(-1.57) 
-0.003 
(-1.84) 
0.000 
(-0.32) 
-0.002 
(-2.02) 
-0.003 
(-2.67) 
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Table A3.3 continued 
Variable  Malaysia Mexico Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Serbia 
Constant -3.664 
(-6.82) 
-3.643 
(-16.39) 
-3.105 
(-7.23) 
-3.474 
(-12.76) 
-3.163 
(-13.7) 
-3.759 
(-17.13) 
-4.084 
(-13.57) 
-3.786 
(-20.58) 
Cooperation 
with 
colleagues 
index 
0.057 
(5.31) 
0.070 
(7.49) 
0.095 
(4.1) 
0.113 
(7.06) 
0.047 
(2.85) 
0.065 
(5.00) 
0.062 
(4.73) 
0.093 
(9.78) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.168 
(12.96) 
0.134 
(9.7) 
0.180 
(9.76) 
0.126 
(5.99) 
0.134 
(8.91) 
0.132 
(9.34) 
0.138 
(7.00) 
0.150 
(12.45) 
Teacher’s age 0.004 
(0.81) 
0.001 
(0.35) 
-0.004 
(-0.83) 
0.009 
(2.95) 
0.003 
(0.52) 
0.010 
(2.45) 
-0.007 
(-1.42) 
0.001 
(0.4) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.006 
(1.77) 
0.008 
(2.69) 
0.007 
(1.73) 
0.006 
(1.59) 
0.004 
(1.05) 
0.018 
(4.23) 
0.006 
(1.97) 
0.003 
(1.15) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.004 
(-0.85) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
-0.010 
(-1.76) 
-0.011 
(-2.25) 
-0.004 
(-0.73) 
-0.015 
(-3.04) 
0.009 
(1.67) 
0.004 
(1.3) 
Female -0.058 
(-1.27) 
-0.015 
(-0.37) 
0.008 
(0.14) 
0.122 
(2.42) 
0.079 
(1.91) 
0.030 
(0.7) 
0.112 
(2.19) 
0.084 
(2.6) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.151 
(1.02) 
-0.021 
(-0.41) 
0.164 
(2.6) 
0.043 
(0.57) 
-0.027 
(-0.44) 
-0.113 
(-1.24) 
-0.096 
(-1.34) 
0.069 
(1.46) 
Is mentee 0.069 
(1.57) 
0.025 
(0.4) 
0.079 
(1.05) 
0.063 
(0.98) 
0.160 
(3.15) 
0.053 
(0.72) 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
-0.028 
(-0.61) 
Is mentor 0.103 
(2.87) 
0.017 
(0.33) 
-0.068 
(-1.08) 
0.277 
(1.89) 
0.126 
(2.12) 
0.139 
(1.69) 
0.117 
(1.69) 
0.135 
(1.86) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.439 
(-0.98) 
0.023 
(0.43) 
-0.222 
(-2.62) 
-0.239 
(-2.81) 
-0.242 
(-3.41) 
-0.035 
(-0.63) 
-0.081 
(-1.71) 
-0.362 
(-7.79) 
Total weekly 
workload 
-0.001 
(-1.52) 
-0.001 
(-0.77) 
-0.007 
(-2.29) 
-0.008 
(-3.6) 
-0.001 
(-0.7) 
-0.002 
(-1.38) 
-0.002 
(-1.53) 
-0.003 
(-2.84) 
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Table A3.3 continued 
Variable  Singapore Slovak 
Republic 
Spain Sweden Abu 
Dhabi 
(UAE) 
Alberta 
(Canada) 
England 
(UK) 
Flanders 
(BEL) 
Constant -2.965 
(-12.33) 
-3.086 
(-11.74) 
-3.325 
(-12.74) 
-3.373 
(-14.3) 
-4.350 
(-11.55) 
-2.616 
(-9.39) 
-3.295 
(-13.88) 
-2.508 
(-11.07) 
Cooperation 
with colleagues 
index 
0.099 
(8.39) 
0.076 
(6.1) 
0.091 
(5.63) 
0.123 
(9.17) 
0.048 
(3.52) 
0.083 
(4.93) 
0.120 
(10.19) 
0.061 
(3.33) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.064 
(7.43) 
0.100 
(6.61) 
0.142 
(11.22) 
0.097 
(7.6) 
0.110 
(5.8) 
0.085 
(5.69) 
0.101 
(7.98) 
0.110 
(7.77) 
Teacher’s age 0.014 
(3.65) 
0.011 
(2.78) 
0.001 
(0.18) 
0.009 
(3.08) 
0.017 
(3.15) 
0.004 
(1.03) 
-0.005 
(-1.33) 
0.005 
(1.44) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.010 
(2.5) 
-0.002 
(-0.52) 
0.016 
(5.67) 
0.001 
(0.46) 
0.004 
(0.64) 
0.019 
(3.82) 
0.001 
(0.3) 
0.008 
(1.87) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.001 
(-0.26) 
-0.009 
(-2.28) 
-0.014 
(-3.43) 
-0.009 
(-2.88) 
-0.006 
(-0.88) 
-0.009 
(-1.71) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
-0.012 
(-2.16) 
Female -0.015 
(-0.38) 
0.060 
(1.17) 
0.113 
(3.34) 
0.131 
(3.42) 
-0.085 
(-1.51) 
-0.006 
(-0.11) 
-0.028 
(-0.66) 
0.042 
(0.99) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.124 
(1.74) 
-0.164 
(-2.32) 
-0.045 
(-0.68) 
0.092 
(2.05) 
0.107 
(0.71) 
-0.115 
(-1.46) 
0.116 
(1.6) 
0.201 
(3.64) 
Is mentee 0.006 
(0.15) 
0.034 
(0.51) 
-0.033 
(-0.47) 
0.259 
(3.17) 
-0.039 
(-0.71) 
0.122 
(2.09) 
-0.015 
(-0.32) 
0.110 
(1.58) 
Is mentor 0.310 
(7.53) 
0.025 
(0.34) 
-0.118 
(-1.08) 
0.420 
(3.78) 
0.019 
(0.38) 
0.173 
(2.32) 
0.156 
(2.59) 
0.176 
(2.56) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.276 
(-5.24) 
-0.170 
(-3.12) 
-0.131 
(-2.46) 
-0.241 
(-3.86) 
-0.179 
(-2.87) 
-0.326 
(-4.08) 
-0.054 
(-0.66) 
-0.292 
(-4.8) 
Total weekly 
workload 
-0.005 
(-6.47) 
-0.002 
(-1.04) 
-0.001 
(-1.15) 
-0.008 
(-4.21) 
-0.003 
(-2.65) 
-0.004 
(-2.57) 
-0.005 
(-3.05) 
-0.010 
(-5.6) 
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Table A3.4: Chapter 3 – Model 3 
Variable Australia Brazil Bulgaria Chile Croatia Czech 
Republic 
Denmark Estonia 
Constant -2.644 
(-5.79) 
-2.850 
(-12.75) 
-3.526 
(-7.7) 
-2.679 
(-7.7) 
-3.945 
(-13.00) 
-2.821 
(-9.05) 
-3.591 
(-7.21) 
-2.832 
(-8.27) 
Distributed 
Leadership 
Index 
-0.051 
(-1.71) 
-0.038 
(-4.18) 
0.018 
(1.25) 
0.006 
(0.42) 
-0.005 
(-0.36) 
0.018 
(1.08) 
-0.031 
(-1.4) 
0.018 
(1.1) 
Instructional 
Leadership 
Index 
-0.002 
(-0.13) 
0.028 
(2.79) 
0.017 
(0.64) 
-0.052 
(-2.4) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
0.000 
(-0.02) 
0.020 
(0.92) 
-0.030 
(-1.67) 
Teacher 
Administrative 
Support 
Personnel Ratio 
0.011 
(0.98) 
0.005 
(0.88) 
-0.045 
(-0.7) 
-0.004 
(-0.33) 
-0.003 
(-0.65) 
0.004 
(0.32) 
0.006 
(0.38) 
0.002 
(0.31) 
Teacher 
cooperates with 
colleagues 
0.082 
(5.31) 
0.063 
(8.31) 
0.030 
(2.11) 
0.079 
(7.7) 
0.107 
(7.91) 
0.083 
(6.35) 
0.066 
(3.83) 
0.100 
(6.25) 
Teacher 
Pedagogical 
Support 
Personnel Ratio 
0.000 
(0.08) 
-0.004 
(-2.72) 
0.004 
(2.25) 
0.006 
(0.99) 
0.003 
(0.92) 
-0.005 
(-3.51) 
0.000 
(-0.02) 
-0.006 
(-1.27) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.095 
(5.93) 
0.113 
(10.72) 
0.133 
(8.79) 
0.092 
(5.79) 
0.155 
(12.29) 
0.120 
(7.4) 
0.150 
(6.27) 
0.080 
(5.87) 
Teacher’s age 0.002 
(0.58) 
0.003 
(1.54) 
-0.004 
(-1.13) 
0.012 
(3.28) 
0.006 
(2.39) 
0.000 
(-0.09) 
0.007 
(1.3) 
0.004 
(1.57) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.008 
(1.4) 
0.000 
(-0.01) 
-0.001 
(-0.46) 
-0.002 
(-0.35) 
-0.001 
(-0.33) 
0.003 
(1.14) 
0.015 
(3.33) 
-0.001 
(-0.58) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.006 
(-1.53) 
0.002 
(0.84) 
0.004 
(1.05) 
-0.004 
(-0.98) 
-0.002 
(-0.69) 
-0.006 
(-1.66) 
-0.017 
(-3.07) 
0.000 
(-0.14) 
Female 0.043 
(0.7) 
0.003 
(0.1) 
-0.058 
(-1.13) 
0.131 
(2.75) 
0.179 
(5.09) 
0.076 
(1.55) 
-0.003 
(-0.04) 
0.028 
(0.51) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.007 
(0.07) 
0.027 
(0.92) 
-0.068 
(-0.8) 
0.045 
(0.69) 
-0.012 
(-0.22) 
-0.087 
(-1.53) 
0.084 
(0.9) 
0.074 
(1.69) 
Head teacher is 
female 
-0.136 
(-2.11) 
-0.035 
(-0.76) 
-0.101 
(-1.61) 
-0.026 
(-0.38) 
-0.065 
(-1.53) 
-0.083 
(-1.68) 
-0.052 
(-0.6) 
-0.013 
(-0.25) 
Is mentee -0.052 
(-0.83) 
-0.005 
(-0.07) 
0.024 
(0.34) 
0.059 
(0.53) 
0.018 
(0.38) 
0.143 
(2.01) 
0.014 
(0.2) 
0.049 
(0.77) 
Is mentor 0.339 
(4.31) 
0.069 
(2.24) 
0.264 
(4.34) 
-0.037 
(-0.32) 
0.242 
(3.26) 
0.175 
(2.08) 
0.074 
(0.45) 
-0.085 
(-0.78) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.061 
(-0.79) 
-0.079 
(-2.1) 
-0.119 
(-1.67) 
-0.027 
(-0.43) 
-0.062 
(-0.97) 
-0.054 
(-0.83) 
0.030 
(0.19) 
0.005 
(0.09) 
Total weekly 
workload 
-0.004 
(-2.48) 
0.000 
(-0.23) 
-0.002 
(-1.43) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
-0.002 
(-1.79) 
-0.005 
(-2.94) 
-0.010 
(-4.06) 
-0.006 
(-4.29) 
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Table A3.4 continued 
Variable Finland France Iceland Israel Italy Japan Korea Latvia 
Constant -3.180 
(-8.17) 
-3.124 
(-8.64) 
-2.276 
(-4.69) 
-3.327 
(-10.33) 
-2.758 
(-7.04) 
-2.280 
(-8.43) 
-2.917 
(-7.46) 
-3.264 
(-6.71) 
Distributed 
Leadership Index 
0.012 
(0.46) 
-0.030 
(-2.68) 
0.013 
(0.6) 
-0.015 
(-0.52) 
0.025 
(0.84) 
0.011 
(0.91) 
0.027 
(1.6) 
0.006 
(0.25) 
Instructional 
Leadership Index 
-0.005 
(-0.29) 
0.018 
(1.21) 
-0.006 
(-0.35) 
-0.019 
(-1.02) 
-0.014 
(-0.91) 
-0.031 
(-1.88) 
0.003 
(0.21) 
-0.012 
(-0.57) 
Teacher 
Administrative 
Support Personnel 
Ratio 
0.006 
(1.12) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
0.010 
(0.79) 
0.016 
(1.06) 
-0.022 
(-3.1) 
-0.008 
(-0.96) 
-0.007 
(-0.45) 
0.018 
(1.41) 
Teacher cooperates 
with colleagues 
0.061 
(4.23) 
0.109 
(6.29) 
0.100 
(5.42) 
0.081 
(5.18) 
0.085 
(7.15) 
0.070 
(5.12) 
0.024 
(1.92) 
0.080 
(4.44) 
Teacher 
Pedagogical 
Support Personnel 
Ratio 
0.001 
(0.26) 
0.002 
(0.69) 
-0.027 
(-3.18) 
-0.004 
(-0.72) 
0.000 
(-0.61) 
-0.002 
(-1.1) 
0.000 
(0.13) 
0.016 
(2.11) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.134 
(11.35) 
0.129 
(8.46) 
0.050 
(2.54) 
0.116 
(9.65) 
0.124 
(8.73) 
0.123 
(9.19) 
0.092 
(9.69) 
0.111 
(4.96) 
Teacher’s age 0.000 
(-0.11) 
0.000 
(-0.02) 
0.004 
(0.85) 
0.023 
(7.06) 
-0.008 
(-2.21) 
0.006 
(1.43) 
-0.004 
(-0.87) 
0.008 
(1.95) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.003 
(0.73) 
0.010 
(2.88) 
-0.005 
(-0.89) 
-0.004 
(-1.08) 
0.011 
(3.42) 
0.005 
(1.06) 
-0.004 
(-1.14) 
-0.004 
(-1.6) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.002 
(-0.45) 
-0.009 
(-1.6) 
-0.005 
(-0.82) 
-0.012 
(-3.06) 
0.000 
(-0.07) 
-0.011 
(-2.82) 
-0.001 
(-0.27) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
Female 0.049 
(1.06) 
0.082 
(2.05) 
0.266 
(4.08) 
-0.053 
(-0.98) 
-0.005 
(-0.11) 
-0.063 
(-1.84) 
-0.049 
(-1.16) 
0.117 
(1.62) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.156 
(1.71) 
0.040 
(0.68) 
0.058 
(0.64) 
0.050 
(0.76) 
-0.067 
(-0.95) 
-0.478 
(-4.55) 
0.185 
(1.1) 
-0.031 
(-0.47) 
Head teacher is 
female 
0.035 
(0.69) 
-0.106 
(-2.36) 
-0.143 
(-1.98) 
0.115 
(1.81) 
-0.040 
(-0.85) 
0.014 
(0.22) 
-0.065 
(-1.00) 
-0.035 
(-0.54) 
Is mentee 0.055 
(0.52) 
0.053 
(0.56) 
0.124 
(1.51) 
0.060 
(1.38) 
0.051 
(0.67) 
-0.014 
(-0.29) 
0.113 
(2.45) 
0.093 
(1.1) 
Is mentor 0.060 
(0.56) 
0.122 
(0.99) 
0.360 
(2.5) 
-0.052 
(-1.08) 
0.022 
(0.2) 
0.206 
(5.32) 
0.230 
(4.98) 
0.033 
(0.32) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.171 
(-3.09) 
-0.240 
(-2.61) 
-0.109 
(-1.23) 
-0.075 
(-1.39) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.119 
(-2.31) 
-0.164 
(-2.55) 
0.031 
(0.38) 
Total weekly 
workload 
-0.003 
(-1.46) 
-0.006 
(-2.8) 
-0.004 
(-1.84) 
-0.001 
(-1.33) 
-0.003 
(-2.00) 
0.000 
(-0.19) 
-0.002 
(-2.05) 
-0.003 
(-2.62) 
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Table A3.4 continued 
Variable Malaysia Mexico Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Serbia 
Constant -3.734 
(-6.56) 
-3.712 
(-13.25) 
-3.417 
(-5.75) 
-4.349 
(-9.61) 
-2.968 
(-9.3) 
-3.297 
(-8.97) 
-4.355 
(-12.83) 
-3.782 
(-12.9) 
Distributed 
Leadership 
Index 
0.017 
(1.04) 
0.018 
(1.87) 
0.027 
(1.54) 
0.073 
(2.2) 
-0.003 
(-0.25) 
-0.005 
(-0.3) 
0.024 
(2.04) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
Instructional 
Leadership 
Index 
0.009 
(0.51) 
-0.015 
(-1.16) 
-0.009 
(-0.45) 
-0.012 
(-0.68) 
-0.019 
(-1.2) 
-0.025 
(-1.84) 
-0.008 
(-0.56) 
-0.004 
(-0.19) 
Teacher 
Administrative 
Support 
Personnel 
Ratio 
-0.015 
(-1.56) 
-0.001 
(-0.29) 
0.015 
(1.1) 
0.003 
(0.25) 
0.004 
(0.57) 
-0.011 
(-1.13) 
0.000 
(-0.01) 
0.002 
(0.4) 
Teacher 
cooperates with 
colleagues 
0.057 
(5.37) 
0.070 
(7.44) 
0.099 
(4.38) 
0.114 
(7.19) 
0.049 
(2.91) 
0.065 
(5.03) 
0.061 
(4.77) 
0.092 
(9.85) 
Teacher 
Pedagogical 
Support 
Personnel 
Ratio 
0.000 
(-0.59) 
0.003 
(1.92) 
0.000 
(-0.04) 
0.003 
(0.67) 
0.007 
(3.09) 
-0.001 
(-0.64) 
0.001 
(0.9) 
0.001 
(1.08) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.167 
(13.17) 
0.135 
(9.74) 
0.180 
(10.01) 
0.125 
(5.98) 
0.134 
(9.13) 
0.132 
(9.4) 
0.138 
(7.22) 
0.150 
(12.52) 
Teacher’s age 0.004 
(0.82) 
0.001 
(0.36) 
-0.004 
(-0.86) 
0.009 
(3.05) 
0.003 
(0.68) 
0.010 
(2.37) 
-0.007 
(-1.4) 
0.001 
(0.45) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.005 
(1.59) 
0.008 
(2.56) 
0.007 
(1.54) 
0.006 
(1.54) 
0.003 
(0.84) 
0.017 
(4.16) 
0.006 
(2.15) 
0.003 
(1.19) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.004 
(-0.8) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
-0.010 
(-1.64) 
-0.010 
(-2.21) 
-0.004 
(-0.75) 
-0.014 
(-2.95) 
0.009 
(1.55) 
0.004 
(1.24) 
Female -0.030 
(-0.67) 
-0.014 
(-0.35) 
0.012 
(0.21) 
0.122 
(2.4) 
0.096 
(2.3) 
0.027 
(0.64) 
0.111 
(2.18) 
0.086 
(2.71) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.130 
(0.88) 
-0.018 
(-0.36) 
0.162 
(2.61) 
0.036 
(0.46) 
-0.035 
(-0.59) 
-0.128 
(-1.43) 
-0.096 
(-1.36) 
0.067 
(1.41) 
Head teacher is 
female 
-0.142 
(-2.68) 
0.019 
(0.37) 
-0.041 
(-0.49) 
-0.069 
(-0.87) 
-0.088 
(-1.94) 
-0.028 
(-0.54) 
0.086 
(1.59) 
-0.017 
(-0.39) 
Is mentee 0.072 
(1.61) 
0.028 
(0.46) 
0.080 
(1.05) 
0.065 
(1.02) 
0.154 
(3.02) 
0.061 
(0.83) 
-0.008 
(-0.11) 
-0.029 
(-0.64) 
Is mentor 0.106 
(2.95) 
0.025 
(0.47) 
-0.067 
(-1.02) 
0.322 
(1.98) 
0.127 
(2.14) 
0.146 
(1.79) 
0.119 
(1.71) 
0.139 
(1.88) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.484 
(-1.1) 
0.006 
(0.11) 
-0.232 
(-2.7) 
-0.242 
(-2.77) 
-0.233 
(-3.33) 
-0.031 
(-0.55) 
-0.085 
(-1.82) 
-0.362 
(-7.82) 
Total weekly 
workload 
-0.001 
(-1.33) 
-0.001 
(-0.83) 
-0.007 
(-2.37) 
-0.008 
(-3.38) 
-0.001 
(-0.62) 
-0.002 
(-1.37) 
-0.002 
(-1.79) 
-0.003 
(-2.89) 
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Table A3.4 continued 
Variable Singapore Slovak 
Republic 
Spain Sweden Abu 
Dhabi 
(UAE) 
Alberta 
(Canada) 
England 
(UK) 
Flanders 
(BEL) 
Constant -3.451 
(-10.34) 
-3.028 
(-7.96) 
-3.266 
(-10.93) 
-3.260 
(-8.39) 
-4.734 
(-8.15) 
-2.554 
(-7.53) 
-3.570 
(-10.41) 
-2.592 
(-7.84) 
Distributed 
Leadership Index 
0.034 
(2.41) 
0.014 
(0.83) 
-0.013 
(-1.41) 
-0.003 
(-0.17) 
0.011 
(0.57) 
-0.006 
(-0.48) 
0.033 
(2.88) 
0.007 
(0.51) 
Instructional 
Leadership Index 
0.007 
(0.54) 
-0.023 
(-1.39) 
0.012 
(1.12) 
-0.009 
(-0.6) 
0.031 
(1.32) 
0.005 
(0.32) 
-0.013 
(-0.94) 
0.007 
(0.44) 
Teacher 
Administrative 
Support 
Personnel Ratio 
-0.004 
(-0.29) 
0.019 
(1.62) 
0.006 
(0.59) 
0.006 
(1.03) 
-0.020 
(-1.43) 
-0.017 
(-1.2) 
0.017 
(0.85) 
-0.003 
(-0.54) 
Teacher 
cooperates with 
colleagues 
0.100 
(8.58) 
0.078 
(6.2) 
0.089 
(5.45) 
0.123 
(9.1) 
0.051 
(3.9) 
0.090 
(5.27) 
0.119 
(10.13) 
0.062 
(3.38) 
Teacher 
Pedagogical 
Support 
Personnel Ratio 
0.004 
(2.52) 
-0.001 
(-0.72) 
-0.001 
(-0.53) 
-0.003 
(-0.54) 
-0.003 
(-0.84) 
-0.004 
(-0.49) 
0.004 
(0.45) 
0.000 
(-0.31) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.064 
(7.55) 
0.101 
(6.71) 
0.143 
(11.35) 
0.098 
(7.73) 
0.113 
(6.26) 
0.086 
(5.8) 
0.102 
(7.9) 
0.110 
(7.69) 
Teacher’s age 0.014 
(3.72) 
0.011 
(2.78) 
0.001 
(0.17) 
0.009 
(3.06) 
0.017 
(3.23) 
0.004 
(1.05) 
-0.005 
(-1.31) 
0.005 
(1.48) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.011 
(2.69) 
-0.002 
(-0.74) 
0.016 
(5.49) 
0.001 
(0.43) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
0.017 
(3.44) 
0.002 
(0.54) 
0.008 
(1.75) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.002 
(-0.37) 
-0.009 
(-2.24) 
-0.014 
(-3.21) 
-0.009 
(-2.9) 
-0.005 
(-0.85) 
-0.009 
(-1.65) 
0.000 
(-0.11) 
-0.011 
(-2.09) 
Female -0.015 
(-0.39) 
0.065 
(1.27) 
0.111 
(3.34) 
0.128 
(3.37) 
-0.080 
(-1.25) 
-0.007 
(-0.14) 
-0.023 
(-0.55) 
0.048 
(1.12) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.120 
(1.68) 
-0.165 
(-2.31) 
-0.035 
(-0.53) 
0.090 
(1.96) 
0.086 
(0.58) 
-0.104 
(-1.32) 
0.111 
(1.54) 
0.196 
(3.57) 
Head teacher is 
female 
-0.077 
(-1.77) 
-0.057 
(-1.17) 
-0.037 
(-0.78) 
-0.025 
(-0.43) 
-0.068 
(-0.8) 
-0.081 
(-1.23) 
-0.082 
(-1.47) 
-0.111 
(-1.98) 
Is mentee 0.004 
(0.1) 
0.043 
(0.64) 
-0.036 
(-0.52) 
0.263 
(3.22) 
-0.033 
(-0.63) 
0.117 
(2.04) 
-0.016 
(-0.35) 
0.118 
(1.73) 
Is mentor 0.312 
(7.5) 
0.023 
(0.31) 
-0.121 
(-1.08) 
0.417 
(3.72) 
0.020 
(0.4) 
0.141 
(1.9) 
0.158 
(2.64) 
0.158 
(2.27) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.270 
(-5.02) 
-0.171 
(-3.16) 
-0.136 
(-2.53) 
-0.247 
(-3.92) 
-0.156 
(-2.68) 
-0.323 
(-4.16) 
-0.062 
(-0.74) 
-0.310 
(-4.94) 
Total weekly 
workload 
-0.005 
(-6.37) 
-0.002 
(-1.05) 
-0.002 
(-1.33) 
-0.008 
(-4.15) 
-0.003 
(-2.57) 
-0.003 
(-2.33) 
-0.005 
(-2.98) 
-0.010 
(-5.41) 
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Table A3.5: Chapter 3 – Model 4 
Variable  Australia Brazil Bulgaria Chile Croatia Czech 
Republic 
Denmar
k 
Estonia 
Constant -3.189 
(-13.62) 
-2.882 
(-20.54) 
-3.370 
(-12.62) 
-2.967 
(-10.07) 
-4.004 
(-21.91) 
-2.725 
(-12.06) 
-3.474 
(-9.73) 
-2.922 
(-13.18) 
Cooperation with 
colleagues index 
0.086 
(6.41) 
0.064 
(8.27) 
0.042 
(3.16) 
0.081 
(7.15) 
0.102 
(7.64) 
0.084 
(6.08) 
0.046 
(2.55) 
0.093 
(7.15) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.084 
(5.69) 
0.099 
(9.84) 
0.130 
(8.19) 
0.078 
(4.31) 
0.162 
(12.08) 
0.122 
(7.42) 
0.136 
(6.35) 
0.078 
(6.12) 
Teacher’s age 0.006 
(1.47) 
0.005 
(2.78) 
0.000 
(-0.14) 
0.010 
(2.09) 
0.006 
(2.36) 
0.002 
(0.49) 
0.007 
(1.66) 
0.004 
(1.88) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.007 
(1.15) 
-0.001 
(-0.26) 
-0.003 
(-1.01) 
0.002 
(0.33) 
0.000 
(-0.04) 
0.004 
(1.29) 
0.007 
(1.69) 
-0.002 
(-0.73) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.009 
(-2.44) 
0.001 
(0.56) 
0.002 
(0.62) 
-0.004 
(-0.89) 
-0.001 
(-0.28) 
-0.007 
(-2.1) 
-0.012 
(-2.42) 
-0.002 
(-0.58) 
Female 0.021 
(0.29) 
0.015 
(0.52) 
-0.052 
(-1.03) 
0.103 
(1.94) 
0.164 
(4.61) 
0.108 
(2.22) 
0.050 
(1.02) 
0.043 
(0.85) 
Full-time 
employment 
-0.075 
(-0.62) 
0.021 
(0.77) 
-0.065 
(-0.71) 
0.100 
(1.41) 
-0.055 
(-1.01) 
-0.068 
(-1.27) 
0.131 
(1.53) 
0.049 
(1.16) 
Is mentee -0.004 
(-0.06) 
0.017 
(0.27) 
0.073 
(0.98) 
0.115 
(1.01) 
0.011 
(0.22) 
0.166 
(2.44) 
-0.041 
(-0.58) 
0.087 
(1.33) 
Is mentor 0.305 
(4.49) 
0.072 
(2.27) 
0.219 
(3.18) 
0.053 
(0.47) 
0.267 
(3.59) 
0.131 
(1.39) 
0.015 
(0.1) 
-0.022 
(-0.2) 
Permanent 
contract 
0.044 
(0.46) 
-0.119 
(-3.19) 
-0.194 
(-2.68) 
-0.136 
(-1.8) 
-0.038 
(-0.6) 
-0.116 
(-1.84) 
0.100 
(0.76) 
-0.042 
(-0.75) 
Total weekly 
workload 
-0.004 
(-2.86) 
0.000 
(-0.79) 
-0.001 
(-0.62) 
0.001 
(0.7) 
-0.002 
(-1.67) 
-0.004 
(-2.3) 
-0.006 
(-2.53) 
-0.004 
(-3.01) 
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Table A3.5 continued 
Variable  Finland France Iceland Israel Italy Japan Korea Latvia 
Constant -2.867 
(-13.46) 
-3.448 
(-10.57) 
-2.566 
(-7.73) 
-3.569 
(-15.81) 
-2.833 
(-9.01) 
-2.087 
(-7.68) 
-2.450 
(-6.09) 
-2.851 
(-9.24) 
Cooperation with 
colleagues index 
0.056 
(4.15) 
0.127 
(7.01) 
0.094 
(4.73) 
0.070 
(3.46) 
0.081 
(5.52) 
0.074 
(5.35) 
0.034 
(2.65) 
0.082 
(4.55) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.134 
(12.96) 
0.133 
(8.6) 
0.061 
(3.22) 
0.124 
(9.88) 
0.130 
(8.48) 
0.111 
(8.13) 
0.095 
(9.32) 
0.092 
(4.27) 
Teacher’s age 0.001 
(0.28) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
0.008 
(1.5) 
0.013 
(3.54) 
-0.012 
(-2.97) 
0.005 
(1.34) 
-0.006 
(-0.97) 
0.005 
(1.28) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.002 
(0.44) 
0.009 
(2.35) 
-0.004 
(-0.81) 
-0.003 
(-0.73) 
0.007 
(2.14) 
-0.002 
(-0.57) 
-0.013 
(-2.92) 
-0.001 
(-0.46) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.004 
(-1.04) 
-0.009 
(-1.64) 
-0.007 
(-1.22) 
-0.006 
(-1.25) 
0.005 
(1.23) 
-0.010 
(-2.63) 
0.000 
(-0.01) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
Female 0.070 
(1.76) 
0.137 
(2.94) 
0.190 
(3.13) 
-0.060 
(-1.04) 
-0.026 
(-0.55) 
-0.060 
(-1.72) 
-0.004 
(-0.09) 
0.095 
(1.34) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.058 
(0.66) 
0.086 
(1.58) 
0.048 
(0.51) 
0.032 
(0.46) 
-0.052 
(-0.7) 
-0.604 
(-5.97) 
0.230 
(0.83) 
-0.056 
(-0.88) 
Is mentee 0.135 
(1.49) 
0.086 
(0.95) 
0.045 
(0.5) 
0.005 
(0.12) 
-0.014 
(-0.15) 
0.041 
(0.86) 
0.115 
(2.23) 
0.043 
(0.53) 
Is mentor 0.079 
(0.77) 
0.127 
(1.12) 
0.385 
(2.73) 
-0.023 
(-0.45) 
0.133 
(1.03) 
0.151 
(3.63) 
0.196 
(3.74) 
0.174 
(1.76) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.148 
(-2.96) 
-0.193 
(-2.17) 
-0.055 
(-0.58) 
-0.095 
(-1.65) 
-0.031 
(-0.48) 
-0.127 
(-2.46) 
-0.192 
(-2.65) 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
Total weekly 
workload 
-0.002 
(-0.83) 
-0.005 
(-2.78) 
-0.005 
(-1.97) 
0.001 
(0.47) 
-0.003 
(-1.77) 
0.001 
(0.54) 
-0.003 
(-2.54) 
-0.002 
(-2.01) 
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Table A3.5 continued 
Variable  Malaysia Mexico Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Serbia 
Constant -3.429 
(-6.35) 
-3.495 
(-14.83) 
-2.729 
(-5.65) 
-3.321 
(-13.33) 
-3.099 
(-13.51) 
-3.797 
(-15.04) 
-4.075 
(-13.42) 
-3.846 
(-21.71) 
Cooperation 
with colleagues 
index 
0.057 
(4.95) 
0.058 
(6.25) 
0.075 
(2.74) 
0.091 
(5.69) 
0.053 
(3.15) 
0.065 
(5.68) 
0.048 
(3.8) 
0.096 
(9.35) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.153 
(10.88) 
0.131 
(9.33) 
0.196 
(6.97) 
0.118 
(5.23) 
0.123 
(7.87) 
0.131 
(8.43) 
0.145 
(7.84) 
0.149 
(11.98) 
Teacher’s age 0.000 
(-0.01) 
0.000 
(-0.09) 
-0.003 
(-0.7) 
0.013 
(4.17) 
0.004 
(0.81) 
0.008 
(1.88) 
-0.006 
(-1.32) 
0.002 
(0.72) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.007 
(1.72) 
0.006 
(1.62) 
0.006 
(1.37) 
0.004 
(1.02) 
0.003 
(0.8) 
0.013 
(3.16) 
0.006 
(1.92) 
0.000 
(0.1) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.001 
(-0.25) 
-0.002 
(-0.55) 
-0.011 
(-2.42) 
-0.013 
(-2.67) 
-0.004 
(-0.78) 
-0.009 
(-2.01) 
0.008 
(1.49) 
0.005 
(1.71) 
Female -0.002 
(-0.05) 
-0.005 
(-0.11) 
-0.029 
(-0.42) 
0.148 
(3.1) 
0.083 
(1.79) 
0.096 
(2.44) 
0.132 
(2.66) 
0.060 
(1.99) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.091 
(0.64) 
0.003 
(0.07) 
0.190 
(2.52) 
0.041 
(0.6) 
0.023 
(0.39) 
-0.043 
(-0.53) 
-0.114 
(-1.53) 
0.019 
(0.43) 
Is mentee 0.077 
(1.59) 
0.010 
(0.17) 
0.011 
(0.15) 
0.080 
(1.37) 
0.137 
(2.52) 
0.045 
(0.61) 
-0.025 
(-0.38) 
-0.024 
(-0.47) 
Is mentor 0.094 
(2.38) 
0.040 
(0.7) 
-0.082 
(-1.06) 
0.295 
(1.71) 
0.133 
(2.18) 
0.175 
(2.24) 
0.100 
(1.59) 
0.145 
(2.07) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.324 
(-0.72) 
0.052 
(1.06) 
-0.326 
(-3.78) 
-0.199 
(-2.13) 
-0.261 
(-3.72) 
-0.033 
(-0.64) 
-0.137 
(-3.02) 
-0.381 
(-8.51) 
Total weekly 
workload 
-0.001 
(-0.75) 
0.000 
(-0.1) 
-0.008 
(-3.27) 
-0.009 
(-3.81) 
-0.001 
(-0.56) 
-0.003 
(-1.78) 
-0.002 
(-1.4) 
-0.002 
(-1.92) 
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Table A3.5 continued 
Variable  Singapore Slovak 
Republic 
Spain Sweden Abu 
Dhabi 
(UAE) 
Alberta 
(Canada) 
England 
(UK) 
Flanders 
(BEL) 
Constant -2.949 
(-12.59) 
-3.000 
(-11.51) 
-3.195 
(-10.98) 
-3.225 
(-11.7) 
-4.020 
(-13.82) 
-2.583 
(-8.84) 
-3.118 
(-12.00) 
-2.420 
(-8.92) 
Cooperation with 
colleagues index 
0.096 
(7.79) 
0.065 
(5.3) 
0.104 
(5.78) 
0.133 
(9.29) 
0.067 
(7.29) 
0.088 
(4.94) 
0.120 
(10.23) 
0.072 
(3.7) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.069 
(8.34) 
0.106 
(6.93) 
0.129 
(9.7) 
0.094 
(6.85) 
0.096 
(6.36) 
0.071 
(4.63) 
0.107 
(7.34) 
0.102 
(7.13) 
Teacher’s age 0.014 
(3.5) 
0.012 
(3.14) 
0.001 
(0.32) 
0.009 
(3.19) 
0.012 
(2.6) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
-0.005 
(-1.37) 
0.009 
(2.79) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.011 
(2.8) 
-0.001 
(-0.35) 
0.007 
(2.1) 
0.002 
(0.73) 
0.002 
(0.41) 
0.012 
(2.72) 
-0.001 
(-0.31) 
0.003 
(0.81) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.003 
(-0.62) 
-0.009 
(-2.26) 
-0.011 
(-2.16) 
-0.010 
(-3.49) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
-0.004 
(-0.64) 
0.003 
(0.77) 
-0.013 
(-2.86) 
Female -0.022 
(-0.54) 
0.087 
(1.76) 
0.127 
(3.19) 
0.136 
(3.58) 
0.063 
(0.91) 
0.016 
(0.29) 
-0.027 
(-0.51) 
0.063 
(1.41) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.144 
(1.96) 
-0.152 
(-2.1) 
0.116 
(1.67) 
0.094 
(1.99) 
-0.066 
(-0.49) 
-0.075 
(-1.00) 
0.110 
(1.24) 
0.198 
(3.46) 
Is mentee 0.039 
(0.97) 
0.083 
(1.22) 
-0.063 
(-0.94) 
0.336 
(4.16) 
0.003 
(0.06) 
0.102 
(1.71) 
-0.015 
(-0.29) 
0.094 
(1.55) 
Is mentor 0.309 
(7.7) 
0.122 
(1.63) 
-0.108 
(-1.16) 
0.344 
(3.1) 
0.074 
(1.93) 
0.099 
(1.26) 
0.179 
(2.94) 
0.150 
(1.94) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.256 
(-4.49) 
-0.168 
(-3.03) 
-0.130 
(-2.17) 
-0.243 
(-3.67) 
-0.099 
(-1.9) 
-0.375 
(-4.37) 
-0.100 
(-1.07) 
-0.279 
(-3.98) 
Total weekly 
workload 
-0.004 
(-5.14) 
-0.003 
(-1.96) 
-0.003 
(-2.7) 
-0.008 
(-3.79) 
-0.001 
(-1.62) 
-0.002 
(-1.48) 
-0.005 
(-3.03) 
-0.010 
(-5.52) 
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Table A3.6: Chapter 3 – Model 1 (different activities) 
Variable Australia Brazil Bulgaria Chile Croatia Czech 
Republic 
Denmar
k 
Estonia 
Constant 0.100 
(1.03) 
0.050 
(1.2) 
-0.028 
(-0.37) 
-0.040 
(-0.45) 
-0.069 
(-0.98) 
0.208 
(3.07) 
0.414 
(3.43) 
0.176 
(3.09) 
Face-to-face 
teaching (hours) 
-0.005 
(-1.39) 
-0.002 
(-1.4) 
0.001 
(0.47) 
-0.001 
(-0.29) 
0.002 
(0.59) 
-0.014 
(-4.03) 
-0.016 
(-3.08) 
-0.005 
(-2.06) 
Planning (hours) -0.010 
(-2.06) 
0.005 
(1.55) 
-0.001 
(-0.2) 
0.009 
(2.02) 
0.003 
(0.94) 
-0.002 
(-0.44) 
0.003 
(0.39) 
-0.004 
(-0.98) 
Team work 
(hours) 
0.014 
(1.77) 
0.008 
(1.79) 
0.005 
(0.38) 
0.021 
(1.34) 
0.026 
(2.38) 
0.002 
(0.15) 
-0.017 
(-1.27) 
0.015 
(1.33) 
Marking (hours) -0.004 
(-0.73) 
-0.003 
(-0.83) 
-0.011 
(-1.41) 
0.000 
(-0.02) 
-0.007 
(-1.07) 
-0.007 
(-1.05) 
0.002 
(0.29) 
-0.022 
(-3.29) 
Student 
counselling 
(hours) 
-0.003 
(-0.35) 
-0.001 
(-0.39) 
-0.006 
(-0.42) 
-0.011 
(-0.76) 
-0.025 
(-2.27) 
0.012 
(1.11) 
-0.003 
(-0.25) 
0.005 
(0.49) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.012 
(2.21) 
0.017 
(4.68) 
0.019 
(1.98) 
0.023 
(2.71) 
0.021 
(1.01) 
0.017 
(2.66) 
-0.003 
(-0.38) 
0.013 
(1.57) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
0.003 
(0.44) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
-0.010 
(-1.06) 
0.001 
(0.08) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
-0.032 
(-2.93) 
-0.016 
(-1.43) 
Interaction with 
parents (hours) 
-0.006 
(-0.28) 
0.008 
(1.35) 
0.015 
(1.1) 
-0.004 
(-0.22) 
0.003 
(0.44) 
0.027 
(1.29) 
0.003 
(0.28) 
0.024 
(1.15) 
Extra-curricular 
activities (hours) 
0.015 
(1.97) 
0.005 
(1.09) 
0.012 
(1.45) 
0.013 
(1.26) 
0.013 
(1.81) 
0.016 
(1.59) 
0.013 
(1.23) 
0.019 
(2.76) 
Other (hours) -0.010 
(-1.19) 
-0.002 
(-0.52) 
0.004 
(0.37) 
-0.021 
(-2.16) 
0.002 
(0.25) 
-0.013 
(-1.9) 
-0.002 
(-0.31) 
0.003 
(0.32) 
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Table A3.6 continued 
Variable Finland France Iceland Israel Italy Japan Korea Latvia 
Constant -0.084 
(-1.1) 
-0.084 
(-0.82) 
0.032 
(0.29) 
-0.072 
(-1.12) 
-0.019 
(-0.21) 
0.117 
(1.56) 
0.074 
(1.07) 
0.028 
(0.48) 
Face-to-face 
teaching (hours) 
0.008 
(2.41) 
0.010 
(1.98) 
-0.003 
(-0.58) 
0.003 
(1.01) 
0.002 
(0.46) 
-0.008 
(-2.3) 
-0.005 
(-1.56) 
0.001 
(0.2) 
Planning (hours) -0.009 
(-1.37) 
-0.007 
(-1.76) 
-0.006 
(-1.18) 
0.004 
(0.63) 
0.003 
(0.48) 
0.000 
(0.14) 
-0.005 
(-1.25) 
0.002 
(0.3) 
Team work 
(hours) 
0.021 
(1.2) 
0.023 
(1.91) 
-0.005 
(-0.3) 
0.017 
(1.74) 
-0.002 
(-0.33) 
0.012 
(2.18) 
0.032 
(2.94) 
0.023 
(1.46) 
Marking (hours) 0.006 
(0.83) 
-0.014 
(-3.18) 
0.002 
(0.18) 
-0.011 
(-2.21) 
-0.008 
(-1.4) 
-0.002 
(-0.48) 
-0.007 
(-1.03) 
-0.023 
(-2.77) 
Student 
counselling 
(hours) 
-0.014 
(-0.9) 
0.018 
(1.14) 
0.019 
(1.09) 
0.024 
(2.64) 
0.011 
(1.44) 
-0.013 
(-2.05) 
0.006 
(1.16) 
0.010 
(1.09) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.027 
(2.19) 
0.058 
(4.51) 
0.003 
(0.43) 
0.022 
(4.93) 
0.032 
(4.47) 
0.004 
(1.11) 
0.003 
(0.29) 
0.020 
(1.38) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
-0.010 
(-0.62) 
-0.040 
(-2.7) 
0.009 
(0.74) 
-0.010 
(-0.85) 
-0.007 
(-0.63) 
-0.004 
(-1.24) 
-0.011 
(-2.3) 
-0.006 
(-0.78) 
Interaction with 
parents (hours) 
-0.042 
(-1.7) 
0.002 
(0.16) 
0.020 
(1.02) 
0.005 
(0.31) 
-0.026 
(-1.63) 
0.004 
(0.34) 
0.015 
(1.31) 
-0.011 
(-0.59) 
Extra-curricular 
activities (hours) 
-0.001 
(-0.11) 
0.013 
(1.35) 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
0.001 
(0.34) 
0.019 
(2.18) 
0.007 
(2.62) 
0.023 
(2.43) 
0.002 
(0.16) 
Other (hours) 0.010 
(0.92) 
-0.016 
(-1.85) 
-0.012 
(-1.38) 
-0.013 
(-1.99) 
0.003 
(0.6) 
0.002 
(0.52) 
-0.017 
(-2.44) 
-0.002 
(-0.22) 
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Table A3.6 continued 
Variable Malaysia Mexico Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Serbia 
Constant 0.013 
(0.18) 
-0.137 
(-2.63) 
-0.039 
(-0.35) 
0.216 
(1.8) 
-0.033 
(-0.48) 
0.023 
(0.28) 
0.007 
(0.09) 
0.056 
(1.14) 
Face-to-face 
teaching (hours) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
0.002 
(0.8) 
0.008 
(1.64) 
-0.012 
(-2.19) 
0.001 
(0.23) 
-0.001 
(-0.43) 
-0.003 
(-0.9) 
-0.003 
(-1.42) 
Planning (hours) -0.005 
(-1.05) 
0.000 
(-0.04) 
0.000 
(-0.04) 
-0.007 
(-1.47) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
0.000 
(0.09) 
-0.006 
(-1.6) 
0.006 
(1.3) 
Team work 
(hours) 
0.003 
(0.32) 
0.016 
(1.65) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.028 
(1.59) 
-0.008 
(-0.6) 
-0.012 
(-1.81) 
0.012 
(0.95) 
0.010 
(1.46) 
Marking (hours) -0.008 
(-1.61) 
0.004 
(1.15) 
-0.015 
(-2.05) 
-0.008 
(-1.7) 
-0.004 
(-0.7) 
-0.003 
(-1.04) 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
-0.006 
(-0.91) 
Student 
counselling 
(hours) 
0.012 
(1.14) 
-0.002 
(-0.34) 
0.007 
(0.42) 
-0.008 
(-0.69) 
0.033 
(3.47) 
0.023 
(2.3) 
-0.004 
(-0.38) 
0.015 
(1.7) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.009 
(1.21) 
0.002 
(0.27) 
0.007 
(0.94) 
0.001 
(0.08) 
0.018 
(2.67) 
0.013 
(3.38) 
0.015 
(1.76) 
0.011 
(1.12) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
-0.007 
(-0.92) 
-0.032 
(-1.97) 
-0.009 
(-1.13) 
-0.020 
(-1.71) 
-0.013 
(-1.83) 
0.009 
(0.67) 
-0.020 
(-1.58) 
Interaction with 
parents (hours) 
0.023 
(2.36) 
0.009 
(1.54) 
0.027 
(1.13) 
0.012 
(0.7) 
0.006 
(0.31) 
0.025 
(2.2) 
0.035 
(1.98) 
0.008 
(0.56) 
Extra-curricular 
activities (hours) 
0.001 
(0.23) 
0.006 
(0.99) 
-0.025 
(-1.48) 
-0.006 
(-0.53) 
0.008 
(0.96) 
0.019 
(3.07) 
0.007 
(1.05) 
-0.004 
(-0.54) 
Other (hours) -0.006 
(-0.76) 
0.006 
(1.03) 
-0.003 
(-0.44) 
0.015 
(0.73) 
0.002 
(0.32) 
-0.004 
(-0.73) 
-0.007 
(-0.82) 
-0.004 
(-0.59) 
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Table A3.6 continued 
Variable Singapore Slovak 
Republic 
Spain Sweden Abu 
Dhabi 
(UAE) 
Alberta 
(Canada) 
England 
(UK) 
Flanders 
(BEL) 
Constant 0.234 
(4.5) 
0.111 
(1.68) 
-0.066 
(-0.91) 
0.092 
(0.95) 
0.140 
(1.58) 
0.155 
(1.78) 
0.066 
(0.67) 
0.169 
(2.07) 
Face-to-face 
teaching (hours) 
-0.006 
(-2.12) 
-0.006 
(-1.92) 
0.000 
(0.12) 
0.002 
(0.55) 
0.000 
(0.13) 
-0.002 
(-0.81) 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
0.003 
(0.86) 
Planning (hours) -0.001 
(-0.27) 
-0.005 
(-1.00) 
-0.009 
(-1.87) 
-0.004 
(-0.76) 
-0.011 
(-1.7) 
-0.012 
(-2.03) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
Team work 
(hours) 
0.007 
(0.9) 
0.015 
(1.23) 
0.025 
(2.11) 
0.035 
(3.6) 
0.012 
(1.06) 
0.013 
(1.85) 
0.016 
(1.82) 
-0.012 
(-0.95) 
Marking (hours) -0.010 
(-3.19) 
-0.002 
(-0.36) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
-0.018 
(-2.86) 
0.000 
(-0.03) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
-0.023 
(-4.15) 
-0.015 
(-2.44) 
Student 
counselling 
(hours) 
0.014 
(1.42) 
-0.005 
(-0.46) 
0.016 
(0.99) 
0.003 
(0.53) 
-0.016 
(-2.02) 
-0.005 
(-0.92) 
0.024 
(2.33) 
-0.008 
(-0.82) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.022 
(3.86) 
0.021 
(3.44) 
0.028 
(4.94) 
0.026 
(2.04) 
-0.002 
(-0.2) 
0.003 
(0.63) 
0.020 
(4.25) 
0.038 
(3.68) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
-0.011 
(-2.67) 
-0.012 
(-1.39) 
-0.043 
(-4.04) 
-0.024 
(-4.38) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
-0.004 
(-0.38) 
-0.021 
(-3.27) 
-0.036 
(-4.02) 
Interaction with 
parents (hours) 
-0.012 
(-0.77) 
0.042 
(2.15) 
0.046 
(2.08) 
-0.013 
(-0.93) 
-0.003 
(-0.29) 
-0.003 
(-0.17) 
0.028 
(1.66) 
0.009 
(0.45) 
Extra-curricular 
activities (hours) 
-0.007 
(-0.97) 
-0.001 
(-0.1) 
0.022 
(3.4) 
0.041 
(2.84) 
0.008 
(0.8) 
0.009 
(1.55) 
0.017 
(2.39) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
Other (hours) -0.009 
(-1.86) 
0.002 
(0.3) 
-0.009 
(-1.41) 
-0.022 
(-2.99) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
-0.015 
(-1.75) 
-0.005 
(-0.9) 
-0.007 
(-1.00) 
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Table A3.7: Chapter 3 – Model 2 (different activities) 
Variable  Australia Brazil Bulgaria Chile Croatia Czech 
Republic 
Denmar
k 
Estonia 
Constant -3.151 
(-12.94) 
-3.070 
(-19.68) 
-3.300 
(-11.57) 
-3.218 
(-12.73) 
-4.039 
(-20.65) 
-2.508 
(-10.93) 
-3.593 
(-10.21) 
-2.863 
(-11.84) 
Cooperation with 
colleagues index 
0.072 
(4.64) 
0.058 
(7.51) 
0.024 
(1.77) 
0.076 
(7.01) 
0.104 
(7.74) 
0.085 
(6.68) 
0.067 
(3.92) 
0.094 
(5.59) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.099 
(5.94) 
0.115 
(10.91) 
0.135 
(9.00) 
0.089 
(5.68) 
0.154 
(12.24) 
0.118 
(7.4) 
0.150 
(6.25) 
0.082 
(6.02) 
Teacher’s age 0.004 
(0.97) 
0.002 
(1.21) 
-0.004 
(-1.07) 
0.012 
(3.3) 
0.006 
(2.38) 
-0.001 
(-0.2) 
0.006 
(1.17) 
0.004 
(1.57) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.009 
(1.5) 
0.000 
(0.18) 
-0.003 
(-0.92) 
-0.002 
(-0.44) 
0.000 
(-0.12) 
0.002 
(0.87) 
0.015 
(3.15) 
-0.002 
(-0.69) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.009 
(-2.09) 
0.002 
(0.8) 
0.003 
(0.93) 
-0.004 
(-0.9) 
-0.002 
(-0.6) 
-0.006 
(-1.69) 
-0.017 
(-3.09) 
0.000 
(0.1) 
Face-to-face 
teaching (hours) 
-0.007 
(-2.34) 
-0.003 
(-2.49) 
-0.002 
(-0.61) 
-0.003 
(-1.26) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
-0.016 
(-3.92) 
-0.020 
(-3.97) 
-0.010 
(-3.74) 
Planning (hours) -0.009 
(-1.72) 
0.003 
(0.98) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
0.010 
(2.68) 
0.001 
(0.28) 
-0.002 
(-0.38) 
-0.002 
(-0.36) 
-0.003 
(-0.6) 
Team work 
(hours) 
0.002 
(0.32) 
0.001 
(0.28) 
-0.002 
(-0.16) 
0.013 
(0.97) 
0.005 
(0.47) 
-0.027 
(-2.02) 
-0.017 
(-1.3) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
Marking (hours) -0.010 
(-1.86) 
0.000 
(-0.03) 
-0.015 
(-2.11) 
-0.002 
(-0.19) 
-0.016 
(-2.73) 
-0.011 
(-1.61) 
-0.010 
(-1.29) 
-0.024 
(-3.45) 
Student 
counselling 
(hours) 
-0.001 
(-0.11) 
-0.004 
(-1.22) 
-0.013 
(-0.88) 
-0.014 
(-1.23) 
-0.032 
(-2.66) 
0.009 
(0.89) 
-0.012 
(-1.00) 
0.000 
(-0.04) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.007 
(1.35) 
0.009 
(2.59) 
0.009 
(1.08) 
0.012 
(1.32) 
0.007 
(0.36) 
0.013 
(1.93) 
-0.009 
(-1.29) 
0.007 
(0.8) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
0.002 
(0.25) 
0.002 
(0.42) 
-0.008 
(-0.91) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
0.004 
(0.67) 
-0.001 
(-0.14) 
-0.032 
(-3.45) 
-0.016 
(-1.41) 
Interaction with 
parents (hours) 
-0.017 
(-0.88) 
0.001 
(0.19) 
0.010 
(0.76) 
-0.012 
(-0.61) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
-0.002 
(-0.2) 
-0.004 
(-0.19) 
Extra-curricular 
activities (hours) 
0.011 
(1.64) 
0.002 
(0.6) 
0.008 
(1.03) 
0.021 
(2.52) 
0.006 
(0.91) 
0.011 
(1.33) 
0.012 
(1.18) 
0.017 
(2.44) 
Other (hours) -0.012 
(-1.61) 
-0.005 
(-1.27) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
-0.019 
(-2.71) 
0.002 
(0.27) 
-0.012 
(-1.94) 
-0.004 
(-0.67) 
0.005 
(0.58) 
Female 0.047 
(0.75) 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
-0.042 
(-0.81) 
0.145 
(2.91) 
0.194 
(5.33) 
0.111 
(2.23) 
0.010 
(0.17) 
0.053 
(0.98) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.006 
(0.06) 
0.039 
(1.25) 
-0.047 
(-0.52) 
0.066 
(1.01) 
-0.026 
(-0.46) 
-0.029 
(-0.48) 
0.117 
(1.26) 
0.132 
(2.76) 
Is mentee -0.086 
(-1.41) 
-0.006 
(-0.08) 
0.016 
(0.23) 
0.043 
(0.38) 
0.023 
(0.47) 
0.121 
(1.72) 
0.033 
(0.45) 
0.010 
(0.15) 
Is mentor 0.360 
(4.75) 
0.077 
(2.5) 
0.268 
(4.28) 
-0.077 
(-0.65) 
0.242 
(3.11) 
0.188 
(2.22) 
0.079 
(0.49) 
-0.079 
(-0.73) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.075 
(-1.00) 
-0.046 
(-1.21) 
-0.106 
(-1.49) 
-0.028 
(-0.45) 
-0.062 
(-0.96) 
-0.061 
(-0.95) 
0.039 
(0.26) 
0.005 
(0.09) 
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Table A3.7 continued 
Variable  Finland France Iceland Israel Italy Japan Korea Latvia 
Constant -2.997 
(-13.11) 
-3.399 
(-11.71) 
-2.374 
(-6.85) 
-3.642 
(-17.26) 
-2.922 
(-11.31) 
-2.533 
(-10.41) 
-2.487 
(-8.36) 
-3.063 
(-9.53) 
Cooperation with 
colleagues index 
0.064 
(4.44) 
0.096 
(5.33) 
0.101 
(5.13) 
0.083 
(5.42) 
0.078 
(6.53) 
0.068 
(5.01) 
0.018 
(1.54) 
0.081 
(4.47) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.133 
(11.08) 
0.122 
(7.71) 
0.048 
(2.44) 
0.116 
(9.39) 
0.130 
(9.3) 
0.123 
(9.13) 
0.089 
(9.41) 
0.104 
(4.58) 
Teacher’s age -0.001 
(-0.27) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
0.005 
(0.97) 
0.025 
(7.61) 
-0.008 
(-2.09) 
0.006 
(1.53) 
-0.004 
(-0.81) 
0.007 
(1.89) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.002 
(0.63) 
0.012 
(3.33) 
-0.005 
(-0.9) 
-0.005 
(-1.36) 
0.011 
(3.46) 
0.004 
(0.9) 
-0.005 
(-1.47) 
-0.005 
(-1.72) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.002 
(-0.34) 
-0.010 
(-1.86) 
-0.005 
(-0.86) 
-0.012 
(-3.08) 
-0.001 
(-0.27) 
-0.011 
(-2.68) 
-0.001 
(-0.29) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
Face-to-face 
teaching (hours) 
0.002 
(0.67) 
0.007 
(1.24) 
-0.004 
(-0.71) 
-0.001 
(-0.27) 
-0.002 
(-0.36) 
-0.005 
(-1.55) 
-0.007 
(-2.41) 
-0.002 
(-1.00) 
Planning (hours) -0.009 
(-1.61) 
-0.005 
(-1.32) 
-0.008 
(-1.58) 
0.003 
(0.53) 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
0.000 
(-0.11) 
-0.004 
(-1.09) 
-0.002 
(-0.46) 
Team work 
(hours) 
-0.006 
(-0.4) 
0.010 
(0.8) 
-0.030 
(-1.88) 
0.006 
(0.64) 
-0.004 
(-0.67) 
0.009 
(1.89) 
0.029 
(2.58) 
0.018 
(1.27) 
Marking (hours) 0.005 
(0.85) 
-0.018 
(-3.91) 
-0.002 
(-0.21) 
-0.014 
(-3.13) 
-0.014 
(-2.3) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.009 
(-1.45) 
-0.022 
(-2.62) 
Student 
counselling 
(hours) 
-0.009 
(-0.6) 
-0.003 
(-0.24) 
0.014 
(1.00) 
0.021 
(2.32) 
0.004 
(0.49) 
-0.013 
(-2.06) 
-0.003 
(-0.44) 
0.007 
(0.83) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.023 
(1.71) 
0.054 
(4.02) 
-0.003 
(-0.37) 
0.013 
(3.48) 
0.019 
(2.89) 
-0.001 
(-0.4) 
-0.006 
(-0.8) 
0.009 
(0.78) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
-0.020 
(-1.41) 
-0.029 
(-2.00) 
0.002 
(0.19) 
-0.010 
(-0.89) 
-0.008 
(-0.7) 
-0.002 
(-0.74) 
-0.010 
(-2.3) 
-0.006 
(-0.89) 
Interaction with 
parents (hours) 
-0.041 
(-1.62) 
-0.002 
(-0.15) 
0.020 
(0.81) 
-0.018 
(-1.11) 
-0.025 
(-1.67) 
0.001 
(0.1) 
0.003 
(0.34) 
-0.028 
(-1.59) 
Extra-curricular 
activities (hours) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
0.002 
(0.27) 
-0.004 
(-0.26) 
0.000 
(-0.00) 
0.016 
(1.86) 
0.004 
(1.45) 
0.014 
(1.55) 
0.005 
(0.39) 
Other (hours) 0.008 
(0.91) 
-0.015 
(-1.7) 
-0.002 
(-0.22) 
-0.015 
(-2.61) 
-0.002 
(-0.39) 
0.002 
(0.57) 
-0.008 
(-1.36) 
-0.002 
(-0.3) 
Female 0.062 
(1.34) 
0.116 
(2.89) 
0.274 
(3.99) 
0.004 
(0.07) 
0.017 
(0.39) 
-0.051 
(-1.44) 
-0.043 
(-0.98) 
0.140 
(1.77) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.128 
(1.43) 
-0.004 
(-0.07) 
0.075 
(0.79) 
0.042 
(0.65) 
-0.094 
(-1.15) 
-0.457 
(-4.4) 
0.209 
(1.32) 
-0.027 
(-0.41) 
Is mentee 0.032 
(0.29) 
0.027 
(0.28) 
0.085 
(1.02) 
0.037 
(0.88) 
0.032 
(0.42) 
-0.015 
(-0.29) 
0.109 
(2.39) 
0.084 
(0.99) 
Is mentor 0.056 
(0.52) 
0.175 
(1.38) 
0.357 
(2.42) 
-0.062 
(-1.31) 
0.029 
(0.27) 
0.207 
(5.3) 
0.213 
(4.72) 
0.051 
(0.48) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.172 
(-3.07) 
-0.277 
(-2.9) 
-0.113 
(-1.27) 
-0.084 
(-1.52) 
0.017 
(0.28) 
-0.106 
(-2.02) 
-0.154 
(-2.43) 
0.036 
(0.45) 
 
 
  
  
200 
 
Table A3.7 continued 
Variable  Malaysia Mexico Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Serbia 
Constant -3.629 
(-6.78) 
-3.657 
(-16.48) 
-3.127 
(-7.44) 
-3.399 
(-11.68) 
-3.173 
(-13.73) 
-3.717 
(-16.54) 
-4.035 
(-13.00) 
-3.792 
(-20.16) 
Cooperation with 
colleagues index 
0.055 
(5.05) 
0.071 
(7.65) 
0.092 
(3.84) 
0.113 
(6.55) 
0.047 
(2.71) 
0.065 
(4.89) 
0.058 
(4.23) 
0.094 
(9.82) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.168 
(12.92) 
0.133 
(9.56) 
0.183 
(9.46) 
0.126 
(6.16) 
0.133 
(8.71) 
0.128 
(9.19) 
0.137 
(6.84) 
0.151 
(12.56) 
Teacher’s age 0.003 
(0.72) 
0.001 
(0.23) 
-0.004 
(-0.81) 
0.009 
(3.05) 
0.003 
(0.53) 
0.011 
(2.68) 
-0.007 
(-1.35) 
0.001 
(0.38) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.006 
(1.8) 
0.008 
(2.68) 
0.008 
(1.86) 
0.006 
(1.56) 
0.003 
(0.89) 
0.017 
(4.08) 
0.006 
(1.89) 
0.003 
(1.12) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.003 
(-0.74) 
0.001 
(0.3) 
-0.010 
(-1.68) 
-0.011 
(-2.47) 
-0.004 
(-0.69) 
-0.015 
(-3.18) 
0.009 
(1.67) 
0.004 
(1.28) 
Face-to-face 
teaching (hours) 
-0.001 
(-0.51) 
-0.001 
(-0.77) 
-0.005 
(-0.87) 
-0.016 
(-3.00) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
-0.004 
(-1.12) 
-0.004 
(-1.23) 
-0.004 
(-1.8) 
Planning (hours) -0.006 
(-1.23) 
0.001 
(0.37) 
0.005 
(0.76) 
-0.004 
(-0.85) 
0.001 
(0.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.27) 
-0.004 
(-1.04) 
0.005 
(1.2) 
Team work 
(hours) 
0.002 
(0.23) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.020 
(-1.41) 
-0.005 
(-0.28) 
-0.015 
(-1.19) 
-0.016 
(-2.6) 
0.002 
(0.14) 
0.000 
(-0.06) 
Marking (hours) -0.006 
(-1.27) 
0.004 
(1.07) 
-0.013 
(-1.69) 
-0.009 
(-2.19) 
-0.011 
(-1.96) 
-0.003 
(-0.99) 
-0.010 
(-1.13) 
-0.012 
(-2.1) 
Student 
counselling 
(hours) 
-0.005 
(-0.54) 
-0.008 
(-1.64) 
0.006 
(0.35) 
-0.014 
(-1.35) 
0.024 
(2.62) 
0.020 
(2.2) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.006 
(0.74) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.004 
(0.64) 
-0.004 
(-0.51) 
0.000 
(-0.04) 
-0.003 
(-0.4) 
0.008 
(1.28) 
0.007 
(1.95) 
0.006 
(0.71) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
-0.008 
(-1.03) 
-0.027 
(-1.45) 
-0.014 
(-1.95) 
-0.023 
(-2.16) 
-0.013 
(-1.86) 
0.004 
(0.28) 
-0.013 
(-1.26) 
Interaction with 
parents (hours) 
0.011 
(1.36) 
0.007 
(1.27) 
0.010 
(0.42) 
-0.001 
(-0.1) 
0.014 
(0.75) 
0.020 
(1.96) 
0.003 
(0.16) 
-0.009 
(-0.61) 
Extra-curricular 
activities (hours) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
-0.004 
(-0.71) 
-0.026 
(-1.8) 
-0.010 
(-0.9) 
0.004 
(0.5) 
0.011 
(1.94) 
0.009 
(1.36) 
-0.006 
(-1.01) 
Other (hours) -0.006 
(-0.98) 
0.004 
(0.85) 
-0.005 
(-0.63) 
0.006 
(0.6) 
0.005 
(0.78) 
-0.002 
(-0.25) 
-0.008 
(-1.05) 
-0.006 
(-0.88) 
Female -0.052 
(-1.12) 
-0.017 
(-0.42) 
0.013 
(0.22) 
0.128 
(2.42) 
0.096 
(2.3) 
0.046 
(1.06) 
0.132 
(2.51) 
0.088 
(2.76) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.158 
(1.06) 
-0.012 
(-0.23) 
0.155 
(2.27) 
0.071 
(0.94) 
-0.019 
(-0.29) 
-0.099 
(-1.09) 
-0.075 
(-1.03) 
0.074 
(1.57) 
Is mentee 0.060 
(1.35) 
0.031 
(0.5) 
0.083 
(1.05) 
0.034 
(0.48) 
0.159 
(3.1) 
0.046 
(0.62) 
-0.011 
(-0.14) 
-0.022 
(-0.47) 
Is mentor 0.102 
(2.84) 
0.017 
(0.33) 
-0.066 
(-1.05) 
0.257 
(1.98) 
0.124 
(2.05) 
0.135 
(1.6) 
0.117 
(1.67) 
0.131 
(1.77) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.456 
(-1.03) 
0.025 
(0.49) 
-0.232 
(-2.7) 
-0.244 
(-2.9) 
-0.244 
(-3.46) 
-0.041 
(-0.75) 
-0.081 
(-1.68) 
-0.356 
(-7.61) 
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Table A3.7 continued 
Variable  Singapore Slovak 
Republic 
Spain Sweden Abu 
Dhabi 
(UAE) 
Alberta 
(Canada) 
England 
(UK) 
Flanders 
(BEL) 
Constant -2.939 
(-11.75) 
-3.014 
(-11.44) 
-3.263 
(-12.2) 
-3.305 
(-13.69) 
-4.459 
(-11.73) 
-2.638 
(-9.61) 
-3.202 
(-13.22) 
-2.574 
(-11.07) 
Cooperation 
with colleagues 
index 
0.097 
(8.15) 
0.073 
(5.73) 
0.092 
(5.74) 
0.113 
(8.05) 
0.050 
(3.73) 
0.082 
(4.94) 
0.113 
(9.7) 
0.061 
(3.18) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.062 
(7.03) 
0.100 
(6.74) 
0.139 
(10.94) 
0.095 
(7.56) 
0.110 
(5.8) 
0.085 
(5.71) 
0.101 
(8.09) 
0.112 
(7.99) 
Teacher’s age 0.015 
(3.88) 
0.011 
(2.8) 
0.002 
(0.44) 
0.009 
(3.17) 
0.018 
(3.32) 
0.005 
(1.12) 
-0.003 
(-1.03) 
0.005 
(1.56) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.009 
(2.37) 
-0.002 
(-0.79) 
0.016 
(5.45) 
0.002 
(0.8) 
0.004 
(0.7) 
0.018 
(3.7) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.008 
(1.85) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.001 
(-0.3) 
-0.009 
(-2.3) 
-0.015 
(-3.6) 
-0.010 
(-3.19) 
-0.006 
(-0.96) 
-0.009 
(-1.56) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
-0.011 
(-2.01) 
Face-to-face 
teaching 
(hours) 
-0.007 
(-2.77) 
-0.002 
(-0.77) 
-0.004 
(-1.32) 
-0.004 
(-1.04) 
0.003 
(0.97) 
-0.002 
(-0.76) 
-0.003 
(-0.9) 
-0.003 
(-0.99) 
Planning 
(hours) 
-0.001 
(-0.2) 
-0.006 
(-1.26) 
-0.005 
(-1.15) 
-0.003 
(-0.71) 
-0.010 
(-1.69) 
-0.006 
(-1.22) 
-0.002 
(-0.45) 
-0.007 
(-1.75) 
Team work 
(hours) 
-0.003 
(-0.39) 
0.002 
(0.16) 
0.000 
(-0.02) 
0.016 
(1.66) 
0.016 
(1.69) 
0.003 
(0.37) 
0.002 
(0.31) 
-0.021 
(-1.71) 
Marking 
(hours) 
-0.011 
(-3.68) 
0.000 
(-0.04) 
0.000 
(0.11) 
-0.020 
(-3.46) 
-0.005 
(-0.75) 
-0.005 
(-0.9) 
-0.024 
(-4.79) 
-0.020 
(-3.47) 
Student 
counselling 
(hours) 
0.014 
(1.51) 
-0.018 
(-1.74) 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
0.002 
(0.26) 
-0.016 
(-2.02) 
-0.006 
(-1.21) 
0.024 
(2.49) 
-0.016 
(-1.5) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.011 
(1.91) 
0.017 
(2.9) 
0.022 
(4.17) 
0.013 
(1.36) 
-0.006 
(-0.77) 
-0.001 
(-0.11) 
0.012 
(2.46) 
0.029 
(2.65) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
-0.007 
(-1.77) 
-0.002 
(-0.25) 
-0.032 
(-3.74) 
-0.022 
(-4.44) 
-0.002 
(-0.3) 
-0.008 
(-0.8) 
-0.024 
(-3.87) 
-0.035 
(-3.94) 
Interaction 
with parents 
(hours) 
-0.026 
(-1.81) 
0.019 
(0.98) 
0.032 
(1.82) 
-0.027 
(-2.26) 
-0.009 
(-0.89) 
-0.005 
(-0.31) 
0.018 
(1.03) 
0.009 
(0.44) 
Extra-
curricular 
activities 
(hours) 
-0.004 
(-0.61) 
0.004 
(0.43) 
0.012 
(1.98) 
0.038 
(2.79) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
0.005 
(0.85) 
0.003 
(0.55) 
-0.001 
(-0.15) 
Other (hours) -0.012 
(-2.59) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
-0.013 
(-2.4) 
-0.016 
(-2.3) 
0.000 
(-0.03) 
-0.022 
(-2.66) 
-0.008 
(-1.46) 
-0.010 
(-1.47) 
Female 0.004 
(0.12) 
0.076 
(1.42) 
0.113 
(3.36) 
0.160 
(4.26) 
-0.095 
(-1.71) 
0.005 
(0.1) 
0.007 
(0.17) 
0.057 
(1.3) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.119 
(1.62) 
-0.161 
(-2.22) 
-0.038 
(-0.56) 
0.076 
(1.6) 
0.098 
(0.65) 
-0.110 
(-1.39) 
0.107 
(1.38) 
0.168 
(2.86) 
Is mentee -0.009 
(-0.23) 
0.015 
(0.23) 
-0.064 
(-0.89) 
0.243 
(3.00) 
-0.041 
(-0.71) 
0.119 
(2.03) 
-0.027 
(-0.6) 
0.088 
(1.29) 
Is mentor 0.308 
(7.55) 
0.041 
(0.55) 
-0.134 
(-1.24) 
0.386 
(3.55) 
0.026 
(0.54) 
0.173 
(2.3) 
0.160 
(2.77) 
0.178 
(2.44) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.274 
(-5.11) 
-0.178 
(-3.22) 
-0.131 
(-2.5) 
-0.243 
(-3.92) 
-0.174 
(-2.83) 
-0.341 
(-4.18) 
-0.072 
(-0.87) 
-0.285 
(-4.55) 
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Table A3.8: Chapter 3 – Model 3 (different activities) 
Variable Australia Brazil Bulgaria Chile Croatia Czech 
Republic 
Denmar
k 
Estonia 
Constant -2.502 
(-4.94) 
-2.807 
(-12.52) 
-3.549 
(-7.71) 
-2.638 
(-7.64) 
-3.972 
(-12.9) 
-2.685 
(-8.68) 
-3.506 
(-6.94) 
-2.785 
(-7.99) 
Distributed 
Leadership 
Index 
-0.050 
(-1.56) 
-0.038 
(-4.17) 
0.019 
(1.31) 
0.005 
(0.33) 
-0.005 
(-0.36) 
0.019 
(1.15) 
-0.031 
(-1.36) 
0.018 
(1.12) 
Instructional 
Leadership 
Index 
-0.006 
(-0.34) 
0.028 
(2.78) 
0.019 
(0.71) 
-0.051 
(-2.39) 
-0.002 
(-0.11) 
0.000 
(-0.03) 
0.022 
(0.97) 
-0.026 
(-1.47) 
Teacher 
Administrative 
Support 
Personnel Ratio 
0.013 
(1.13) 
0.006 
(0.97) 
-0.044 
(-0.68) 
-0.003 
(-0.19) 
-0.002 
(-0.55) 
0.005 
(0.4) 
0.010 
(0.69) 
0.003 
(0.38) 
Teacher 
cooperates with 
colleagues 
0.078 
(5.08) 
0.062 
(8.31) 
0.026 
(1.86) 
0.077 
(7.39) 
0.106 
(7.79) 
0.083 
(6.39) 
0.069 
(3.93) 
0.093 
(5.65) 
Teacher 
Pedagogical 
Support 
Personnel Ratio 
0.000 
(0.13) 
-0.004 
(-2.66) 
0.005 
(2.37) 
0.004 
(0.67) 
0.003 
(0.87) 
-0.004 
(-3.36) 
0.000 
(-0.08) 
-0.006 
(-1.23) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.097 
(6.03) 
0.112 
(10.58) 
0.133 
(8.76) 
0.091 
(5.82) 
0.155 
(12.32) 
0.121 
(7.5) 
0.151 
(6.27) 
0.083 
(6.09) 
Teacher’s age 0.003 
(0.9) 
0.003 
(1.47) 
-0.004 
(-1.12) 
0.012 
(3.38) 
0.006 
(2.45) 
-0.001 
(-0.19) 
0.006 
(1.23) 
0.004 
(1.47) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.008 
(1.39) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
-0.001 
(-0.52) 
-0.001 
(-0.34) 
-0.001 
(-0.29) 
0.002 
(0.84) 
0.014 
(3.32) 
-0.002 
(-0.75) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.008 
(-1.92) 
0.002 
(0.87) 
0.003 
(1.02) 
-0.003 
(-0.83) 
-0.001 
(-0.56) 
-0.006 
(-1.62) 
-0.017 
(-3.05) 
0.000 
(0.16) 
Face-to-face 
teaching (hours) 
-0.008 
(-2.46) 
-0.002 
(-2.37) 
-0.002 
(-0.6) 
-0.003 
(-1.24) 
0.000 
(-0.13) 
-0.016 
(-3.88) 
-0.021 
(-4.31) 
-0.010 
(-3.62) 
Planning (hours) -0.008 
(-1.58) 
0.003 
(0.82) 
0.000 
(-0.03) 
0.009 
(2.4) 
0.001 
(0.31) 
-0.002 
(-0.37) 
-0.002 
(-0.36) 
-0.002 
(-0.56) 
Team work 
(hours) 
0.002 
(0.23) 
0.002 
(0.58) 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
0.015 
(1.17) 
0.005 
(0.56) 
-0.027 
(-1.94) 
-0.017 
(-1.33) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
Marking (hours) -0.011 
(-2.05) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
-0.016 
(-2.27) 
-0.003 
(-0.36) 
-0.016 
(-2.71) 
-0.010 
(-1.48) 
-0.010 
(-1.24) 
-0.024 
(-3.42) 
Student 
counselling 
(hours) 
-0.002 
(-0.21) 
-0.003 
(-1.04) 
-0.012 
(-0.8) 
-0.013 
(-1.16) 
-0.031 
(-2.64) 
0.010 
(0.98) 
-0.012 
(-0.9) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.008 
(1.56) 
0.008 
(2.45) 
0.008 
(0.97) 
0.013 
(1.39) 
0.007 
(0.33) 
0.013 
(1.99) 
-0.007 
(-1.18) 
0.006 
(0.76) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
0.001 
(0.28) 
-0.007 
(-0.85) 
-0.001 
(-0.11) 
0.004 
(0.75) 
0.000 
(-0.04) 
-0.033 
(-3.46) 
-0.016 
(-1.44) 
Interaction with 
parents (hours) 
-0.017 
(-0.86) 
0.002 
(0.32) 
0.010 
(0.81) 
-0.013 
(-0.65) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
-0.003 
(-0.16) 
-0.003 
(-0.27) 
-0.005 
(-0.27) 
Extra-curricular 
activities (hours) 
0.010 
(1.51) 
0.003 
(0.71) 
0.008 
(1.02) 
0.021 
(2.37) 
0.006 
(0.92) 
0.011 
(1.39) 
0.012 
(1.22) 
0.018 
(2.4) 
Other (hours) -0.012 
(-1.62) 
-0.005 
(-1.28) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
-0.019 
(-2.91) 
0.002 
(0.33) 
-0.013 
(-2.06) 
-0.004 
(-0.61) 
0.005 
(0.61) 
Female 0.063 
(0.97) 
0.003 
(0.1) 
-0.038 
(-0.75) 
0.141 
(2.88) 
0.195 
(5.36) 
0.107 
(2.17) 
0.013 
(0.22) 
0.056 
(1.03) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.010 
(0.1) 
0.043 
(1.44) 
-0.072 
(-0.83) 
0.062 
(0.95) 
-0.031 
(-0.54) 
-0.035 
(-0.58) 
0.116 
(1.26) 
0.130 
(2.72) 
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Head teacher is 
female 
-0.128 
(-1.93) 
-0.034 
(-0.76) 
-0.096 
(-1.52) 
-0.028 
(-0.42) 
-0.064 
(-1.5) 
-0.084 
(-1.72) 
-0.051 
(-0.61) 
-0.022 
(-0.43) 
Is mentee -0.084 
(-1.38) 
-0.016 
(-0.25) 
0.012 
(0.17) 
0.047 
(0.4) 
0.020 
(0.42) 
0.117 
(1.71) 
0.035 
(0.48) 
0.027 
(0.42) 
Is mentor 0.346 
(4.56) 
0.066 
(2.15) 
0.256 
(4.13) 
-0.061 
(-0.55) 
0.239 
(3.2) 
0.185 
(2.21) 
0.075 
(0.47) 
-0.086 
(-0.8) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.073 
(-1.00) 
-0.074 
(-1.96) 
-0.121 
(-1.67) 
-0.033 
(-0.53) 
-0.061 
(-0.94) 
-0.061 
(-0.94) 
0.039 
(0.25) 
0.004 
(0.08) 
 
 
Table A3.8 continued 
Variable Finland France Iceland Israel Italy Japan Korea Latvia 
Constant -3.167 
(-7.96) 
-3.125 
(-8.81) 
-2.334 
(-4.79) 
-3.294 
(-10.08) 
-2.758 
(-6.88) 
-2.241 
(-8.27) 
-2.876 
(-7.57) 
-3.273 
(-6.7) 
Distributed 
Leadership Index 
0.011 
(0.43) 
-0.030 
(-2.82) 
0.012 
(0.59) 
-0.018 
(-0.66) 
0.028 
(0.93) 
0.012 
(1.01) 
0.026 
(1.6) 
0.005 
(0.22) 
Instructional 
Leadership Index 
-0.007 
(-0.4) 
0.019 
(1.27) 
-0.003 
(-0.19) 
-0.016 
(-0.85) 
-0.016 
(-1.08) 
-0.033 
(-2.00) 
0.004 
(0.24) 
-0.011 
(-0.52) 
Teacher 
Administrative 
Support Personnel 
Ratio 
0.006 
(0.97) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
0.009 
(0.68) 
0.013 
(0.88) 
-0.022 
(-3.18) 
-0.006 
(-0.81) 
-0.005 
(-0.31) 
0.019 
(1.45) 
Teacher cooperates 
with colleagues 
0.064 
(4.38) 
0.093 
(5.16) 
0.102 
(5.36) 
0.083 
(5.32) 
0.081 
(6.74) 
0.069 
(5.03) 
0.019 
(1.57) 
0.079 
(4.34) 
Teacher 
Pedagogical 
Support Personnel 
Ratio 
0.001 
(0.14) 
0.002 
(0.47) 
-0.026 
(-3.23) 
-0.004 
(-0.67) 
0.000 
(-0.54) 
-0.003 
(-1.15) 
0.000 
(0.14) 
0.016 
(2.17) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.133 
(11.15) 
0.123 
(7.85) 
0.051 
(2.66) 
0.116 
(9.5) 
0.127 
(8.9) 
0.124 
(9.28) 
0.090 
(9.65) 
0.109 
(4.78) 
Teacher’s age 0.000 
(-0.13) 
0.001 
(0.17) 
0.005 
(1.08) 
0.022 
(6.83) 
-0.007 
(-1.89) 
0.006 
(1.47) 
-0.004 
(-0.78) 
0.008 
(1.94) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.002 
(0.64) 
0.010 
(2.78) 
-0.005 
(-0.91) 
-0.005 
(-1.25) 
0.010 
(3.32) 
0.005 
(1.01) 
-0.004 
(-1.25) 
-0.004 
(-1.55) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.002 
(-0.4) 
-0.009 
(-1.58) 
-0.006 
(-1.05) 
-0.011 
(-2.73) 
-0.001 
(-0.31) 
-0.011 
(-2.68) 
-0.002 
(-0.39) 
0.001 
(0.29) 
Face-to-face 
teaching (hours) 
0.002 
(0.75) 
0.006 
(1.07) 
-0.004 
(-0.76) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
-0.003 
(-0.56) 
-0.005 
(-1.44) 
-0.006 
(-2.33) 
-0.003 
(-1.14) 
Planning (hours) -0.009 
(-1.64) 
-0.005 
(-1.29) 
-0.008 
(-1.5) 
0.003 
(0.5) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.000 
(-0.16) 
-0.004 
(-0.98) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
Team work (hours) -0.007 
(-0.46) 
0.010 
(0.81) 
-0.035 
(-2.24) 
0.005 
(0.48) 
-0.005 
(-0.74) 
0.009 
(1.99) 
0.027 
(2.47) 
0.016 
(1.15) 
Marking (hours) 0.004 
(0.74) 
-0.019 
(-4.01) 
-0.002 
(-0.23) 
-0.014 
(-3.12) 
-0.015 
(-2.47) 
0.001 
(0.27) 
-0.009 
(-1.46) 
-0.022 
(-2.62) 
Student counselling 
(hours) 
-0.010 
(-0.65) 
-0.002 
(-0.11) 
0.015 
(1.06) 
0.020 
(2.18) 
0.004 
(0.48) 
-0.013 
(-2.06) 
-0.002 
(-0.28) 
0.006 
(0.75) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.024 
(1.79) 
0.053 
(4.01) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
0.013 
(3.56) 
0.018 
(2.79) 
-0.002 
(-0.45) 
-0.008 
(-1.01) 
0.007 
(0.63) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
-0.021 
(-1.49) 
-0.029 
(-2.1) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
-0.009 
(-0.84) 
-0.008 
(-0.75) 
-0.003 
(-0.86) 
-0.011 
(-2.49) 
-0.005 
(-0.75) 
Interaction with 
parents (hours) 
-0.041 
(-1.63) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
0.019 
(0.79) 
-0.017 
(-1.09) 
-0.028 
(-1.85) 
0.002 
(0.21) 
0.003 
(0.34) 
-0.025 
(-1.41) 
  
204 
 
Extra-curricular 
activities (hours) 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
-0.007 
(-0.41) 
0.000 
(-0.14) 
0.016 
(1.92) 
0.004 
(1.49) 
0.013 
(1.51) 
0.007 
(0.52) 
Other (hours) 0.006 
(0.71) 
-0.014 
(-1.65) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
-0.013 
(-2.3) 
-0.001 
(-0.21) 
0.002 
(0.6) 
-0.007 
(-1.18) 
-0.002 
(-0.23) 
Female 0.062 
(1.34) 
0.111 
(2.8) 
0.274 
(3.99) 
-0.037 
(-0.67) 
0.020 
(0.46) 
-0.053 
(-1.49) 
-0.041 
(-0.96) 
0.143 
(1.85) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.132 
(1.43) 
-0.010 
(-0.15) 
0.062 
(0.67) 
0.044 
(0.67) 
-0.067 
(-0.85) 
-0.471 
(-4.47) 
0.227 
(1.38) 
-0.020 
(-0.31) 
Head teacher is 
female 
0.041 
(0.8) 
-0.103 
(-2.28) 
-0.157 
(-2.16) 
0.103 
(1.61) 
-0.031 
(-0.66) 
0.016 
(0.26) 
-0.053 
(-0.84) 
-0.030 
(-0.45) 
Is mentee 0.032 
(0.29) 
0.027 
(0.28) 
0.121 
(1.44) 
0.043 
(1.02) 
0.041 
(0.55) 
-0.010 
(-0.19) 
0.110 
(2.42) 
0.072 
(0.85) 
Is mentor 0.057 
(0.53) 
0.171 
(1.31) 
0.354 
(2.39) 
-0.050 
(-1.03) 
0.021 
(0.2) 
0.203 
(5.28) 
0.215 
(4.72) 
0.042 
(0.4) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.175 
(-3.13) 
-0.269 
(-2.91) 
-0.114 
(-1.28) 
-0.081 
(-1.49) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
-0.114 
(-2.17) 
-0.162 
(-2.51) 
0.042 
(0.51) 
 
 
Table A3.8 continued 
Variable Malaysia Mexico Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Serbia 
Constant -3.692 
(-6.56) 
-3.719 
(-13.24) 
-3.435 
(-5.78) 
-4.254 
(-9.04) 
-2.986 
(-9.16) 
-3.261 
(-8.85) 
-4.317 
(-12.45) 
-3.785 
(-12.95) 
Distributed 
Leadership 
Index 
0.018 
(1.1) 
0.017 
(1.87) 
0.026 
(1.49) 
0.074 
(2.2) 
-0.003 
(-0.21) 
-0.003 
(-0.18) 
0.025 
(2.17) 
0.000 
(-0.01) 
Instructional 
Leadership 
Index 
0.008 
(0.47) 
-0.014 
(-1.16) 
-0.007 
(-0.36) 
-0.015 
(-0.83) 
-0.019 
(-1.17) 
-0.026 
(-1.94) 
-0.008 
(-0.59) 
-0.004 
(-0.23) 
Teacher 
Administrative 
Support 
Personnel 
Ratio 
-0.016 
(-1.61) 
-0.001 
(-0.28) 
0.015 
(1.1) 
0.003 
(0.25) 
0.004 
(0.65) 
-0.010 
(-1.05) 
0.000 
(-0.00) 
0.002 
(0.37) 
Teacher 
cooperates with 
colleagues 
0.055 
(5.12) 
0.071 
(7.58) 
0.095 
(4.11) 
0.113 
(6.72) 
0.048 
(2.73) 
0.066 
(4.91) 
0.057 
(4.25) 
0.093 
(9.89) 
Teacher 
Pedagogical 
Support 
Personnel 
Ratio 
0.000 
(-0.57) 
0.003 
(1.98) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.003 
(0.69) 
0.007 
(3.16) 
-0.001 
(-0.69) 
0.001 
(0.99) 
0.001 
(1.18) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.166 
(13.13) 
0.134 
(9.63) 
0.183 
(9.74) 
0.126 
(6.19) 
0.133 
(8.93) 
0.129 
(9.25) 
0.138 
(7.04) 
0.151 
(12.64) 
Teacher’s age 0.003 
(0.72) 
0.001 
(0.25) 
-0.004 
(-0.85) 
0.009 
(3.14) 
0.003 
(0.7) 
0.010 
(2.62) 
-0.007 
(-1.33) 
0.001 
(0.44) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.006 
(1.63) 
0.008 
(2.58) 
0.007 
(1.64) 
0.006 
(1.49) 
0.003 
(0.69) 
0.016 
(3.98) 
0.006 
(2.07) 
0.003 
(1.15) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.003 
(-0.69) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
-0.009 
(-1.55) 
-0.011 
(-2.43) 
-0.004 
(-0.73) 
-0.014 
(-3.16) 
0.009 
(1.55) 
0.004 
(1.22) 
Face-to-face 
teaching 
(hours) 
0.000 
(-0.15) 
-0.002 
(-1.04) 
-0.006 
(-0.98) 
-0.016 
(-3.05) 
0.000 
(0.12) 
-0.004 
(-1.22) 
-0.005 
(-1.4) 
-0.004 
(-1.87) 
Planning 
(hours) 
-0.006 
(-1.37) 
0.002 
(0.42) 
0.005 
(0.76) 
-0.004 
(-0.76) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
-0.001 
(-0.31) 
-0.004 
(-1.04) 
0.005 
(1.21) 
Team work 
(hours) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
-0.020 
(-1.35) 
-0.008 
(-0.47) 
-0.014 
(-1.08) 
-0.016 
(-2.55) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.08) 
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Marking 
(hours) 
-0.005 
(-1.09) 
0.004 
(1.08) 
-0.013 
(-1.74) 
-0.008 
(-1.93) 
-0.012 
(-2.15) 
-0.003 
(-1.02) 
-0.012 
(-1.29) 
-0.012 
(-2.12) 
Student 
counselling 
(hours) 
-0.003 
(-0.36) 
-0.009 
(-1.69) 
0.008 
(0.49) 
-0.014 
(-1.35) 
0.025 
(2.76) 
0.020 
(2.26) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.006 
(0.73) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.004 
(0.72) 
-0.003 
(-0.41) 
0.000 
(-0.04) 
-0.003 
(-0.49) 
0.010 
(1.52) 
0.007 
(2.03) 
0.007 
(0.8) 
0.001 
(0.12) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.007 
(-1.01) 
-0.027 
(-1.46) 
-0.013 
(-1.93) 
-0.023 
(-2.15) 
-0.012 
(-1.75) 
0.002 
(0.2) 
-0.013 
(-1.22) 
Interaction 
with parents 
(hours) 
0.011 
(1.3) 
0.008 
(1.25) 
0.009 
(0.38) 
0.002 
(0.17) 
0.011 
(0.63) 
0.020 
(1.99) 
0.003 
(0.19) 
-0.008 
(-0.59) 
Extra-
curricular 
activities 
(hours) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
-0.003 
(-0.65) 
-0.026 
(-1.83) 
-0.009 
(-0.76) 
0.003 
(0.42) 
0.011 
(1.98) 
0.009 
(1.35) 
-0.006 
(-0.96) 
Other (hours) -0.005 
(-0.8) 
0.004 
(0.88) 
-0.004 
(-0.59) 
0.007 
(0.75) 
0.006 
(0.89) 
-0.002 
(-0.33) 
-0.009 
(-1.23) 
-0.006 
(-0.96) 
Female -0.025 
(-0.53) 
-0.016 
(-0.41) 
0.017 
(0.29) 
0.128 
(2.4) 
0.114 
(2.71) 
0.043 
(1.01) 
0.132 
(2.52) 
0.090 
(2.87) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.137 
(0.93) 
-0.006 
(-0.11) 
0.154 
(2.3) 
0.064 
(0.85) 
-0.030 
(-0.48) 
-0.112 
(-1.27) 
-0.075 
(-1.05) 
0.073 
(1.54) 
Head teacher is 
female 
-0.141 
(-2.64) 
0.021 
(0.42) 
-0.049 
(-0.61) 
-0.070 
(-0.88) 
-0.093 
(-2.02) 
-0.034 
(-0.66) 
0.088 
(1.62) 
-0.016 
(-0.37) 
Is mentee 0.062 
(1.39) 
0.033 
(0.53) 
0.081 
(1.02) 
0.038 
(0.55) 
0.151 
(2.95) 
0.054 
(0.73) 
-0.017 
(-0.23) 
-0.023 
(-0.5) 
Is mentor 0.106 
(2.94) 
0.026 
(0.48) 
-0.064 
(-0.97) 
0.305 
(2.09) 
0.124 
(2.07) 
0.143 
(1.71) 
0.121 
(1.7) 
0.134 
(1.79) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.511 
(-1.18) 
0.010 
(0.19) 
-0.243 
(-2.77) 
-0.246 
(-2.85) 
-0.234 
(-3.39) 
-0.036 
(-0.66) 
-0.085 
(-1.79) 
-0.356 
(-7.64) 
 
 
Table A3.8 continued 
Variable Singapore Slovak 
Republic 
Spain Sweden Abu 
Dhabi 
(UAE) 
Alberta 
(CAN) 
England 
(UK) 
Flanders 
(BEL) 
Constant -3.452 
(-10.27) 
-2.964 
(-7.81) 
-3.197 
(-10.52) 
-3.169 
(-8.38) 
-4.854 
(-8.34) 
-2.570 
(-7.67) 
-3.454 
(-9.8) 
-2.618 
(-7.96) 
Distributed 
Leadership 
Index 
0.035 
(2.57) 
0.015 
(0.87) 
-0.013 
(-1.4) 
-0.002 
(-0.12) 
0.012 
(0.64) 
-0.007 
(-0.56) 
0.031 
(2.54) 
0.007 
(0.49) 
Instructional 
Leadership 
Index 
0.007 
(0.56) 
-0.023 
(-1.39) 
0.010 
(0.98) 
-0.013 
(-0.93) 
0.032 
(1.36) 
0.005 
(0.34) 
-0.014 
(-1.00) 
0.005 
(0.29) 
Teacher 
Administrativ
e Support 
Personnel 
Ratio 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
0.018 
(1.53) 
0.007 
(0.69) 
0.007 
(1.26) 
-0.020 
(-1.41) 
-0.018 
(-1.25) 
0.018 
(0.88) 
-0.003 
(-0.56) 
Teacher 
cooperates 
with 
colleagues 
0.098 
(8.34) 
0.074 
(5.8) 
0.090 
(5.59) 
0.113 
(8.03) 
0.052 
(4.06) 
0.089 
(5.26) 
0.113 
(9.67) 
0.062 
(3.22) 
Teacher 
Pedagogical 
Support 
Personnel 
Ratio 
0.004 
(2.94) 
-0.001 
(-0.62) 
0.000 
(-0.27) 
-0.002 
(-0.38) 
-0.003 
(-0.89) 
-0.004 
(-0.43) 
0.005 
(0.52) 
-0.001 
(-0.49) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.063 
(7.15) 
0.101 
(6.86) 
0.139 
(11.08) 
0.097 
(7.71) 
0.113 
(6.23) 
0.086 
(5.81) 
0.102 
(8.03) 
0.111 
(7.9) 
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Teacher’s age 0.015 
(3.92) 
0.011 
(2.8) 
0.002 
(0.42) 
0.009 
(3.15) 
0.018 
(3.36) 
0.005 
(1.16) 
-0.004 
(-1.05) 
0.005 
(1.6) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.010 
(2.55) 
-0.003 
(-1.01) 
0.015 
(5.35) 
0.002 
(0.75) 
0.002 
(0.29) 
0.017 
(3.29) 
0.001 
(0.33) 
0.008 
(1.73) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.002 
(-0.37) 
-0.009 
(-2.24) 
-0.015 
(-3.41) 
-0.010 
(-3.22) 
-0.006 
(-0.91) 
-0.008 
(-1.48) 
-0.001 
(-0.25) 
-0.011 
(-1.95) 
Face-to-face 
teaching 
(hours) 
-0.007 
(-2.83) 
-0.002 
(-0.67) 
-0.005 
(-1.51) 
-0.004 
(-1.04) 
0.003 
(0.98) 
-0.002 
(-0.57) 
-0.002 
(-0.7) 
-0.003 
(-0.95) 
Planning 
(hours) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.005 
(-1.21) 
-0.005 
(-1.13) 
-0.003 
(-0.74) 
-0.010 
(-1.63) 
-0.006 
(-1.14) 
-0.002 
(-0.33) 
-0.007 
(-1.71) 
Team work 
(hours) 
-0.004 
(-0.53) 
0.002 
(0.14) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
0.017 
(1.81) 
0.014 
(1.45) 
0.004 
(0.45) 
0.004 
(0.54) 
-0.020 
(-1.65) 
Marking 
(hours) 
-0.012 
(-3.8) 
-0.002 
(-0.33) 
0.000 
(0.07) 
-0.020 
(-3.42) 
-0.004 
(-0.63) 
-0.005 
(-0.95) 
-0.024 
(-4.73) 
-0.020 
(-3.67) 
Student 
counselling 
(hours) 
0.015 
(1.67) 
-0.016 
(-1.63) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.29) 
-0.013 
(-1.84) 
-0.006 
(-1.3) 
0.023 
(2.44) 
-0.016 
(-1.39) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.010 
(1.75) 
0.017 
(2.99) 
0.022 
(4.11) 
0.013 
(1.45) 
-0.004 
(-0.51) 
-0.002 
(-0.3) 
0.012 
(2.57) 
0.029 
(2.66) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
-0.007 
(-1.77) 
-0.002 
(-0.2) 
-0.032 
(-3.68) 
-0.022 
(-4.51) 
-0.006 
(-0.7) 
-0.007 
(-0.73) 
-0.024 
(-3.89) 
-0.034 
(-3.75) 
Interaction 
with parents 
(hours) 
-0.025 
(-1.7) 
0.016 
(0.84) 
0.030 
(1.72) 
-0.027 
(-2.3) 
-0.009 
(-0.9) 
-0.004 
(-0.23) 
0.018 
(1.01) 
0.011 
(0.56) 
Extra-
curricular 
activities 
(hours) 
-0.004 
(-0.64) 
0.004 
(0.46) 
0.012 
(2.02) 
0.038 
(2.74) 
0.001 
(0.15) 
0.006 
(0.96) 
0.002 
(0.31) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
Other (hours) -0.012 
(-2.53) 
0.000 
(-0.07) 
-0.013 
(-2.34) 
-0.016 
(-2.28) 
-0.002 
(-0.32) 
-0.020 
(-2.44) 
-0.008 
(-1.45) 
-0.010 
(-1.56) 
Female 0.004 
(0.09) 
0.082 
(1.54) 
0.111 
(3.34) 
0.158 
(4.2) 
-0.089 
(-1.41) 
0.004 
(0.08) 
0.010 
(0.24) 
0.064 
(1.46) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.114 
(1.56) 
-0.163 
(-2.22) 
-0.027 
(-0.4) 
0.074 
(1.54) 
0.077 
(0.52) 
-0.100 
(-1.27) 
0.098 
(1.27) 
0.163 
(2.8) 
Head teacher 
is female 
-0.072 
(-1.68) 
-0.057 
(-1.16) 
-0.035 
(-0.76) 
-0.029 
(-0.5) 
-0.067 
(-0.8) 
-0.079 
(-1.2) 
-0.078 
(-1.39) 
-0.114 
(-2.07) 
Is mentee -0.010 
(-0.24) 
0.022 
(0.33) 
-0.067 
(-0.93) 
0.248 
(3.04) 
-0.034 
(-0.62) 
0.115 
(1.99) 
-0.029 
(-0.65) 
0.095 
(1.42) 
Is mentor 0.308 
(7.51) 
0.040 
(0.52) 
-0.135 
(-1.22) 
0.384 
(3.49) 
0.027 
(0.57) 
0.142 
(1.91) 
0.163 
(2.8) 
0.162 
(2.19) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.269 
(-4.91) 
-0.179 
(-3.25) 
-0.136 
(-2.56) 
-0.252 
(-4.01) 
-0.153 
(-2.64) 
-0.337 
(-4.26) 
-0.082 
(-0.96) 
-0.302 
(-4.66) 
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Table A3.9: Chapter 3 – model 4 (different activities) 
Variable  Australia Brazil Bulgaria Chile Croatia Czech 
Republic 
Denmar
k 
Estonia 
Constant -3.087 
(-12.65) 
-2.825 
(-20.1) 
-3.375 
(-12.56) 
-2.931 
(-10.00) 
-4.016 
(-21.62) 
-2.541 
(-11.66) 
-3.244 
(-9.22) 
-2.807 
(-12.36) 
Cooperation with 
colleagues index 
0.083 
(6.3) 
0.062 
(8.18) 
0.041 
(3.07) 
0.079 
(6.97) 
0.101 
(7.47) 
0.082 
(5.93) 
0.048 
(2.66) 
0.086 
(6.4) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.085 
(5.71) 
0.098 
(9.75) 
0.129 
(8.14) 
0.077 
(4.34) 
0.162 
(12.07) 
0.121 
(7.34) 
0.136 
(6.36) 
0.079 
(6.24) 
Teacher’s age 0.007 
(1.63) 
0.005 
(2.71) 
0.000 
(-0.02) 
0.010 
(2.09) 
0.006 
(2.37) 
0.001 
(0.36) 
0.006 
(1.3) 
0.004 
(1.78) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.006 
(1.07) 
-0.001 
(-0.34) 
-0.003 
(-1.12) 
0.002 
(0.41) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(1.06) 
0.007 
(1.56) 
-0.002 
(-0.86) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.011 
(-2.89) 
0.001 
(0.56) 
0.002 
(0.6) 
-0.004 
(-0.79) 
-0.001 
(-0.21) 
-0.007 
(-2.01) 
-0.011 
(-2.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.34) 
Face-to-face 
teaching (hours) 
-0.007 
(-2.55) 
-0.002 
(-2.17) 
0.000 
(0.14) 
-0.002 
(-0.67) 
-0.001 
(-0.4) 
-0.013 
(-3.32) 
-0.022 
(-4.37) 
-0.009 
(-3.51) 
Planning (hours) -0.004 
(-0.71) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.007 
(1.7) 
0.009 
(2.22) 
0.000 
(0.16) 
-0.002 
(-0.43) 
0.004 
(0.69) 
-0.001 
(-0.27) 
Team work 
(hours) 
0.001 
(0.18) 
0.006 
(1.72) 
0.008 
(0.77) 
0.011 
(0.79) 
0.002 
(0.17) 
-0.023 
(-1.6) 
0.000 
(-0.03) 
0.003 
(0.3) 
Marking (hours) -0.010 
(-1.99) 
-0.003 
(-0.96) 
-0.021 
(-3.23) 
-0.005 
(-0.61) 
-0.012 
(-1.91) 
-0.013 
(-1.88) 
-0.007 
(-0.94) 
-0.019 
(-2.92) 
Student 
counselling 
(hours) 
-0.005 
(-0.6) 
-0.004 
(-1.14) 
-0.017 
(-1.33) 
-0.008 
(-0.78) 
-0.023 
(-2.06) 
0.011 
(1.08) 
-0.010 
(-0.9) 
0.004 
(0.44) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.009 
(1.91) 
0.007 
(2.14) 
0.009 
(1.17) 
0.009 
(1.05) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
0.015 
(2.3) 
0.003 
(0.31) 
0.007 
(1.02) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
-0.002 
(-0.31) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
-0.010 
(-1.12) 
0.005 
(0.44) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.002 
(0.33) 
-0.022 
(-1.92) 
-0.013 
(-1.52) 
Interaction with 
parents (hours) 
-0.025 
(-1.35) 
0.008 
(1.19) 
0.007 
(0.56) 
-0.015 
(-0.88) 
0.001 
(0.08) 
0.005 
(0.28) 
-0.006 
(-0.62) 
0.012 
(0.66) 
Extra-curricular 
activities (hours) 
0.005 
(0.65) 
0.000 
(-0.09) 
0.007 
(0.96) 
0.019 
(1.99) 
0.009 
(1.47) 
0.013 
(2.00) 
0.004 
(0.49) 
0.015 
(2.1) 
Other (hours) -0.009 
(-1.14) 
-0.002 
(-0.65) 
0.000 
(-0.04) 
-0.015 
(-1.99) 
-0.001 
(-0.16) 
-0.009 
(-1.34) 
-0.003 
(-0.42) 
0.003 
(0.41) 
Female 0.033 
(0.45) 
0.013 
(0.46) 
-0.038 
(-0.75) 
0.116 
(2.14) 
0.179 
(4.85) 
0.146 
(3.03) 
0.059 
(1.17) 
0.063 
(1.25) 
Full-time 
employment 
-0.068 
(-0.63) 
0.033 
(1.23) 
-0.063 
(-0.69) 
0.110 
(1.63) 
-0.066 
(-1.12) 
-0.021 
(-0.38) 
0.166 
(1.94) 
0.104 
(2.32) 
Is mentee -0.027 
(-0.37) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
0.061 
(0.81) 
0.115 
(0.98) 
0.010 
(0.2) 
0.131 
(2.00) 
-0.027 
(-0.37) 
0.062 
(0.95) 
Is mentor 0.312 
(4.56) 
0.067 
(2.13) 
0.202 
(2.92) 
0.047 
(0.42) 
0.261 
(3.48) 
0.142 
(1.53) 
0.029 
(0.19) 
-0.030 
(-0.27) 
Permanent 
contract 
0.045 
(0.47) 
-0.112 
(-2.99) 
-0.196 
(-2.66) 
-0.135 
(-1.79) 
-0.037 
(-0.57) 
-0.129 
(-2.09) 
0.106 
(0.8) 
-0.041 
(-0.74) 
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Table A3.9 continued 
Variable  Finland France Iceland Israel Italy Japan Korea Latvia 
Constant -2.862 
(-13.22) 
-3.438 
(-10.55) 
-2.568 
(-7.5) 
-3.570 
(-14.95) 
-2.841 
(-8.88) 
-2.071 
(-7.43) 
-2.426 
(-6.08) 
-2.853 
(-9.17) 
Cooperation with 
colleagues index 
0.055 
(3.99) 
0.107 
(5.8) 
0.091 
(4.52) 
0.069 
(3.38) 
0.077 
(5.39) 
0.073 
(5.23) 
0.029 
(2.23) 
0.081 
(4.52) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.132 
(12.64) 
0.128 
(8.11) 
0.062 
(3.32) 
0.123 
(9.66) 
0.132 
(8.87) 
0.112 
(8.23) 
0.094 
(9.26) 
0.091 
(4.19) 
Teacher’s age 0.001 
(0.23) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
0.008 
(1.62) 
0.014 
(3.67) 
-0.011 
(-2.72) 
0.005 
(1.35) 
-0.005 
(-0.92) 
0.005 
(1.26) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.001 
(0.36) 
0.009 
(2.21) 
-0.004 
(-0.81) 
-0.003 
(-0.83) 
0.006 
(1.94) 
-0.002 
(-0.53) 
-0.014 
(-2.93) 
-0.001 
(-0.41) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.004 
(-0.97) 
-0.009 
(-1.63) 
-0.007 
(-1.37) 
-0.005 
(-1.15) 
0.004 
(0.92) 
-0.010 
(-2.5) 
0.000 
(-0.04) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
Face-to-face 
teaching (hours) 
0.005 
(1.63) 
0.013 
(2.5) 
-0.005 
(-0.86) 
0.002 
(0.64) 
-0.004 
(-0.64) 
-0.003 
(-0.81) 
-0.005 
(-1.7) 
-0.004 
(-1.76) 
Planning (hours) -0.013 
(-2.32) 
-0.006 
(-1.63) 
-0.009 
(-1.68) 
0.002 
(0.38) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.002 
(-0.53) 
-0.005 
(-1.27) 
0.000 
(-0.09) 
Team work 
(hours) 
0.005 
(0.33) 
0.014 
(1.09) 
-0.017 
(-1.12) 
0.015 
(1.43) 
0.000 
(-0.05) 
0.008 
(1.73) 
0.024 
(1.87) 
0.003 
(0.3) 
Marking (hours) 0.003 
(0.45) 
-0.019 
(-4.01) 
-0.005 
(-0.56) 
-0.014 
(-2.89) 
-0.014 
(-2.21) 
0.003 
(0.62) 
-0.008 
(-1.13) 
-0.017 
(-2.09) 
Student 
counselling 
(hours) 
-0.008 
(-0.51) 
-0.002 
(-0.1) 
0.005 
(0.35) 
0.002 
(0.18) 
0.002 
(0.31) 
-0.008 
(-1.31) 
-0.003 
(-0.51) 
0.007 
(0.87) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.015 
(1.15) 
0.048 
(3.14) 
-0.001 
(-0.2) 
0.011 
(2.53) 
0.019 
(2.28) 
-0.002 
(-0.53) 
-0.010 
(-0.99) 
0.008 
(0.76) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
-0.016 
(-1.02) 
-0.025 
(-1.76) 
0.004 
(0.3) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
0.005 
(0.44) 
-0.002 
(-0.83) 
-0.011 
(-2.05) 
-0.004 
(-0.57) 
Interaction with 
parents (hours) 
-0.024 
(-0.9) 
0.008 
(0.44) 
0.022 
(1.12) 
0.004 
(0.22) 
-0.044 
(-2.64) 
0.010 
(0.82) 
0.009 
(0.89) 
-0.026 
(-1.73) 
Extra-curricular 
activities (hours) 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.14) 
-0.011 
(-0.68) 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
0.009 
(0.91) 
0.005 
(1.83) 
0.005 
(0.42) 
0.021 
(1.89) 
Other (hours) 0.000 
(0.00) 
-0.015 
(-1.89) 
-0.007 
(-0.72) 
-0.006 
(-1.26) 
-0.006 
(-0.74) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
-0.012 
(-1.87) 
0.004 
(0.43) 
Female 0.086 
(2.18) 
0.166 
(3.67) 
0.187 
(2.89) 
-0.046 
(-0.79) 
-0.006 
(-0.13) 
-0.052 
(-1.41) 
-0.007 
(-0.15) 
0.129 
(1.74) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.027 
(0.3) 
0.007 
(0.11) 
0.048 
(0.49) 
0.022 
(0.33) 
-0.046 
(-0.57) 
-0.596 
(-5.85) 
0.280 
(1.03) 
-0.042 
(-0.67) 
Is mentee 0.120 
(1.28) 
0.056 
(0.61) 
0.035 
(0.39) 
-0.004 
(-0.08) 
-0.010 
(-0.12) 
0.049 
(0.97) 
0.110 
(2.18) 
0.020 
(0.24) 
Is mentor 0.086 
(0.82) 
0.203 
(1.7) 
0.373 
(2.62) 
-0.019 
(-0.35) 
0.127 
(1.00) 
0.146 
(3.54) 
0.182 
(3.54) 
0.179 
(1.82) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.155 
(-3.1) 
-0.234 
(-2.67) 
-0.066 
(-0.68) 
-0.106 
(-1.82) 
-0.025 
(-0.37) 
-0.126 
(-2.39) 
-0.193 
(-2.62) 
0.010 
(0.12) 
 
 
  
  
209 
 
Table A3.9 continued 
Variable  Malaysia Mexico Netherlands Norway Poland Portugal Romania Serbia 
Constant -3.429 
(-6.29) 
-3.473 
(-14.41) 
-2.690 
(-5.99) 
-3.187 
(-11.77) 
-3.093 
(-13.07) 
-3.703 
(-14.95) 
-4.023 
(-13.06) 
-3.850 
(-20.9) 
Cooperation 
with 
colleagues 
index 
0.056 
(4.78) 
0.057 
(6.12) 
0.069 
(2.41) 
0.089 
(5.32) 
0.053 
(3.02) 
0.066 
(5.73) 
0.044 
(3.34) 
0.096 
(9.17) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.153 
(10.96) 
0.131 
(9.2) 
0.196 
(7.5) 
0.118 
(5.28) 
0.123 
(7.81) 
0.126 
(8.35) 
0.144 
(7.67) 
0.150 
(11.76) 
Teacher’s age 0.000 
(-0.05) 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
-0.003 
(-0.63) 
0.013 
(4.17) 
0.004 
(0.77) 
0.010 
(2.16) 
-0.005 
(-1.21) 
0.002 
(0.75) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.007 
(1.73) 
0.006 
(1.67) 
0.006 
(1.43) 
0.003 
(0.81) 
0.003 
(0.71) 
0.012 
(2.96) 
0.005 
(1.71) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.001 
(-0.17) 
-0.002 
(-0.55) 
-0.011 
(-2.4) 
-0.013 
(-2.98) 
-0.005 
(-0.81) 
-0.010 
(-2.36) 
0.008 
(1.55) 
0.005 
(1.65) 
Face-to-face 
teaching 
(hours) 
0.000 
(0.18) 
-0.001 
(-0.61) 
-0.005 
(-0.92) 
-0.020 
(-3.58) 
-0.002 
(-0.33) 
-0.006 
(-1.96) 
-0.005 
(-1.5) 
-0.001 
(-0.7) 
Planning 
(hours) 
-0.004 
(-0.89) 
-0.003 
(-0.74) 
-0.002 
(-0.29) 
-0.005 
(-1.03) 
-0.002 
(-0.24) 
-0.004 
(-0.99) 
-0.003 
(-0.7) 
0.001 
(0.31) 
Team work 
(hours) 
0.006 
(0.68) 
0.006 
(0.68) 
-0.026 
(-1.76) 
-0.005 
(-0.37) 
-0.017 
(-1.41) 
-0.010 
(-1.55) 
0.000 
(-0.00) 
0.002 
(0.33) 
Marking 
(hours) 
-0.005 
(-1.01) 
0.004 
(1.05) 
-0.021 
(-2.96) 
-0.011 
(-2.49) 
-0.008 
(-1.48) 
-0.005 
(-2.00) 
-0.017 
(-1.84) 
-0.008 
(-1.27) 
Student 
counselling 
(hours) 
-0.006 
(-0.58) 
-0.005 
(-1.09) 
0.016 
(1.2) 
-0.015 
(-1.32) 
0.019 
(2.18) 
0.018 
(2.33) 
0.011 
(1.05) 
0.008 
(1.03) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.006 
(1.05) 
0.001 
(0.21) 
-0.003 
(-0.38) 
-0.003 
(-0.54) 
0.013 
(1.92) 
0.009 
(2.3) 
0.010 
(1.29) 
0.010 
(0.94) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
-0.001 
(-0.15) 
-0.008 
(-1.24) 
-0.013 
(-0.65) 
-0.012 
(-1.47) 
-0.028 
(-2.21) 
-0.006 
(-0.86) 
0.009 
(0.66) 
-0.013 
(-1.4) 
Interaction 
with parents 
(hours) 
0.002 
(0.19) 
0.008 
(1.26) 
0.018 
(0.65) 
-0.004 
(-0.27) 
0.042 
(1.99) 
0.018 
(2.00) 
0.004 
(0.21) 
-0.009 
(-0.59) 
Extra-
curricular 
activities 
(hours) 
-0.002 
(-0.43) 
-0.002 
(-0.53) 
-0.023 
(-2.19) 
-0.011 
(-0.85) 
-0.001 
(-0.11) 
0.005 
(0.89) 
0.009 
(1.31) 
-0.005 
(-0.91) 
Other (hours) -0.001 
(-0.18) 
0.007 
(1.69) 
-0.006 
(-0.88) 
0.013 
(1.39) 
0.012 
(1.91) 
-0.006 
(-1.04) 
-0.018 
(-2.51) 
-0.006 
(-0.94) 
Female 0.000 
(0.01) 
-0.008 
(-0.18) 
-0.027 
(-0.39) 
0.153 
(3.04) 
0.094 
(2.02) 
0.110 
(2.8) 
0.156 
(3.07) 
0.063 
(2.04) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.100 
(0.7) 
0.016 
(0.32) 
0.174 
(2.18) 
0.079 
(1.21) 
0.045 
(0.67) 
-0.014 
(-0.17) 
-0.088 
(-1.15) 
0.020 
(0.44) 
Is mentee 0.072 
(1.48) 
0.005 
(0.09) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.041 
(0.68) 
0.129 
(2.32) 
0.019 
(0.26) 
-0.035 
(-0.54) 
-0.019 
(-0.38) 
Is mentor 0.095 
(2.44) 
0.046 
(0.78) 
-0.081 
(-1.05) 
0.269 
(1.85) 
0.129 
(2.04) 
0.173 
(2.2) 
0.110 
(1.77) 
0.142 
(2.00) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.336 
(-0.74) 
0.054 
(1.11) 
-0.349 
(-3.8) 
-0.211 
(-2.23) 
-0.266 
(-3.78) 
-0.041 
(-0.81) 
-0.137 
(-2.91) 
-0.379 
(-8.44) 
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Table A3.9 continued 
Variable  Singapore Slovak 
Republic 
Spain Sweden Abu 
Dhabi 
(UAE) 
Alberta 
(Canada) 
England 
(UK) 
Flanders 
(BEL) 
Constant -2.923 
(-12.03) 
-2.927 
(-11.2) 
-3.094 
(-10.51) 
-3.160 
(-11.41) 
-4.033 
(-13.51) 
-2.599 
(-8.79) 
-3.026 
(-11.51) 
-2.475 
(-9.14) 
Cooperation 
with colleagues 
index 
0.094 
(7.53) 
0.061 
(4.85) 
0.103 
(5.85) 
0.123 
(8.12) 
0.067 
(7.16) 
0.086 
(4.94) 
0.116 
(9.7) 
0.068 
(3.46) 
Teacher’s self-
efficacy 
0.068 
(8.07) 
0.106 
(7.15) 
0.126 
(9.38) 
0.094 
(6.83) 
0.097 
(6.36) 
0.070 
(4.54) 
0.105 
(7.16) 
0.104 
(7.35) 
Teacher’s age 0.014 
(3.61) 
0.012 
(3.21) 
0.002 
(0.54) 
0.009 
(3.41) 
0.012 
(2.64) 
0.002 
(0.36) 
-0.005 
(-1.21) 
0.009 
(3.04) 
Experience at 
current school 
0.011 
(2.72) 
-0.002 
(-0.63) 
0.006 
(1.81) 
0.003 
(0.91) 
0.002 
(0.38) 
0.011 
(2.44) 
-0.002 
(-0.38) 
0.003 
(0.82) 
Total teaching 
experience 
-0.003 
(-0.6) 
-0.009 
(-2.26) 
-0.011 
(-2.22) 
-0.011 
(-3.9) 
0.001 
(0.24) 
-0.003 
(-0.53) 
0.003 
(0.56) 
-0.012 
(-2.8) 
Face-to-face 
teaching 
(hours) 
-0.006 
(-2.34) 
-0.004 
(-1.47) 
-0.009 
(-2.45) 
-0.003 
(-0.69) 
-0.001 
(-0.47) 
-0.001 
(-0.3) 
-0.002 
(-0.59) 
-0.003 
(-0.87) 
Planning 
(hours) 
0.000 
(0.18) 
-0.005 
(-1.07) 
-0.005 
(-1.13) 
-0.004 
(-0.75) 
-0.006 
(-1.57) 
-0.008 
(-1.5) 
-0.002 
(-0.52) 
-0.007 
(-1.63) 
Team work 
(hours) 
-0.005 
(-0.73) 
0.004 
(0.38) 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
0.011 
(1.11) 
0.010 
(1.18) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.002 
(-0.24) 
-0.010 
(-0.81) 
Marking 
(hours) 
-0.009 
(-3.25) 
-0.009 
(-1.29) 
-0.003 
(-0.9) 
-0.025 
(-4.24) 
-0.006 
(-0.95) 
-0.002 
(-0.38) 
-0.022 
(-4.31) 
-0.022 
(-3.97) 
Student 
counselling 
(hours) 
0.014 
(1.54) 
-0.017 
(-1.98) 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
0.005 
(0.71) 
0.002 
(0.37) 
-0.004 
(-0.66) 
0.020 
(2.3) 
-0.024 
(-2.09) 
School 
management 
(hours) 
0.008 
(1.24) 
0.021 
(3.31) 
0.022 
(4.04) 
0.010 
(0.92) 
0.003 
(0.4) 
0.001 
(0.27) 
0.015 
(2.67) 
0.025 
(2.34) 
Admin duties 
(hours) 
-0.006 
(-1.53) 
-0.002 
(-0.29) 
-0.025 
(-2.93) 
-0.019 
(-3.25) 
-0.004 
(-0.68) 
-0.005 
(-0.57) 
-0.016 
(-2.51) 
-0.033 
(-3.42) 
Interaction 
with parents 
(hours) 
-0.019 
(-1.22) 
0.009 
(0.5) 
0.033 
(1.93) 
-0.017 
(-1.62) 
-0.001 
(-0.18) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
0.000 
(-0.01) 
0.028 
(1.49) 
Extra-
curricular 
activities 
(hours) 
-0.006 
(-0.96) 
0.004 
(0.49) 
0.007 
(1.6) 
0.020 
(1.39) 
0.000 
(-0.01) 
0.010 
(1.39) 
-0.003 
(-0.5) 
-0.009 
(-0.97) 
Other (hours) -0.010 
(-2.27) 
-0.002 
(-0.33) 
-0.011 
(-1.81) 
-0.017 
(-2.31) 
-0.006 
(-0.9) 
-0.019 
(-2.31) 
-0.007 
(-1.32) 
-0.011 
(-1.61) 
Female -0.009 
(-0.21) 
0.108 
(2.15) 
0.133 
(3.36) 
0.161 
(4.15) 
0.069 
(1.02) 
0.031 
(0.54) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.076 
(1.61) 
Full-time 
employment 
0.143 
(1.91) 
-0.141 
(-1.91) 
0.131 
(1.77) 
0.080 
(1.7) 
-0.056 
(-0.41) 
-0.064 
(-0.85) 
0.100 
(1.05) 
0.170 
(2.78) 
Is mentee 0.028 
(0.69) 
0.051 
(0.77) 
-0.107 
(-1.45) 
0.333 
(4.13) 
-0.002 
(-0.04) 
0.098 
(1.63) 
-0.042 
(-0.84) 
0.069 
(1.18) 
Is mentor 0.307 
(7.7) 
0.132 
(1.74) 
-0.111 
(-1.18) 
0.327 
(3.05) 
0.076 
(1.96) 
0.100 
(1.28) 
0.195 
(3.17) 
0.144 
(1.79) 
Permanent 
contract 
-0.254 
(-4.43) 
-0.178 
(-3.14) 
-0.136 
(-2.31) 
-0.252 
(-3.85) 
-0.104 
(-2.00) 
-0.399 
(-4.59) 
-0.104 
(-1.11) 
-0.280 
(-3.93) 
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Table A3.10: Chapter 3 – Model 3b (England)  
Variable Estimate 
Total workload -0.005 
(-3.01) 
Full-time employment 0.153 
(2.12) 
Permanent contract -0.101 
(-1.24) 
Female -0.023 
(-0.55) 
Is mentor 0.118 
(1.81) 
Is mentee 0.008 
(0.18) 
Teacher’s self-efficacy 0.114 
(11.3) 
Cooperation with 
colleagues index 
0.117 
(9.92) 
Head teacher is female -0.070 
(-1.19) 
Instructional Leadership 
Index 
-0.014 
(-1.08) 
Distributed Leadership 
Index 
0.025 
(1.94) 
Teacher pedagogical 
support staff ratio 
-0.000 
(-0.05) 
Head teacher’s age -0.003 
(-0.64) 
Teacher administrative 
staff ratio 
0.001 
(0.07) 
School size 0.000 
(1.59) 
Proportion of pupils 
receiving free school 
meals 
-0.002 
(-0.66) 
Average Key Stage 2 score 0.027 
(0.83) 
Proportion of pupils 
receiving 5 A*-C grades in 
their GCSE exam 
0.003 
(1.34) 
Independent school 0.193 
(2.11) 
Maintained School 0.022 
(0.36) 
Constant -3.399 
(-3.77) 
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Table A3.11: Chapter 3 – Model 4b (England) 
Variable Estimate 
Total workload -0.001 
(-0.69) 
Full-time employment 0.078 
(1.09) 
Permanent contract 0.035 
(0.54) 
Female 0.00 
(0.00) 
Is mentor 0.108 
(1.80) 
Is mentee -0.014 
(-0.29) 
Teacher’s self-efficacy 0.078 
(6.98) 
Cooperation with colleagues 
index 
0.041 
(3.54) 
Well-behaved pupils 0.383 
(6.56) 
Effective school management 0.306 
(3.67) 
School managers give clear 
vision and direction 
0.155 
(2.31) 
Insufficient autonomy -0.300 
(-5.46) 
Teachers are underpaid -0.042 
(-1.13) 
Own pay is fair given 
performance 
0.073 
(1.83) 
Unmanageable workload -0.323 
(-6.98) 
No additional pressure from 
accountability system 
0.092 
(1.33) 
Supportive parents 0.201 
(2.91) 
No additional workload from 
accountability system 
0.059 
(1.05) 
Scope to progress as a teacher 0.279 
(4.41) 
Scope to progress to leadership 
role 
0.080 
(1.63) 
Scope to progress to higher pay. 0.10 
(1.84) 
Constant -2.324 
(-14.33) 
 
 
 
